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PREFACE
In the Fall of I968,

the Peruvian government seized

the assets of International Petroleum Company, a wholly

owned subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
The move by the Peruvian military junta seemed out of keeping

with the traditional role of the Latin American military
establishments as defenders of the status quo and as friends
of the United States.

Military interventions in Latin Amer-

ica have traditionally been carried out to prevent change,

or to veto an unacceptable national election.

But the junta

which took power in Peru in early October seemed bent on
reform, and on a confrontation with American companies oper-

ating in Peru.
In undertaking this study,

I

originally planned to

analyze the military's seizure of Standard Oil's assets in
Peru,- hoping that such an analysis vrould shed some light on

the at:titudes of the

'=new

military.

During the course

of study, it became increasingly clear that the seizure

of International Petroleum Company property
to the actual coup of I968.

x-^as

incidental

At the same time, however,

the controversy surrounding the company in Peru proved sig-

nificant in a deeper sense than anticipated.

operation of

Ownership and

the La 3rea y Parinas oil fields becam.e a divi-

coastal
sive issue which split and weakened the Peruvian

government's
oligarchy, and undermined the United States

V

supportive role behind this ruling elite.

In undermining

the elite's cohesiveness as well as its good relationahip

with the United States, the I.P.C. controversy helped to
set the stage for the eventual military take over.
1968,

In

the Peruvian military argued, with a measure of

Justification, that the civilian leadership had proved itself incompetant in dealing with national problems.

la

Brea y Parinas was a long term problem tackled by several

generations of Peruvian leaders.

V/hile the I.P.C.

con-

troversy did not play a significant role as the immediate
cause of the I968 coup, at the same time, the International

Petroleum Company played a very important role in Peruvian
politics over a period of several decades.
In preparing this study,

the author wishes to acknow-

ledge the contribution of Professor Howard Wiarda, of the

University of Massachusetts, whose comments, suggestions
'c^nd

encouragement made the experience both enlightening

and enjoyable.

The Department of Political Science of

the University of Massachusetts provided a deeply appreciat

measure of financial assistance.
The management of International Petroleum Company

cooperatec to the fullest extent on this project by facili-

tating

ray

Florida,

research at the company's offices in Coral Gables
I

wish to thank in particular Mr. John Oldfield,

vi

and the other company executives who have chosen to remain

anonymous for personal reasons.

They all made generous

contributions of time and insight.

Former President of

Peru Fernando Belaunde Terry extended both his hospitality
and a marvelous first-hand account of the events of his
administration.

Mr.

Fernando Espinosa, former General

Manager of International Petroleum Company in Peru recounted his experiences in Peru frankly in a valuable
interview.
In addition,

I

acknowledge the cooperation of

General Pedro Ferndndez Baca, Director of Petroleos del
Peru, Mr.

Bruce Sever, Peru desk officer at the United

States Department of Commerce, and Dr. Alberto Ruiz
Eldredge, Ambassador of Peru to Brazil.

Finally, the

staffs of the National Archives and the Library of Congress

provided me with much of the

ravr

material of this study,

End their assistance was invaluable.
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INTRODUCTIOM
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
A multinational corporation can be defined as an

enterprise which does most of its business across national
boimdaries.

To narrow the definition,

the scholar can set

more definite criteria as to the proportion of business
done across boundary lines, and the volume of that business.

Typical multinational corporations such as Standard Oil
of New Jersey, Pfizer, Singer, or International Telephone

and Telegraph have at least half of their assets abroad,
and either do more than half of their marketing in, or get

more than half of their revenue from, countries other than
the United States.

1

The United States oil industry accounts for a larger

share of American investment abroad than any other industry.
In 1969* this investment totalled over twenty billion dollars,

and represented more than a quarter of all American foreign
direct Investment.

2

The oil industry is significant not

only because of its large scale, but because it is a pioneer
of vrhat has become an ever increasing trend for other

American industries to expand across national borders.
Galloway, "Multinational Enterprises as V/orld
Paper presented to the 66th Annual Meeting
Groups,"
Interest
of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles,
California, September 8-12, 1971. PP- ^-5^Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay- -The Multinational Spread
Enterprises (Mew York: Basic Books, 1971). P- 27.
Of' U.S

"^Jonathan F.

.
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Beginnins during the first decade of the 20th century,

American oil companies began buying producing and refining
facilities in the Third V/orld, including Latin America.
It was not until the I930

'

that other American industrial

s

groups began to move in the direction of establishing

manufacturing operations in Latin America.
Given the current conditions in Latin America, with

economic nationalism on the upswing in Chile, Peru and
Bolivia, American owned subsidiaries throughout Latin America

are bracing themselves for

vrhat

could be a very difficult

period characterized by official hostility from host country
governments.

VJith the

Alliance for Progress over, and the

after effects of the Cuban Revolution nearly forgotten, Latin
Americans have begun taking a closer took at economic problems, and more than ever, at the mushrooming role played

by multinational corporations in their economies.

Yet,

to

.

argue that Latin America is on the threshold of a wave of

nationalizations and open confrontations

vjith

American

economic interests might be as unfounded as the predictions
of continental upheaval made after the Cuban Revolution.

The problem of assessing the impact of the multinational

corporation on latin American socid}
life is a very complex one.

,

economic and political

Increasingly, ix^tin Americans

a
have taken the view that these corporations have played

-

IX

detrimental role in their national affairs.

A variety of

arguments— social, political, and economic--have been advanced
to support this point of vieiT.

On the sociological level, the American subsidiaries

have changed the ownership patterns in Latin America.

As

these enterprises move in and purchase or dominate industries,

they co-opt vihatever local entrepreneurial talent is available, thus transforming the national bourgeoisie into a

"transnational technocracy,

"

void of any legitimacy as a

national ruling class, according to Osvaldo Sunkel.
middle class is also affected;

The

part is incorporated into

the new economic structure and part is left out--ef f ectively

barred from upward mobility and terrified by the prospect
of proletarianization.

The working class is simply divided:

those few who find employment with the American subsidiary
companies become a privileged elite within the working class.
The balance of the labor force is

left to endure the pro-

blems of unemployment and marginal economic exi stance. This

division of the working class makes it difficult to organize
labor, and the corporate absorption of the local talent inter-

runts the nevelopment of a native entrepreneurial class
Consequently, national development along the lines histori-;

cally followed by Great Britain and the United States is

X

impossible.

The economic argument has been vrell articulated by
the Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Orlando

Letelier.

When asked x^hether the government of Salvador

Allende was frightening foreign capital away from Chile,
the Ambassador replied:
In ger.eral terms, we have been exDortin.-y
capital, not importing it.
between
1950 and 1967, 17 years, v^50 million
flowed into Chile as direct investments.
Mow deduct depreciation for such investments during that period, which the companies took back out of the coun.try, and
the net figure would be only ,?2^7 million.
In the same period, the outflow of profits
and dividends just on investments was
'31.056 billion, about four times the net
.

.

investment
.

The Chilean argument is probably valid for the rest of

Latin America.

From I96O to I968, there was a flow of

one billion dollars of fresh capital from the United States
to American owned subsidiaries in the under-developed world.
In that same period,

veloped

incoming capital

from,

the less de-

areas to the United States in the form of income

alone amounted to about 2.5 billion dollars.

The latter

a Latin
"3ig Business and Dependencia,
(-^pril,
No.
L,
1972),
A
ffairs
Foreirn
3
view,"
American
a
departure
iDoint
of
as
his
takes
Sunkel
pp. 517-^^31;
del
concentracion
''La
Furtajo,
Celso
by
similar argument
.America
en
prouecciones
sus
ulE.
UU.
los
y
Doder economico en
3-'-^
"
IIo.
(1963).
I,
Internacionales
Fstudios
Latina,
^Orlando Letelier, as intervievred by Boffrey Smith, "As They
See It, ExproTDriation: Why Do They Do It?" Forbes CVTII, i-Io. 1
(July 15, 1971). p. 3^.
-^Osvaldo Sunkel,

'

'

.

,

,

xi

figure is a rather conservative estimate, according to

economist Raymond Vernon, and if other factors such as

royalty payments were included, the difference between what
the United States sends to the Third V/orld and what it gets

from there would be even greater.-^

counter arguments;

However, there are

the United States Department of the.

Treasury suggests that there is more to the effects of
American foreign investment than the above figures indicate.
The Treasury Department holds that

x^rhen

an i\merican

subsidiary establishes producing facilities in a Latin

American nation, for example, a process knoxm as "import
substitution" takes place.

That is, products xjhich vrere

previously imported into that country are henceforth produced locally.

Given this import substitution, the obvious

advantage which the United States has in net capital flow
6

is minimized if not reversed.

This argument assumes that

import substitution would not have taken place xfithout the

presence of the American subsidiary company.

Furthermore,

in the case of extractive industries geared for exports,

there is only minimal import substitution.

For example,

Chile does net need to import copper, but then, Chile would
be imlikely to import copper in any quantity in any event.
•^Vernon,
^

Ibid

.

.

p.

pp.

172.

173-178.

xii

Related to the economic impact of multinational cor-

porations on the Latin American balance of payments is the

taxation problem.

Since corporate subsidiaries often con-

duct their transactions with other subsidiaries of the same

parent company, that parent company can arbitrarily choose
to show profit in a certain transaction and not another.

For example, if an oil company in Ecuador produces oil at
one dollar per barrel,

it could conceivably sell that oil

to another subsidiary of the same company at .pl.Ol;

the

profit margin reported to the host country would be minimal.
The subsidiary receiving the oil could then market it in
the United States or elsewhere at two dollars per barrel,

with a profit margin of nearly lOO/L

The host coimtry could

not tax the profit because the transaction took place outside
its national boundaries, between corporate entities over
which- it had no jurisdiction.

Latin Americans have grown increasingly suspicious of

multinational oil companies.

As they develop a more sophis-

ticated understanding of economic complexities, they arc

reassessing their relations

vjith

foreign companies.

This

reassessment has translated itself into more critical attitude
Latin Americans are no longer viewjng the foreign investment
in their comitries as an unqualified blessing bringing

Western capital and technology.

The role of the United States

xiii

in particular as an economic missionary bent on industrial-

izing the' Third V/orld has come into question.
The political impact of the multinational corporation
is even more complex than the sociological and economic

effects of such corporations, and the corresponding theories

are even more controversial.

The basic question raised is

whether multinational corporations intervene in the politics
of their host countries, and if they do, how far do they go?
Do such giants as Standard Oil of New Jersey or the Royal

Dutch Shell Company distort the precarious balance of

power which might exist within a relatively under-developed

nation?
Opinions range very widely.
in Oil

,

In his book Vlorld Crisis

Harvey O'Connor refered to Peru as Standard Oil's

province.

The thrust of his argument

vras

that Standard Oil

has dominated Peruvian politics in all matters affecting
7

A similar thesis has been advanced by

its own interests.'

8

a number of Peruvian political leaders.

Yet,

the spokesmen

for the oil industry flatly deny any meddling in the politics
of host countries by the oil companies.

national Affairs

.

Writing in Inter -

Geoffrey Chandler, Trade Relations
Nonthly

"^Harvey 0"'Jcnnor, vJorld Crisis in Oil (New York:
Review Press, I962), pp. 225-232.

j_o
^Alfonso Benavides Correa, El Petroleo Peruano.
Autopsia de un Clan " (Lima: Papel Grafica ^ditora, 190I)
Nacionalicemos el Petroleo.' (Lima:
Jose ilacedo riendoza,
Edi clones Hora del Hombre, I96O}.
.

,

xlv

Co-ordinator for Shell International Petroleum Company,

attempted to put to rest what he sees as the myth that oil
companies influence the politics of their host countries.
He stated that
if an affiliate of an international
group were to meddle in internal politics in order to serve its ovm ends,
this xjould amoujit at the least to folly
and at the most to suicide vrhich would
provoke no sympathy.^

Chandler suggested that the oil company is part of the

society within which it operates.
case to the fullest

,

'"but

The company will argue its

the strength of its argument will

rest on the economic factors it can adduce to encourage or
or discourage particular measures affecting itself.

"

He

finally dismissed the widely held suspicion that bribery
was an oil company technique on the groujids of inexpediency,
for "lasting marriages are not based on venal affection.

"'^'^

This utilitarian morality, to the extent that it
exists,

surely must be a relatively recent development.

Earlier in the century. Chandler's o\m employer. Royal Dutch
Shell apparently financed the illegal coup d'etat of Augusto

Leguia to a considerable degree.

The financial assistance

granted Leguia was no corporate philanthropy meant to aid

^Geoffrey Chandler, "The Myth of Oil Power, International
Groups and National Sovereignty. " International Affairs
,

XLVI, No.
""^Ibid.-,

^ (October,

pp.

718-719.

1970), p. 71?.

XV

Peru along the path to authoritarian bliss; rather, it was
a trade.

Royal Dutch Shell financed the coup, and in return

Leguia was to give that company favorable concessions in
Peru.

The record does show that this move on the part of

the multinational corporation was pure "folly,

"

for Leguia

got a better deal vjith Shell's competitor Standard Oil, and

being somexfhat less than trustworthy, he favored the American
company during his administration at the expense of Shell.
This incident merely proved that Shell was outmaneuvered
in Peru, and not that the technique used was inherently

inexpedient.

And in any case, to argue that political med-

dling and bribery is unxfise does not prove that it does not
take place.

Chandler's argument has limitations.

While generalizations about the size and recent growth
of multinational corporations abound both in studies and in
the press, the problem of actually defining their role in

various countries and their impact upon the political develop

ment of those countries is very difficult.

The impact of

a given multinational corporation on one country might be

considerably different from the effect of that same corporation on the country's next door neighbor.
subsidic^rj-

in Peru.

,

Standard Oil's

International Petroleum Jompany, was nationalized

However, its Colombian subsidiary

vjas

able to iron

out its difficulties with the Colombian government.

They

^^See the "Strictly Confidential (To be kept in locked files)
enclosure attached to a report by Carlton Jackson, U.S.

XV i

probably employed similar tactics in both countries, and it
was in fact represented by the same executive in both cases.
However, there were very different results.

Within two weeks of the nationalization of Standard
Oil of New Jersey's properties in Peru, a military junta

seized the assets of Gulf Oil Corporation in Bolivia.

'£ven

the most superficial analysis vrould show that Gulf's historic

role in Bolivia, and its position in that country did not

bear any resemblance to the position of International Petroleum Company in Peru.

Multinational corporations and their

host countries interact on a wide variety of levels.

It is

possible to make any number of theoretical assertions which
can then be supported by any number of examples

;

but given

the variety of multinational corporate experiences, any

number of mutually incompatible hypotheses may be supported.'
It is precisely because of this variety that it is

necessary to proceed cautiously.

One research technique

which yields particularly fruitful results is to examine

an industry or even a specific corporation and analyze its
impact on one or two countries.

Beginning with Department

of Commerce statistics on the largeness of multinational

corporations, and simply dravjing the conclusion that largeness

means involvement in host country politics is of little use
Trade Commissioner in Lima to the Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce, August 5. 1920. U.S. Department of State
Document iJo. 823-6363/32.

—

xvli

in illuminating the operations of multinational corporations.

The scholar must discern the types of involvement and the

impact upon different categories of countries.
,

The fact that corporation "A" is very large and powerful

and that it operates in country "X"

x^rhich

is small and under-

developed in itself tells us nothing about the relationship

between corporation "A" and coimtry "X".

It is possible

for corporation "A" to dominate the political system of the

host country, but perhaps the corporation's assets in the

country might not merit the time, effort and money iihich
such domination would entail.

Furthermore,

country "X"

might be v:eak in nearly every respect except in its ability
to deal with foreign capitalists.

In other words,

the rela-

tionship between any country and the foreign subsidiaries

which operate in its national territory is determined by

many variables, and not hy any global theory which postulates that foreign subsidiaries co-opt national elites
into a rootless and illegitimate "transnational technocracy.

National elites may be co-opted, but not necessarily

so.

The nature of the subsidiaries functioning in the country,

and the natioiial elite itself arc the factors which determine the rutcome of international coD^porate investment.
Moreover, it is not enough to study a particular indus-

try's operation in a country during a brief period of time.

'

xviii

Some corporations have operated a Latin American subsidiary
for many decades and their more current policies should be

placed in historical perspective.

It is quite possible

that instead of finding global theories to explain multi-

national corporations in the viorld today,

vre

might find an

historical theory which explains the existance of such enterprises and their impact in terras of predictable phases or
stages.

The objective of this study is to illuminate the

impact which a United States company as large and as powerful
as Standard Oil of New Jersey had on the politics of a rela-

tively feeble and under-developed country such as Peru.
How did a company which during the i960

'

s

had annual revenues

three times larger than Peru's gross national product operate
as a citizen of that country?

payroll

vias

Hovr

did

a.

company whose I969

about ZS% larger than the entire budget of the

government of Peru operate as a subject of that government?
The answer to these questions varied through the years of

I.P.C.'s stay.

The relationship of the company to the

government of Peru was shaped by many economic and political
factors vihich were essentially d3mamic.

i.'hat

factors molded

the nature of this economically unevon relationship?

What

generalizations can be made about the effect of large corporations on small or medium countries with limited industrial

xix

development?
Even though they were unevenly matched from a financial
point of view, in I968 the government of Peru dared to do
v;hat

generations of Peruvian political leaders had wished

to do for decades:

assets in Peru.

the military junta seized Standard Oil's

The road from the I910

'

s

to the 1960's

.v:as

a long one, and one from vrhich the student of politics

can gain valuable insights into a widespread phenomenon--

the coexistence of multinational corporate giants in the

midst of national pigmies

— pigmies,

however, whose internal

dynamics are changing and who are no longer willing to accept
their traditiona.l subservience to such giants.

1

CHAPTER

I

THE ORIGINS OF LA BREA Y PARINAS
The center of the conflict betireen International Pet-

roleum Company and the Government of Peru

vras

a very large

hacienda in Northwestern Peru--La Brea y Parinas.

Ownership

of the subsoil of that hacienda was in dispute vrell before

Standard Oil of New Jersey entered the Peruvian oil business,

and these problems of ownership remained to plague the com-

pany and the country until the late 1960's.

By I968, the

controversy had grown from the dispute over the hacienda alone
to all other properties and installations connected with
the refining, marketing and distribution of petroleum products

from that field.
In order to fully appreciate the nature of the conflict

between Standard Oil's subsidiary. International Petroleum
Company and the Government of Peru it is necessary to trace
the history of the dispute to its origins, and to follow its

development to the present.

V/ithout historical persepctive,

the actions of most of the Peruvians involved would seem

highly irrational, and understanding the causes of the apparent viciousness with which the political leaders of Peru

persecuted a beneficial, well-run and efficient company serving the petroleum needs of their country would be difficult,
if not impossible.

While historical perspective will not in

itself vouch for the rationality of Peruvian, policies during

2

the 1960's. it does Illuminate the sources
of their irritation with the oil company.
The inanasement of International Petroleum
Company foua;ht
desperately to preserve what they considered the
legitimate
role of their company in Peru.

That very struggle led them

to a deep involvement in the political process of
the country,

covering the whole

garnet of

political action, from veiled

international intrigue to the outright financial underrrriting
of cabinets and governments, from gentle private persuasion
of political leaders to heavily funded public relations cam-

paigns aimed at convincing the population at large of the
justice of their position.

The hacienda of La Brea y Parinas was plagued by ano-

malies from the time that Peru secured its independence.
Hence, the legal problems over the title to the soil and

subsoil existed for as long as the country has existed as

an independent republic.

It was to this early confusion

that International Petroleum Company and the Government of

Peru trace their arguments.
The extensive lands which are now called La Brea y

Parinas were first explored by a Spaniard around I629.
Captain Martin Alonzo Granadino, a resident of Paita,

acquired usage rights over the land in l6^2.

However, the

property belonged to the King imtil after sixty years of
possession, when in accordance with Spanish law, it finally

3

became private property.

Granadino's heir. Don Juan Benito

de las Heras. formally acquired the
title to the property
in 1689. Eventually, the land became the
property of the
Roman Catholic Convent of Belen through
Inheritance;
it

remained in the hands of the clerics during most
of the 18th
century and until I8I5. when usage rights were sold
to Don

Jose de la Lama for a period of I50 years.

By I830. the

convent was forced to close down, and de la Lama bought
the

property.
perty;

He no longer simply had usage rights to the pro-

he was then the complete owner of the hacienda, then

known as Mancora.
In accordance with Spanish customs and law, the subsoil
of the hacienda remained the property of the King.

The land

gave off surface emanations of a black substance alternatively
called brea or cope .

In Incas reportedly used the substance

to light up their pre-columbian ceremonies.

After the estab-

lishment of the colony, the Spanish Crown directly exploited
this mineral.

Brea

,

which was nothing more than petroleum,

was heated to evaporate the lighter elements.

The resulting

thick black substance, mineral pitch, was used by the Spanish
government to waterproof ships.

In 1735 the Crown decided

to lease this very primative mining operation to Montero de

Ugarte.

After two successive leases, the Spanish government

rented the property to Juan Cristobal de la Cruz in 1802.

With the achievement of independence in

182-^,

the mine

became the property of the Peruvian state, and in
order to
raise revenue to pay the public debc, the Peruvian Congress "
enacted a law directing the government to sell all kinds
of
state property.

This law, dated March 5, 1825, provided

"that all kinds of goods, haciendas, mines, houses and

whatever real estate or property which belonged to the State,
and of which the State might freely dispose of, be used to1

wards the liquidation of the public debt."

The law was

signed into effect by Simon Bolivar on March 9, 1825.

Soon thereafter, on September 22, 1826, the "pitch
mine" which up to that point had been the property of the
State, was sold to Antonio de la Quintana, in consideration

of a debt owed him.

The mine was valued at 2,695 pesos by

the government's assessor, but Quintana was vrilling to settle
his ^,96^ peso debt for the mine.

After the necessary legal

papen-rork was cleared, the sale was effectuated, and the Lima

government Issued a decree which stated in part that the

representatives of the State "take avray and separate the
State which they represent, from the operation, property

and dominion of the pitch mine of reference, which is given»

I
The entire text of the law was reproduced in a pamphlet issued
by the London and Pacific Petroleum Company in I916 and later
reissued by International Petroleum Company in I96O. Ilistoria
de La Erea ^ Parinas Articulos 2 Documentos Publicados en
191^pcr la London « Pacific Petroleuri Company , Ltd . (Lima;
International Petroleum Company, 1960}.
;

5

ceded, renounced to and passed on to the buyer.

2
.

Hardly four months had passed when Quintana sold the
mine
for an unspecified sum to Don Jose de la Lama, the
owner
the hacienda within which the mine was located.

of

From that

point, De la Lama owned both the surface— the Mancora hacienda,

and the Amotape mine

— the

subsoil.

De la Lama died in I850, and his property was divided

between his widow and his daughter.

The executors of the

estate decided to name the daughter's portion La Brea;

it

apparently contained the bulk of the Imown pitch deposits.
The widow's share was called Parinas.

In 18 57 , De la Lama's

widow died, and her daughter inherited her part of the estate.
Henceforth, the property was known not by its old name
but by a name which was carried down to the present

— Mancora,

— La

Brea

y Parinas.
Originally, the estate was larger than it was to be in
The hacienda stretched from

the 19th and 20th centuries.

the river Chira in the South to the river Tumbes in the
North, and from the Pacific Coast in the V^est to the foot-

hills of the Andes in the East
of the state of Delaware.

—an

area comparable to that

Through inheritance and partition,

the area was reduced considerably until it
fourth the original estate.

2

Ibid.

xras

about one-

During the 19th century, the

6

hacienda covered approximately

6^+3

square miles— an area

about half the state of New Hampshire.^

Lying on the

northern coast of Peru, the property covers terrain
which
can best be described as desert.
V/ater is available

only

from the outside, or from the sea via a desalination
plant.
Due to its remote location and the lack of lines
of communi-

cation with Lima. La Brea y Parinas was isolated not only
from the vjorld, but even from the country within which it
was located, during its early years.

Peru had no

lavrs

or ordinances covering or in any way

regulating mining from the time independence was proclaimed
on July 28, 1821 until 1824.

On June 22,

182^1-,

the Peruvian

Congress enacted a law declaring that all colonial ordinances
vrere

valid for the Republic.

The effect of this law was

to place mining under the concession system;

the State

owned the subsoil and gave exploitation rights to private

parties in exchange for a percentage of the minerals extracted

and/or profits obtained from the property--a roj'alty.

The

lavr

of 1925 which directed the executive to sell any state

property including mines was inconsistant with this long
established Spanish policy.

The present Peruvian military

government maintains that the original avrard to ciuintana was

illegal in so far as it was inconsistant with the Spanish
•^

Historical Resume of "la Brea ^ Parinas " (International
Petroleum Company ,'Tugust I967).
,

ordinances valid for Republican Peru.

However, that

conclusion seems unwarrented considering that the
Spanish
ordinances had validity only through the 1824
law.
What

the Peruvian Congress did in 1821+ could be freely
contradicted
or undone by that same Congress a year later.

In other

words, the sale to Quintana cannot be considered
"illegal"

on the grounds that it violated an

182^^ law,

when in fact,

it was carried out in accordance with another later
law

which would take precedence over the earlier one.
In 1859. Edwin Drake drilled the first oil well in

Titusville, Pennsylvania,

Four years later, on November 2,

1863, A, E. Prentice, an engineer working for the Campanfa

de Gas de Lima, drilled the first oil well in Peru, in an

area just north of La Brea y Parinas.

During the 1860's,

as a result of the expanding Industrial Revolution, interest
in petroleum skyrocketed.

Reflecting this new interest,

the Peruvian Congress enacted a mining law on April 28, I873.
Its purpose was to promote the petroleum and coal production

in the coimtry.

The law established that petroleum and

coal seekers could "denounce" their discoveries and establish

pertenencias or claims which would be limited to an area of
200 by 200 meters, or 400,000 square meters.

The pertenenc ig.s

Revolutionary Government of Peru, National Office of Information,
Petroleum in Peru The History of a Unique Case for the World
to Jud/:';e (Lima: Petroleos del Peru, I969)
p. 2?.

—

,
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were given as concessions— their holders
had to work them
continuously in order to preserve their right

to extract the

mineral.

The law also provided a four month
period within

which mine operators would have to present
their papers to
the Mining Court in Lima for re-validation.

Otherwise, old

claims would be considered null and void.
The owner of La Brea y Parinas at the time of the

initiation of this new ordinance, Genaro Helguero, did not
submit his title for validation.

He simply assumed that

since the law dealt with mining concessions, and he owned
his mine, it did not apply to his property.

In I875 Helguero

hired an American to do some exploratory drilling on his
property.

The venture proved a success;

petroleum was

found in commercially exploitable quantities.

On January 12, I877 the Peruvian government enacted

another mining law simply establishing a surface tax on mining.
Instead of requiring continuous exploitation of the mine,
the new law required a semi-annual payment of fifteen soles

per pertenencia . Again, Helguero assumed that the law did
not apply to his property;

he took no action, and the govern-

ment made no move to enforce the

lav:

—a

fact that could be

interpreted as either confirming Helguero 's stand, or showing
that La Brea y Parinas was so far removed from national life

physical factors that the question of enforcement never
came up.

9

Helguero apparently intended to exploit his oil holdings
outside the confines of Peruvian mining regulations.

From

his point of view, La Brea y PariFLas had a special status;

the mine had been sold to him, not given as a concession.

The status of the property might never have become problematic
except for the fact that in the next decade British oil pro-

moters became interested in the property and Helgruero decided
to sell.

The idea of an untaxed and untaxable oil field

privately owned and therefore outside the reach of the Lima
government must have appeared very tantalizing indeed.

The

situation seemed too good to be true to the British investors;

they demanded clarification of the status of the mine before
proceeding with the purchase.
In response to these pressures, on January 1^, 1886

Helguero petitioned the Court of Claims of Paita to have his
title to the surface property and the mineral subsoil of La
Brea y Parinas confirmed.

In the petition Helguero argued

that the subsoil of his property "remained outside the law

which authorized prospecting and claims, inasmuch as the
nation could not dispose in favor of third persons of what
5

it had previously disposed of by legitimate sale."

On

February 12, the Judge of the Court of Claims ordered that

"Chronological History of 'La Brea y Parinas" Oilfields of
the International Petroleum Company, I826-I963. " Peruvian
Times, July 28, I967. p. 13-

10

the imopposed petition be granted.

Apparently, the British

investors were not completely satisfied, and they
demanded
some assurance from the government in Lima.

On October 12,

188?, Helguero filed a new petition with the Peruvian

government asking that it recognize that he, and not the
state, was the "absolute owner" of the minerals underlying
his property,

that his dominion was complete and total,

and that no one could prospect or make claims inside the

boundaries of his property, in so far as Quintana had acquired the land by sale and hence it was not subject to
6

the procedures created by the ordinances.

As fate and the whims of the Peruvian bureaucracy would
have it, Helguero

petition was handled by both the Mining

's

Department and the Acting Attorney of the Supreme Court

with opposite results.

The Mining Department concurred with

Helguero 's petition, and further stated that the Laws of
1873 and 1878 could not have retroactive effects detrimental
to interests which dated back to 1826.

However, the Attorney

of the Supreme Court stated that Helguero was the rightful

owner of the property, but subject to the mining ordinances.

On October 29» 1887

f

the government issued a decree

z
Historia de La 3rea 2 Parinas ,

—a

Supreme

11
7

Resolution,

acknowledging the fact that the pitch mine had

been adjudicated to Quintana, and that through successive
transferences Genaro Helguero acquired the rights of the

original buyer.

However, echoing the Attorney of the

Supreme Court and his judgement, the resolution also stipulated that,

.

"while the State has the right to sell its

mining properties, it cannot exercise that right except in

accordance with the restrictions of the laws covering the
8

matter."

The decree went on to order that the property

be inscribed in the official registry under the name of

Helguero, and that the property be listed as three pert en encias until a proper measurement could be made.

This decree

had the net effect of hopelessly confusing the situation.

On the one hand, it admitted that the mine had been sold to
Helguero, and on the other hand it stated that this could
not have been done since existing regulations did not allow

such a sale.

The decree ordered that the mine be registered

as belonging to Helguero and at the same time be taxed as

though it did not.
muddled as its text

The reasoning behind the decree was as

— the

assumption was that the Spanish

ordinances covering mining had some sort of constitutional

In the press and often in conversation, Peruvians' refer
the their government as El Supremo Gobierno. Decrees are
called Supreme Resolutions officially and colloquially.
8

The entire decree is reproduced in Ibid.

12

force which pre-empted parts of the 1825 law signed into
effect by Sim5n Bolfvar.

More likely, the bureaucrat who

actually issued the decree assumed nothing and merely
attempted to reconcile the diametrically opposite conclusions
of the Attorney of the Supreme Court and the Department of

Mining.

The result was a nonsensical decree.

Of particular concern to Helguero was the fact that
the decree ordered that the property be surveyed in order
to determine the number of pertenencias encompassed within
its limits.
(

After all, the ordinance had a ten pertenencia

i+00,000 square meters)

1,600 square kilometers.

limit and the property extended over

The problem was resolved by an

executive decree, a Resolucion Suprema dated November I6,
1887

— only

two weeks after the first decree.

This decree,

which made no mention whatever of any property and

vjas

presumably aimed at mining in general, established that in
conditions where mineral deposits extend "irregularly" through

the subsoil, a pertenencia need not be regular (200 by 200 meters) but may be measured irregularly.

The "irregualr"

pertenencia may be larger than the prescribed ^0,000 square
meters.

On November 15. I887, Helguero filed another petition

asking for further clarification of his property's status,
in the petition he clearly stated that he needed such a

clarification to obtain capital for the development of the

13

mine.

In response, the government issued another Supreme

Resolution dated December 22, 188?.

'

This new decree re-

affirmed the previous one, and in addition it granted that
"Genaro Helguero is the sole owner of the 'La Brea' mine.

."^
.

It recognized that only Helguero could exploit its mineral

wealth;

however, the Law of 18?? governed the mine.

Helguero

must have been quite concerned about the measurement of his
land into pertenencias and the resulting potential tax.

As

a concession to this concern, the 188? decree established
that the property would be measured in accordance with Article
10,

Section 8 of the Mining Ordinance and the rule set in

the Supreme Resolution of November l6, 188?, providing for

"irregular pertenencias .

"

It specifically instructed the

Judge of Primary Jurisdiction of Paita to "designate the

number and extension /Emphasis supplled7 of the pert enencias
10

encompassed by the property of 'La Brea',

.

."

In other

words, the government was willing to compromise with Helguero-the property would be taxed as if it were a common concession,

except that since it was privately owned, the tax vrould be
far less than it would otherx^ise be, given the extent of the

property.
In late December or early January, 1888, the Judge of

Primary Jurisdiction, accompanied by Helguero and an assessor^

9

Ibid.
10
Ibid.

1^

inspected the property.

On January 10 the judge Issued a

report which stated in part:

Taking into account the irregularity
of the above mentioned deposits and
tht; difficulties which must be encountered in their discovery, for in
the exploitation of oil it often
happens that great works are carried
out at great expense with no results
whatever, his honor, the Judge ordered
the assessor to divide the whole extension of the lands within the above
mentioned demarcation lines into ten
pertenencias
On January 26, 1888, the Lima government issued a Supreme

Resolution specifically acknox^ledging the validity of the
12

Judge's report.

Given this sequence of events and the

actual texts of the two supreme resolutions and the Judge's
report, it may be surmised that this final arrangement in
fact reflected a compromise settlement between Helguero and

the Peruvian government in Lima.

Since the Mining Ordinances imposed a limit of ten
per-Q enencias

for any one individual or corporation, Helguero

would have lost well over 99 •9i^ of the subsoil under his

property if the exact maximum extension had been applied.
The oil wells were widely dispersed throughout the hacienda.
11

The entire text of the Judge's reoort is reproduced in Ibid .
12
"The measurement performed and
The decree stated in part:
the assessment of ten pertenencias which had been determined
by the Paita Judge are hereby approved, with the extension
which corresponds to each pertehencia according to the enclosed
topographic sketch. . . " Ibid .

15

If the property had been taxed according to regular
perten encias. the tax of well over a million soles per year
would

have been burdensome even for a man of means such as Helguero.

The government taxed Helguero only 30O soles a year;

how-

ever, the government actually gained in the agreement, for

since the mine had been sold to Helguero, it v^s not tech-

nically entitled to collect any mining tax geared for concessions from the privately-owned mines.

Helguero gained

from the agreement because he was then free to sell his mine
to the British entrepreneurs on the assumption that its

status of private ownership, as well as a favorable tax
rate, had been satisfactorally settled.

mine was in fact even more muddled

— it

The status of the
was privately owned

but "irregularly" taxed as a concession!

On February

3»

1888 Helguero sold his property to

British oil promoter Herbert Wilkin Colguhoun Tweedle for
18,000 Pounds Sterling.

Tweedle sold a one half interest

to William Keswick, and the two of them organized the London

and Pacific Petroleum Company with a capital of 250,000 Pounds

and subsequently leased La Brea y Parinas to the company
for a period of 99 years beginning July 1, I889.

From that

point on, with the influx of British capital, the petroleum

operation grew by leaps and bounds.
The year after the London and Pacific Company took over
La Brea y Parinas the field produced about 8,000 barrels;

16

ten years later at the turn of the century,
production had
shot up to 200,000 barrels, an average annual groxrth
of
The rate of growth from 1900 to 1915 slowed somewhat,

215^.

to 53^

— but

by 1915. the fields were producing 1,800,000

barrels per year.

By 1910 it was obvious to all observers that La Brea
y
PariRas was a success. The Peruvian government realized
that the "nickels and dimes" settlement of the 1880

's

had

become a multi-million dollar operation in which Peru had

virtually no part.

Almost simultaneously, Rockefeller's

Standard Oil of New Jersey arrived at the same conclusion
the oil giant had no part in what promised to be a most

profitable operation.
It was during the first decade of the 20th century that

Rockefeller's oil trust was broken.

By the dissolution

decree of 1911. the company lost its Ci^iifornia oil supply

and installations.

Standard Oil depended on these western

installations to supply its Far Eastern market, especially
in China, which offered a vast potential profit.
need for a

nevj

It was the

western coastal source of iDetroleum which
1^

enticed Standard Oil of New Jersey to Peru.

In 1913.

13

International Petroleum Company, "100 Anos de Industria
Petrolera en al Peru," FANAL XVIII, No. 68 (I963), p. 28.
,

Harvey O'Connor, V/orld Crisis in Oil (New York:
Review Press, I962), pp. 225-22o;

Monthly

1?

Walter

Teagle. a high company executive
persuaded Standard'
president John D. Archbold to initiate negotiations
for the
purchase of the London and Pacific Petroleum
Company.
Due
C.

"

to the considerable bitterness which Standard's
encounters

with the United States Government had generated, the company
management decided to utilize Standard's Canadian subsidiary.
Imperial Oil, to carry out the purchase.

The management

felt that the British government was far more willing to

back

lip

British enterprises abroad than the American govern-

ment, and therefore they played it safe and arranged to

maintain their purchase under the British flag.

In

191^1-,

Jersey Standard organized the International Petroleum Company
in Toronto, Canada.

I.P.C., as it became knoxra, was destined

to serve as a holding company for Standard's operations in

Peru and later in Colombia and Ecuador.

The purchase of

London and Pacific Petroleum Company was kept secret;
is, there was no direct acquisition.

Piather,

that

the stock was

bought and by 191^t Standard Oil of New Jersey had a dominent
interest

— it

owned over ^0% of the stock.

As previously mentioned, the prosperity of La Brea
y Farinas struck the Peruvians as well as Standard Oil.

In

1911, Ricardo Deustua, a Peruvian engineer -employed by the

government and a relation of the prominent Peruvian philo-

sopher Alejandro 0, Deustua, traveled to Northeastern Peru

and "discovered" that La Brea y Parinas was far larger than

18

ten regular pertenencias.

After returning to Lima, Deustua

spoke before the Geographic Society and
"unmasked" the
London and Pacific Petroleum Company for
alleged fraud
15
against the Peruvian treasury.
While there is no clear

reason why Deustua journeyed to La Brea
y Parinas, there
are two logical possibilities. As an employee of the

Lima

government, he might have been ordered there with
specific

Instructions to inspect the land.

Another alternative is

that he might have been urged to conduct his inspection by

Peruvian entrepreneurs who had become anxious to acquire
a share of the booming petroleum interest, as the fact that
he reported

xhis

16

findings to the Geographic Society seemed

to suggest.

As a result of Deustm's inquiry, the Ministry of

Development issued another Supreme Resolution, dated March
31,

1911, declaring that the 1888 Supreme Resolution dividing

La Brea y Parinas into ten pertenencias was an administrative

error because it failed to follow the prescribed pattern
for dividing mining concessions into regular pertenencias .
It also ordered that the property be re-measured.

Ricardo

Jose Macedo Mendoza, Na c i ona 1 i c emo s el Petroleoi (Lima:
Hora del Hombre, i960), p. 22.
16

That the Geographic Society was in effect a kind of chamber
of commerce for entrepreneurs became obvious later when the
Society attempted to get exclusive privileges to explore for
certain minerals, including petroleum. See the telegram
from V/illiam Smith, Charge D'affaires ad interim in Lima to
Secreta-^y of State, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
Record Group 59, No. 823.6363/20, March 5f 1920.
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Deustua was appointed to carry out the order.

William Keswick,

who by then had become the sole owner of the property, and
his leasee, the London and Pacific Petroleum Company,
objected to the decree and enlisted the support of the British

legation in Lima to try to stop or at least delay the application of the decree.

Due to pressure from the British,

and even more likely, due to the internal turmoil that the
Clvilista Administration of Augusto Legufa was then encountering, the Supreme Resolution was never carried out.

Augusto Leguia, the Clvilista President of Peru from I908
to 1912 and future dictator from I919 to 1930, was well

known for his rapport with foreign investors and it is
unlikely that his administration would have acted unfavorably
against as prominent a British enterprise as the London and

Pacific Petroleum Company.
There were national elections in Peru in 1912, and the

Civilistas were voted out of office.

by Guillermo Billinghurst

,

took over.

Their opposition, led
The question of La

Brea y Parinas rested unresolved, but not forgotten as the

American owners of London and Pacific might have wished.
President Billinghurst was the grandson of a British soldier

who had fought in the War of Independence

—a

man who had a

substantial business interest in the guano industry of Southern
Peru.

While he made promises of social reform, Billinghurst

found that it was very difficult to move against the entrenched

20

Peruvian Congress.

It was this Congress which
finally in-

spired a coup d'etat against Billinghurst and
inaugurated
a new government under the leadership of
Colonel Oscar R.

Benavides in 191^.

And it was this military government which was
destined
to drag La Brea y Parinas out of its splendid isolation
and

into the arena of Peruvian and eventually, international
politics.
ments.

Several factors contributed to the new develop-

V/orld

War

I

substantially diminished Peruvian foreign

trade, and as a result, the government's income dropped,

Benavides was forced to suspend payments on the foreign debt.
His government looked around for new sources of revenue,

and the prosperous La Brea y Parinas operation, with an

annual tax rate of about ^150.00 figured prominently as a
potential source of much-needed revenue.

Another factor

which- made the move against the London and Pacific Petroleum

Company plausible

vjas

the harrassment which both the Americans

and the British had been carrying on against Peruvian
landlords and their labor practices.

For instance, in 1912

the British and American governments carried out a Joint

investigation of slavery in Peru.

This represented but the

latest chapter in what had been a continuous campaign since
the turn of the century conducted by Peru-based British and

American officials.

They were trying to focus world public

21

opinion on the conditions of "virtual
slavery" under which
Peruvian farm workers labored. Along
with other

newspapers.
the London Times deplored the
"horrible evils" plaguing the
poor Indians on the haciendas of
Peru/^ This ill-advised
campaign, which might have diverted
attention away from
labor conditions in the sweat shops of
Britain and the United
States, created a groat deal of animosity
among the Peruvian
Samonales --the landowners, who were very much
in control of
lo
the Congress in Lima,

The intellectual climate of opinion was
not very favorable to Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Many wealthy
Civilistas

repudiated modernization.

Their chief spokesman, Alejandro

Deustua condemned the use of scientific knowledge
in the
pursuit of utilitarian objectives as the lowest
form of human
endeavor.

Through his popular philosophy courses at the

University of San Marcos. Deustua convinced many prominent
Peruvians of the idea that man's highest endeavor was to
seek the "ideal image of God."

Naturally, such a goal was

possible only for the selected few, and consequently, society
should be organized in such a way that its material benefits
1?

James C, Carey. Peru and the Unit ed States . I9OO-I962
(Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 196^),
pp. 25-27
18

Fredrick B. Pike, The ffodern History of Peru (New York:
Praeger, I967). pp. 183-18^.
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would go to that tiny, but intellectually capable
minority
wnich would pursue the highest of goals. At
a policy

level.

Deustua favored a reduction of primary and
secondary
school enrollments— widespread education would only
encourage the materialistic appetites of the masses. 19

Deustua

's

While

ideas were not universally accepted in Peru, the

gamonales reduced his philosophy to a rationalization of

the Peruvian hierarchical society.

These landlords disliked

capitalism because it represented a sort of materialistic
endeavor sprinkled with egalitarianism which they distasted.
It was in the context of this political and ideological

climate that the government of Colonel Benavides issued its

decree of April 25, 191^1 rejecting all the arguments presented by the London and Pacific Petroleum Company and ordering

that the property by re-surveyed.

Engineers Hector Boza and

Alberto Jochamowitz went to Northeastern Peru to survey the
property.

They apparently encountered a considerable amount

—

of difficulty the company refused to give them drinking
20
After their work was completed, they returned to
water.

Lima and announced their findings

— La

Brea y Pariflas covered

not ten but ^l,6l4 regular pertenencias .

By the 191^ decree

and subsequent ones issued the following year, the Peruvian
19

Ibid .

,

pp. 18^-186.

20

Macedo Mendoza,

p.
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government insisted that the company raise
its tax payments
from 300 soles to 1.2i^0.000 soles per year.
This would have
represented an increase from $150.00 to $600,000.00.^"^
The

new tax rate would have amounted to approximately
one third
of the gross revenues and somewhere between
50^ and 6o^
of

the net gains according to calculations of Peruvians
friendly
to the company.

The company objected, and the Peruvian

government's answer came in the form of a decree ordering
that the property be officially registered as consisting of

pertenencias

,

and that the tax be paid accordingly.

On April 12, 1915, Standard Oil of New Jersey sent an
urgent and confidential telegram to the Department of State

in Washington complaining that the Peruvian government was
"imposing and enforcing destructive and actual confiscatory
tax" on London and Pacific's operation.

The telegram also

advised the State Department that Jersey Standard had a
"dorinent financial interest" in that company, and asked that

Washington intercede by asking the Peruvian government to

delay enforcement of the decree until the company had an
21

O'Connor, p. 226.
22
"DiscuT*co del Doctor Manuel Vicen^p Villaran, Senador por
Junin, Sesion del 15 de Noviembre de 1917," Arturo Osores, et. al.
Le.crislatura
Discursos ante el Senado
La Brea ^ Farinas
(Lima;
International
Jurldicos
Dictamenes
^dinaria de 191? ^
Petroleum Company, "Noticias de Petroleo," I963), p. ^0,
;

)

,

(

24

opportunity to argue its case.
the request immediately;

23

Washington complied with

on April 14, 1915 the Department

of State sent a coded message to the American
ambassador in
24
Lima instructing him to do as Standard Oil
suggested.
This
fateful telegram signaled the beginning of what
was to become
a long and for the most part acrimonious tripartite
relation-

ship between Standard Oil of New Jersey, the United
States

government and the Peruvian government.
At this point in the history of this controversy, however,

the partisans were not limited to the three mentioned above.
The government of Great Britain, through its legation in Lima,

also intervened on behalf of London and Pacific Petroleum
Company, which was registered as a British business even

though it was controlled by Standard Oil of New Jersey, and
on behalf of William Keswick, the British subject
La Brea y Parinas, even though the property

London and Pacific.

lias

owned

who'

leased to

In a note to the Peruvian Foreign Office,

the British Ambassador wondered "how one can demand, with
justice, the claimed sum as specified in the decree.

.

23
A report on this telegram appears in a dispatch, William
Libby to Secretary of State, A-oril 12, 1915» U.S. Department
of Stat3 Decimal Files, No. 823.6'^63/5.
24
Secretary of State to the American Legation in Lima, April 14,
1915, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/5.
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He went on to state:

"It can be expected thereby, that
in

view of the above mentioned reasons and of
the great and
important interests which are involved, the
Government of
"^^
Peru will see to it that the Decree of March I5
be annulled.

Years later. Peruvian public leaders would bitterly
remember

the imperative tone of the British note as an example
of
the humiliations Peru suffered during this stage of
its
26

history.

On April 1?, 1915 t American Ambassador to Peru, Benton

McMillin

cabled Washington advising the Department of State

that the Peruvian government had acquiesed to the Anglo-

American demand.

In a dispatch dated April 28, the ambas-

sador advised the American government that according to the

Peruvian government, Peru

vras

not attempting to levy a new

tax, but was merely trying to collect a general tax which

the London and Pacific Petroleum Company had not been paying.
The Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs persuaded the American

ambassador

that London and Pacific had been paying taxes

for only the few acres which they were exploiting, and that
27
the law required them to pay for the complete acreage.

25

The text of the diplomatic note is reproduced in:
Government of Peru, p. 35»

Revolutionary

26

Augusto Zimmermann Zavala, La Hlstoria Secreta del Petroleo
Editorial Grafica Labor, I968), d. ^6.
(Lima:
27

Benton MQHin to Secretary of State. April 26. 1915.
Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823/6363/7.

U.S.
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This was an inaccurate interpretation
from the company's
point of view, for the 1888 settlement made
it quite clear
that the whole property was divided into
ten
irrep:ular

pertenencias

,

not that the company would pay taxes
on only

part of its territory.

The ambassador also reported

conversations with representatives of the company,
who
gave him their side of the story.

What is most significant

about this exchange is that up to that point the State
Department seemed to have no information whatever as to the

involvement of Standard Oil of New Jersey in the Peruvian

oil extraction business.

With serious problems in the

offing, the Department began to learn from the Peruvian

government and from the company's management via the American

ambassador about a problem which had been smouldering for
several years.

When taking over his duties as ambassador

in 1913t McMillin was specifically instructed "to keep a

look out for such resources in Peru as might prove pro28

fitable investments for Americans.

.

."

It appears that

Standard Oil meant to keep its Peruvian operation secret,
even from the American government, until its hand was

—

2H

The fact is reported by McMillin himself in a memo dated
dated February 2, I916.

27

forced by the need for diplomtic
pressure from Washington.
The State Department apparently did
not take offense, for
it intervened on behalf of the company,
and then continued
to exercise a careful viatch over the
situation once the
enforcement of the I915 decree was indefinitely
postponed.
1915 was an election year in Peru, and the Civilista
Party's presidential candidate was victorious.
In August.
Jose Pardo began his second term as president.
His admin-

istration seemed more willing to negotiate with
Standard
Oil than had the administration of Benavides.

No sooner was

the new government in power than negotiations were
initiated

with R. V. Sueur, International Petroleum Company's chief
counsel.

However, these conversations continued for several

months without achieving a conclusive settlement.
On November

7.

1915. Walter Teagle. Standard Oil's

overseas entrepreneur, reputed architect of the London and Pac
29

ific purchase.

and president of International Petroleum

Company, arrived in Callao in what must have been one of

the earlie?!t corporate yachts.

Teagle and his entourage

spent some time visiting La Brea y Parifias on their
the coast.

vray

down

They declared that the Peruvian oil fields would

29

O'Connor, pp. 225-226.

28

never become "great oil producers.

.

.

that the deposits

are already showing signs of exhaustion.

These state-

.

ments were promptly cabled to the New York press, with a

corresponding flurry of concern in Peru.

Teagle conferred

with La Sueur, the company's chief negotiator in Lima,
Soon thereafter, a satisfactory agreement from the company's
30

point of view was finalized.

This agreement was presented in a bill submitted to
the Civilista-controlled Senate on December

7,

1915,

As

amended by the Senate, the bill provided th^t La Brea y
Pariflas covered a territory of ^l,6l^ regular pertenencias .

However, provisions were made for dividing the property
into two parts taxed at different rates.

The pertenencias

currently exploited would be taxed at the regular rate of
30 soles per year;

the remaining area would be taxed at

the special rate of one sol during the first ten years

after 1915

»

tv70

soles between 1926 and 1935

1

three soles

from 1936 to 19^5, and fifteen soles from 19^6 to I965.

The bill fixed the tax rates for fifty years beginning in
1915;

land
30

however, the proportion of exploited to unexploited
^^rould

vary.

It was expected that London and Pacific

The entire affair is covered in a memo from William Hadley,
U.S. Consul-General in Lima-Callao to the Secretary of State
November 1^, 1915, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
No. 823/6363/9.
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would be using about 1.000 pertenenclas in the beginning.
while the remaining area would be considered inactive. 31
Under this formula, the company's tax payments would
in-

crease to 3.000 soles -- a considerable sum, but far short
of the previously demanded annual tax rate of 1,2^0,000
soles .

The government's bill was debated by the Senate Legislative Commission, and after much discussion lasting through
1916, a favorable report was issued by the Commission's

majority agalrst bitter opposition of the minority.

From

1915 to 1918, La Brea y Parifias ceased to be a dispute

between the Peruvian government and a private enterprise
VTith

occassional interference from the British and American

governments

— it

became a

hotly contested internal political

issue in Peru.

The Pardo administration had good reason to insist that
the compromise solution reached with London and Pacific

be accepted.

The Peruvian economy had overcome the financial

difficulties faced by the Benavides administration, thanks
to the booming exports of items such as petroleum.

The

government's revenue, highly dependent on export taxes, went

Osores, et. al., p.

H'S.
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from 28.000.000 soles in I9I5 to ^0.000,000
soles in I9I8.
In addition. Pardo wanted to enlist the aid of
the United
States in the settlement of the touchy Tacna-Arica
dispute
with Chile.
Unfortunately, Pardo was unable to persuade
the opposition and some very prominent members of his
own

party of the wisdom of his compromise solution.

Many

Civilista legislators preferred to remain loyal to Alejandro

Deustua

'

s

philosophy— anti-capitalist.

Leading the group of twelve dissenting Senators, and

writing the minority report, was Antonio Miro Quesada, a
member of the government Civilista Party and editor of the
Influential Lima dally. El Comercio .

Miro Quesada contended

that the government's bill would "place the owners of La

Brea y Parinas in a privileged condition.

,

."

He argued

that the State would grant the London and Pacific Petroleum

Company a reduced tax burden and furthermore tie its hands
for fifty years.

Peru would abdicate its sovereign privilege

of taxation for half a century.

Basing his argument on the

fact that throughout the transactions of iBBO's, the property

had been referred to only as "La Brea." Miro Quesada and his

fellow dissenting senators insisted that the Parifias side of
32

Pike. pp. 209-210.

31

the property could not even discussedo

No viable claim on

its subsoil could be made by any private party.

He main-

tained that the mine bought by Quintana consisted of
a few
wells in the Prieto Mountains with insignificant territory,

and that the c^irrent owners could not claim ownership over
the subsoil of thousands of square kilometers on the basis
of that original purchase.

In any case, he argued that what

was purchased was brea (pitch) and not petroleum.

The

dissenting senators inferred that an administrative error
was made in allowing such large pertenencias

,

and that bad

faith or corruption entered into the granting of the I889
decree.

Some of their arguments vrere pragmatic;

they pointed

out that with the new technology. La Brea y ParifTas would

soon become more fully exploitable and as such a very important world oil field.

Finally, Iliro Quesada and his

friends appealed to the wounded Peruvian national pride:
"Peru has lost the guano and the saltpeter, but now generous
33

Nature offers it petroleum.

Our duty is to conserve it,"

During the month of November, 1917* the partisans of
the compromise produced a sharp rebuttal.

Senator Manuel

Vicente Villaran led the attack on the dissenters.

33

He

Luis Humbert o Delgado, Historia de Antonio Niro Quesada,
1875-1935 Vol. I (Lima: American Express Limited, 193*^)t
pp. lol-171«
,
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declared that there had been no error and
that the government knew Of the extent of La Brea
Parinas
y

in the 1880 's.

He emphatically rejected the allegations
of corruption,
noting that the government in power then was
supported by
the Clvilista Party. The Pardo administration
feared that
the opposition was attempting to place
responsibility for
the problem at the Civllista door-step.

The senators favor-

ing the compromise presented a well-researched legal
case

stressing the validity of the private title to the subsoil
of La Brea y Parinas,

Given the validity of the private

title, it would be logical for the government to reach a

compromise solution so that the state could receive more
income while preserving the sanctity of private property.
The supporters also had pragmatic arguments
that it

^'^ould

investment.

— they

stated

be expedient for Peru to attract foreign

Senator Villaran exhorted Peru not to look

with suspicion upon foreign enterprises and "to note that

they represent a step ahead in what is most important to
us, the industrial development of the country."

Villaran

and his supporters in the Senate favored the kind of

utilitarian capitalism which had been so resoundingly
rejected by the Civilista Party's leading thinker

—Alejandro

35

Deustua,
35
Osores, et. al, p. ^8,
35

Francois Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru
Translated by Paul Stevenson (New York: Praeger, I970),
pp. 61-62.

,
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The battle, with its partisan and
philosophical configuration well-delineated, soon grew in
bitterness. During
1917, the Pardo administration published the speeches
of

Senators Villaran, Arturo Osores and other
pro-government

legislators in booklet form.

In an acrimonious preface,

the administration charged the opposition with
"pitiful
sterility for the good." and with "using subterfuge to
distort reality so as to mold passion to their

ox'xn

interests

A week after the speeches of Villaran and Osores
were

delivered, the Senate passed the La 3rea y Parinas bill,

and it was sent on to the Chamber of Deputies, where it

soon became evident that it faced an uphill battle for

acceptance.

The opposition in the Chamber of Deputies

refined some of the same arguments which had been offered
in the Senate.

The possibility of defeat was very real,

and the management of the International Petroleum Company

decided to bring pressure to bear.

On January 12, I9I8, the West Coast Leader

,

an English

language newspaper which generally reflected the interests
of the Anglo-American entrepreneurs in Peru, published an

article declaring that "a fortnight ago the Canadian Government requisitioned the steamer tanker Azof," one of the two

IS
Government of Peru,
Parlamentarios (Lima:

Guest ion "Brea j Parinas "
Emprenta del Estado, 191?)
,

.

f

Pi scurs
p. 3.

3^

carrying oil from Talara to Lima-Callao.

At the time, the

Lima-Callao area needed some 6,000 metric tons
of petroleum
per month. The remaining tanker, the Circassian
Prince,
could carry 5.000 metric tons per month.

The metropolitan

area faced a petroleum deficit of 1,000 metric tons.

The

article made it clear that while the Canadian government
had
allowed the two tankers to remain in service "if thereby a
a favourable settlement of the controversy could be
effected

with the Peruvian government," the pressures of war and "the
failure of the Peruvian government to take definite action.

.

h^s removed the essential cause for the Canadian Govern-

ment

's

forbearance in the question of the tankers, and as a

result one of them has been withdrawn and the second will
37

probably soon follow."
The warning could not have been more explicit

— either

the Peruvian government reached a compromise acceptable to

the company, or else it would face first a shortage and

possibly a complete lack of petroleum with resulting hardship
to the economy of the country.

The battle continued unabated during 1918, and it

intensified as time passed.

The International Petroleum

37
A copy or the article entitled "Petroleum Famine" is included in a memo from the American Consulate in Lima-Callao
to the Secretary of State, January 23t 1918, U.S. Department
of State Decimal Files, No. 823/6363/IO.

.
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Company, which had already stopped all new
exploration and
development, leaked information to the effect
that it might
stop all work at its oil fields. On September 2if.
Le Sueur

publically confirmed the rumors that the company
was considering a work stoppage and gave as the reason the

lack of

progress in the settlement of the La Brea y Parinas tax
controversy.

The Lima press widely interpreted the company's

move as an attempt to pressure the Chamber of Deputies into
passing the bill approved earlier by the Senate.

Miro-Quesada'

El Comerclo demanded that the government take over the oil
fields and form a Peruvian corporation to run the operation.

Even La Prensa, Lima's other major daily newspaper, joined in
counseling

tliat if

I.P.C. carried out its threat, the govern38
ment should expropriate the fields.

The Peruvian government, which was under heavy pressure

from the United States and the oil company then faced the
acute displeasure of the oil workers at Talara,
for an early settlement of the controversy.

vxho

appealed

The government's

response was to confidentially agree to submit the dispute
to arbitration, perhaps to the Hague Tribunal.

This agree-

ment appeared to have been reached at the urging of the

American ambassador in Lima, although the evidence is not
3^

See telegram from Benton McMillin to the Secretary of State,
September 2?, 1918, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
No. 823/6363/11.
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entirely clear.
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October brought no relief in
Congress.
The opposition vigorously argued
against any compromise on
the grounds that the original
sale to Quintana
was null,

and that the concession was given
subject to the general
mining laws. The sale of a mine
of pitch could not be turned
into the sale of a petroleum field,
and since the surface

property was separate from the subsoil
there was no reason
to assume that the subsoil sold to
Quintana

corresponded to

the entire hacienda, M^ncora.

When word of the government's

proposal to submit the question to international
arbitration
was made public, the opposition countered
with
demands that

the International Petroleum Company should
pay back taxes
amounting to some $l6 million dollars. The
inflexibility
Of their argument was well illustrated by the

statement of

one of the outspoken opposition leaders.

even assuming that it would be
possible to submit our sovereign rights
to arbitration in a conflict vrith a
private party which should disappear
as a pigmy, as a germ before the magnificance and greatness of a State, it
turns out that we have always arrived at
solutions which were prejudicial to Peru.^^Q
Now,-

With hindsight, it is simple to recognize that Oscar Barros's
premonitions about an internationa.l arbitrary award were
3?

Ibidi See also No. 823/6363/I2.

Oscar C, Barros, Discursos Parlamentarios
Asunto Brea 2
Parinas (2nd. ed.
Lima:
Imprenta Hinerva, i960) p. ??.
:

;

,
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quite correct;

however, his assessment of I.P.C. and
its

parent company, Standard Oil of New Jersey,
was very unrealistic. The "pigmy" prevailed for many years.
It was Standard Oil and not the Canadian
government

which withdrew the steamship Azof from its Peruvian route.
By October the second ship was also put out of service,
thus
effectively cutting Peru off from its petroleum supply.

4-1

The American, British and Canadian embassies in Lima kept

quiet about the ship requisition scheme and played Standard
Oil's game

— effectively

pulling the rug out from under Peru.

Joining in this concerted effort was the only other significant oil producer in Peru, the Lobitos Oil-Fields Co., Ltd

Realizing that without oil Peru's railroads and electric
power plants would come to a grinding halt, the Peruvian
government ordered the Lobitos Oil-Fields Company to transport 20% of .the oil it usually exported to Canada to Callao.

TTT"
Earlier in 1918, U.S. Secretary of State Franlc Polk inquired
whether the Canadian government was requisitioning the two
ships serving Peru.
The Canadian reply left no doubt:
"Neither the Azof nor the Prince have been requisitioned
by the Canadian Government." .ii chard Crawford to Frank
Polk, January 20, 1918, U.S. Department of State Decimal
Files, No. 823.6363/9¥.
The Unit*^.:! States, Britain and Canada may have decided to
support Standard Oil due to hard feelings in the State Depar
ment over Peru's refusal to allow the Allies to use certain
German ships which were interned in Peruvian harbors. At
one point, ^ the Secretary of State reminded the Peruvian
governjnent that such hesitation "has produced an unfortunate
impression upon the American people." Carey, pp. 29-31*

'
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The British company refused vrith the
backing of the

British ambassador;

the company argued that the ships

used by the Lobitos company were under the
control of the
Canadian government.

By October 28, the situation became untenable
for the
Peruvian government. In a final effort, the Pardo
administration, through its ambassador in v;ashington,
requested
"that the government of the United States kindly
use its

good offices to the effect that the British Government
liO

The relationship hetvieen the Lobitos Oil-Fields, Ltd.
and
the International Petroleum Company has been complex
and
somewhat obscure. The Lobitos com-oany began operations
in Ijorthern Peru in 1902. During the first two decades
of the century, both I.P.C. and Lobitos were represented
by the same managing firm in Lima. Furthermore, a State
Department memo dated December 30, 1918 stated that "both
the Lobitos Oil-Fields Company and the London and Pacific
Petroleum Company are now owned by the International Petroleum
Company," A check with docujTients subpoenaed during U.S.
Congressional Investigations during the 1940 's showed that
Lobitos was not listed as a subsidiary of Standard Oil of
New Jersey. Company officials of I.P.C. expressed bewilderment when presented with the document and em.phatically denied
that Lobitos had ever been owned by I.P.C. The State Department
memo identifies the source of the information as V/alter
Penfield, counsel for the London and Pacific Petroleum Company.
The scholar is left with two alternative interpretations:
either the two companies were owned by I.P.C.
and that fact became one of the best kept secrets in American corporate history, or else, the memo was in error.
-If the former conclusion is correct, then I.P.C. operated
a virtual petroleum monopoly in Peru that has not to this
date been discovered. However, the fact that the Information
was only mentioned in two memoranda in 1918 and 1919, and
not dealt with in diplomatic correspondence through 1939
would seem to indicate that the Information was a' mistake.
The evidence is inconclusive. U.S. Department of State Decimal
Files, No. 823.6363.12, December 30, 1918;- No. 823.6363/II,
February 10, 1919.
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reconmend the af ore-raentioned Oil
Companies to observe the
laws of Peru."
The Pardo government was
brought to its
knees-Peru begged Washington to intercede
with London so
that a private company would obey
its laws.
The American
government, however, was an accomplice
to the oil company
maneuver, and the State Department
merely shuffled papers
without taking any action. The
Department forwarded the
Peruvian request to the War Trade Board,
which had already
obtained the German ships which Peru had
held.
Peru had
nothing further to bargain with, and the
War Trade Board
responded that it "would be reluctant to take
any action
in this matter, except upon the express
request
of the

Department of State."

No such request was forthcoming,

and Pardo was left to fend for himself against
the recalcitrant and pro-confiscatory forces in the Peruvian
Congress

and press.
During the early weeks of November I9I8, the Peruvian
Congress debated the question of La Brea y Parifias,' apparently

unconvinced that the battle was lost.

The Lima press, with

Antonio Hiro-Quesada and SI Comercio in the lead, recommended
that the legislators consult Mexican laws dealing with oil.

M. de Freyre, Peruvian Ambassador to the United States, to
the Secretary of State, October 28, I9I8, U.S. Department of

State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/I2.
See the memorandum from the War Trade Board to the Department
of State, November 2, I9I8, U.S. Department of State Decimal
Files, No. 823.6363/13.
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At last, V/ashlngton showed some concern;

the Department

of State feared that "General Carranza vjlll
seize this
opportunity to. . . induce the Peruvian Government

to adopt

a policy similar to that of the Mexican Government."

The

American ambassador in Lima was ordered to watch the
situation closely, and "to report to the Department any

evidence

of Mexican influence."

This concern proved unfounded, for on December 2^, I9I8

the Peruvian Congress passed Law 3OI6, which proclaimed in
its single article:

The Executive Power is authorized to
come to an agreement with the Government
of His Britannic Majesty for submission
of the controversy pending between the
State and the mining enterprise "Brea y
Parinas" to the final decision of an international arbitration,

Representing the legislative branch, Antonio Miro-Quesada,
President of the Senate, editor of El Gomercio and arch foe
of the International Petroleum Company, signed the bill and

forwarded it to President Pardo.
The Civilistas were once described by an American

ambassador to Peru as:
ITS

See note?: from the Department of State to Benton McHillir,
November 7, I9I8 and November I6, I9I8, U.S. Department of
State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/1^.
.

^7

The La Brea ^ Parinas Controversy Vol 1 (International
Petroleum Company, February, 1969) Exhibit 1,
.

,

*

^1

the reactionary, ultra-conservative
faction of Peru, corresponding to the
group of large landowners so powerful
in Mexico in the days of President Dias.
They are anti-foreign, anti-industrial
and wish Peru to be solely an agricultural country without development outside their own haciendas, with the
country administered entirely for their
own benefit.^g

—

The question of La 3rea y PariHas proved a watershed
in the
history of Pardo's Civilista Party— the oil issue
divided
the party hopelessly.

Pardo and his supporters x^anted to

reach an expedient compromise with American capitalism and
one of its foremost representatives in Peru, the Interna-

tional Petroleum Company.

Opposing him were men of consi-

derable prominance, led by Amtonio Hire ^^uesada, who so

bitterly contested the government's action that the Civilistas
could not heal their wounds nor face the challenges of

the election year 1919.

Widespread strikes in Lima-Callao, an untimely reduction
of the military budget, and an over-anxious opposition can-

didate for the presidency provided the ingredients for a
coup d'etat in July 1919.

Before the year was over, most

important Civilista leaders, including Pardo and Miro Quesada

were exiled

an end.

— the

golden age of oligarchy in Peru had come to

Henceforth:

TTB

American Ambassador to Peru Miles Poindexter to the
Department of State, April 23, 1925. U.S. Department of
State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363A9I.

The wealthy families would continue to
be a force in politics. . . but from now
onwards the oligarchy would not have it
all its own way. A new force had begun
to play its part in Peruvian politics—
the urban working and middle classes.
Their growing influence could no longer
safely be ignored either by the men of
wealth or the soldiers. . , Peru by I919
had already taken a first important step
into the modern age.,
M'9

According to Francois Bo urricaud, the Coup of I919 ended
.

the Civilista dream of "an aristocratic republic," under
the

tutelage of the great Lima families, and initiated for the
first time in the 20th century, a "duality between the

governing /or rather dominating? and the political class.

.

With the ant i- foreign and ant i- industrial oligarchy
shocked and in disarray, the Peruvian scene looked more

promising than ever to American capital in general and to
Standard Oil's Latin American subsidiary, the International

Petroleum Company in particular.

In August, I919, the

Department of State sent a circular to all American embassies

and consular offices impressing upon the personnel "the
vital importance of securing adequate supplies of mineral
oil both for present and future needs of the United States.

They

vrere

inatructed to obtain and forward information

1^
Sir Robert Marett, Peru (New York: Praeger, 1969)* p. 135.
50

Bourricaud, p. 52.

.

^3

regarding the discovery of oil. the granting of
concessions
and the "change of ownership of oil property or
important

changes in ownership or control of corporate companies
con-

cerned with oil production or distribution."^'''

The American

diplomatic personnel in Peru took the message to heart, for
during the 1920

's

American diplomatic channels were saturated

with information concerning the moves of American and
European petroleum interests in that country.
The key to the new American optimism rested not only
on the broken back of the oligarchy, but on the personal

background of the new strong man

—August©

Leguia. The new

president of Peru learned fluent English early in his life—

an important asset in his very successful business career.
Prior to his entrance into politics, Leguia served as the

general manager of the Peruvian, Bolivian and Ecuadorian
operations of the New York Life Insurance Company.

After

a trip to London, he became manager of the British Sugar

Company in addition to his duties as president of the
52

National Bank of Peru.

He served as Minister of the

Treasury in the first Pardo administration from 190^ to I908.
At that point he became the presidential candidate of the
51

See the circular from Alvey Adee, August 16, 1919, U.S.
Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/23,
52

Pike, p. 195.
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Civilista Party and won the election.

His term in office

was marred by Congressional stalling on his
legislative

program and even a theatrical uprising in which he was

actually captured by his adversaries and marched through
the streets of Lima,

An unperceptive American attache

\iho

witnessed the event reported that Leguia had gone mad and
joined in a demonstration against himself

53

As time passed, Legufa grew more bitter and suspicious
of democratic institutions.

He plotted to rig the congressional

elections and when his machinations were discovered, he
found himself in opposition to his own party's congressional

delegation,

Legufa remained in office

circumstances of his own creation.
valuable lesson,

—a

prisoner of the

However, he learned a

"Never again would the future dictator of

Peru allow himself to be pushed around by the oligarchy, or
54

indeed by politicians of any political creed,"

Following the expiration of his term in 1912, Legufa
went abroad.

He spent most of that time between the end of

his first term and the 1919 coup d'etat in London, apparently

selling British businessmen on the idea that he would be the
future leader of Peru,

In exchange for an unspecified sum

which he pla'ined to use in the finr.ncing of his coup, Legu^?.

Ibid ,

,

p.

i960
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Marett, pp, 32-34.

^5

promised the Royal Dutch Shell Company that
once he was in
power, he would grant that company exclusive
exploration
rights in Peru. The international oil giant
fell for Legufa's
proposition.
On his way from London to Lima. Legufa
stop-

ped in New York and in Washington during the
spring of I919.

He held conversations with important American
businessmen,

and while the nature of these conversations and even
the

identity of the businessmen remains unclear to this date,
chances are that Legufa tried to strike deals similar to

the one he reached with Royal Dutch Shell.

It is known that

Legula talked with the president of the National City Bank
of New York about his desire to "consolidate the various

government agencies and monopolies operating in Peru.

.
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and about refinancing the Peruvian public debt.
In the words of James Carey,

There is no evidence to conclude that
the prospective president of Peru and
the head of the National City Bank
entertained other than honorable intentions. V/hen it is noted, however, that
the conversations took place before
the elections were held in Peru, it is
evident that some presumptuous planning
was done with a man who had not yet
returned from a five-year absence. ^r,
55

Memorandum to the U.S. Department of Commerce from Carlton
Jackson, Trade Commissioner in Lima, -August 5, 1920, U.S.
Department of State Decimal Files. No. 823.6363/32.
56

Testimony by Claude W. Calvin, representative of the National
City Bank in Peru, before the Committee on Banking and Currency.
Quoted by Carey, p. 3^»
57
Ibid.
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Legufa proved to be a more skillful
politician than his
British and American promoters might have
suspected.

He

refused to honor or even acknowledge his commitments
to
Hoyal Dutch Shell. Instead, he began to bargain
with

British and American businessmen to see who would
offer the
most for the favors of his government.
V/hen vrord of his

dealings with some British promoters

leaked out, the Department of State instructed its Lima

embassy to make it known to Legufa that Washington would
not look favorably upon any Peruvian oil concessions to

any oil concerns reflecting any future exclusion of American
oil companies.

Legula promptly responded "that Americans

would be given equal or preferential opportunities for
Investment and development in Peru."
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However, in spite

of Legufa's pledges, V/ashington remained skeptical.

The

American Embassy in Lima carefully monitored everything
fioing on in the country.

Even a Swedish scientific expedi-

tion was suspected as a cover operation for the exploratory

activities of Royal Dutch Shell, the worldvride arch enemy
of Standard Oil of New Jersey.

The American charge d'affaires

Telegram from the Department of State to the American Legation
in Lim-^.j February 10, 1920, U.S. Department of State Decimal
Files, No. 823.6363/17a.

William 'Walker Smith, Charge D'affaires ad interim to the
Secretary of State, February 19 1920, U.S. Department of
State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/2I.
t

^7

talked with Legufa regularly, yet he commented
in a dispatch
to Washington dated March 5. 1920 that he would
be "obliged
to discount his statements as I do not believe
he is giving
60

out full information."

By the middle of March. William Walker Smith
reported
that "the President again brought up the question of
financial assistance to the country."

Noting that Peru was hard

pressed for capital and that Leguia's success depended on

aid from abroad, Smith went on to conclude:

"Whoever can

come to the financial assistance of Peru at this time vfill
61

gain a great commercial advantage."

With a clearer

understanding of Legufa's strategy, the United States
government and the International Petroleum Company moved;
the first to promote the entry of American mining enter-

prises in Peru, and the second to consolidate its very

profitable operations by settling the still-pending La Brea
y Parinas issue.

In late March, 1920, a memorandum from

Alvey Adee, Second Assistant Secretary of State, went to
the Department of Commerce, advising that:

there is great activity for the
development of oil at the present
time in Peru, and I earnestly

William Walker Smith to the Secretary of State, March 5, 1920,
U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/2O.
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William Walker Smith to the Secretary of State, March I5, 1920,
U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/22.
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recommend that the Department so
place the matter before American
interests that they may enter this
field with the least possible delay,
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In accordance with this recommendation, the
Department of
Commerce issued a confidential three page report
entitled

"Peruvian Oil Development" to major American oil
companies.
A covering letter from Philip B. Kennedy.
Director of the

Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, informed the
companies
that "siace so much interest is now being displayed by
European

companies in Peru, it behooves American oil interests to

look carefully into the possibilities of the Peruvian fields.
The United States government, knovring that the Royal Dutch

Shell Company was attempting to gain a foothold in Peru, viarned
the American giant Standard Oil to engage in counter-maneuvers.^

^27
Memorandum from Alvey Adee to the Department of Coimnerce,
March 25, 1920, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
No» 823.6363/21.

Report and letter from Philip Kennedy, May 7, 1920, U.S.
Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/24.
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Official concern with American oil interests was at one point
interpreted as favoring the entry of any American company into
Peru.
Ho^rever, when Standard Oil of Indiana attempted to
negotiate with Leguia to secure an oil monopoly, the State
Department instructed its ambassador in Lima not to introduce
the company's representative because it would be "tantamount,
to favoring said businessman's proposals, • ." in the eyes of
the Peruvian president. The question was long debated. The
Departmant justified its position on the grounds that an oil
monopoly for Indiana Standard would damage the "established"
interests of Jersey Standard, and furthermore would errode the
open door policy the Department sought to establish in Peru,
The fact is that Standard Oil of New Jersey also attempted to
establish oil monopolies without incurring the disfavor of the
State Department, Standard Oil of Indiana's proposed oil mono
poly did not necessarily threaten I,P,C.'s holdings. See the
diplomatic correspondence from May to August, 1930*

^9

The messase was not wasted, for in
April I920, Walter
Teagle called on the governiaent to give his
company "all
possible and proper assistance. "^^ "The company
needed to
settle the La Brea y Parinas question; however,
such a
settlement might have to be reached in the context
of a

larger package deal.

~

During the Spring or Sumner of I920,

the International Petroleum Company offered the
Peruvian

government $10,000,000.00 in exchange for an oil monopoly
in that country— the compensation would cover the La
Brea
y Parinas problem as well.

Leguia neither accepted nor

rejected the offer— he merely kept everyone in suspense,

pending counter offers from Royal Dutch Shell, British Oil
Fields, Sinclair Oil, or from promoter Lewis Emery, Jr.

Leguia wanted a .^25,000,000.00 loan, and he wanted

Standard Oil of New Jersey to finance "the civic and general

sanitary improvements" which he had plaiined for Peru.

Since

the company was paying taxes of about 11,000,000.00 per year,

Legufa proposed to pledge that annual tax to service the
loan.

He also proposed.

.

."to settle in the company's favor

certain long- continued disputes with the government over the
67

titles of certain oil-lands in the Talara district.

The

^^As report 3d in an inter-office me.T-oranduii, April 8, 1920,
U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/23.

^^James Roth, Vice-Consul at Lima-Callao to Secretary of State,
August 3, 1920, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
No. 823.6363/29
^"^Carleton Jackson, American Trade Commissioner in Lima to
Department of State, August 5, 1920, U.S. Department of State
Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/32.

i
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executives of Standard Oil well understood their predicament—
the Peruvian Congress authorized the president to settle
the La Brea y Parinas controversy by international arbitration, but as of 1919 it was up to Leguia to initiate this

action.

He was not willing to do so unless Standard Oil

was willing to underwrite his public works program.

The

company rejected Leguja's proposal, and its relations with
the Peruvian strongman began to corrode rapidly.

Legufa

continued his coy strategy during the first half of 1921,

keeping the American ambassador partially informed of loan
offers by the representatives of the Shell Company and the
serious consideration they were being given.

At the same

time he earnestly declared his almost passionate partisanship for American capital.

You know, he was quoted as saying
by the American Ambassador, that if
I could have my way, Peru would be
practically American within ten or
fifteen years. But, Mr, Ambassador,
what can I do when the business interests of the United States refuse to
take advantage of the opportunities
given to come into Peru and lay the
foundation for such conditions

Leguia 's strategy

x^^as

clear.

He sought to pressure Standard

Oil of New Jersey into underwriting his government while

hinting that he had other bidders whom he would have taken
Augusto Leguia, as quoted by American Ambassador to Peru
William E, Gonzales in a dispatch to the Secretary of State,
July 26, 1921, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No,

823.6363A8.
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up long ago had it not been
for his love for American
business.
The company resented Legufa's
attitude. From the
middle Of 1920 to the fall of I92I.
International Petroleum's
manager in Lima. William Montavon-a
former representative
of the U.S Department of Commerce
in that city, openly
attacked the administration of Augusto
Legufa. Ambassador
Gonzales reported to Washington that
Hontavon was "favorable
to any revolutionary movement that
might cause an overthrow
Of the present government . "^^ The
ambassador admonished

Montavon against further public comment,
but Hontavon. upon
departing for a trip to the United States,
promptly declared
that an insurrection by one Captain
Cervantes then

in progress

in Iquitos signaled "the beginning of the
end of Legufa."

This was particularly distressing to the
ambassador, since
American military intelligence received reports that
oil

interests were financing the insurrection.

70

Another

would-be anti-Leguia revolutionary, Augusto Duran, also

approached American oil companies seeking a llOO.OOO.OO loan
in exchange for future concessions of oil lands in Peru. 71

While there is no evidence of whether or not the loan was
made, it was apparent that Standard Oil of New Jersey wanted
"^9

:

William

E, Gonzales to the Secretary of State, September 26,
1921, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363A8.

"^^

Ibid .
71

Henry S. Waterman, American Consul in San Jose, Costa Rica to
the Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
No. 823.6363/407.

52

to depose Legufa. or at least frighten him
into a compromise.
Standard Oil's "get tough" policy was deeply
disturbing
to the American diplomatic personnel in Lima.
William-

Gonzales, the U.S. Ambassador, noted that the
manager of

International Petroleum Company was "one of the most
prominent
Americans in Peru." and poignantly concluded that "any

tendency of American businessmen in foreign countries to
become 'King makers,' should be discouraged if for no
better

reason than in behalf of the sound general business interests
.•72

of the United States.

Unfortunately, Standard Oil's influence

in VJashington was great, and Gonzales's assignment was cut

short.

Even so, the logic of his statement would live to

haunt the company's Peruvian operation to the end of its
days.

With Gonzales replaced and Standard Oil threatening to
finance a new revolution, Leguia opted for settlement with
the company.

On August 27, 1921 Leguia 's Minister of Foreign

Affairs and a representative from Britain signed an Agreement
for Arbitration in Lima,

This agreement signaled the begin-

ning of the diplomatic phase of the La Brea y Parihas
controversy.

72

William E. Gonzales to the Secretary of State, September 26,
1921, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363A05.
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CHAPTER

II

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAUDO OF
1922

Any settlement of the La Brea
y Parinas controversy
necessarily had to involve several parties: the
formal

owners of the property— the British heirs of
the Keswick
estate, the London and Pacific Petroleum Company—
the

British firm which held a 99 year lease on the petroleum
fields. International Petroleum Company--Gan^dian owner
of

the London and Pacific Petroleum Company, Imperial Oil

Company— Canadian owner of International Petroleum Company,
and finally. Standard Oil of New Jersey

— American

owner of

Imperial Oil Company, and thus International Petroleum

Company and London and Pacific Petroleum Company.

Stripped

of corporate complexities, Standard Oil of New Jersey con-

trolled and operated through its Canadian and British subsidiaries the la Brea y Parinas property.

The heirs of the

Keswick estate had a stake in the form of the royalties due
them from the production of the Peruvian fields.

It was

the fact of British "ownership" however, which made an agree-

ment between the Peruvian and British governments diploma-

tically plausible.
The Agreement for Arbitration contained a statement of
the respective positions of the Peruvian and British governments:

The Government of the Republic of
Peru contends that the Supreme

5^

Resolutions or Decrees of the 31st
March, I911, 15th March and 22nd May,
1915, relating to the Mineral Pro,perty of "La Brea y Parinas" are
valid and legal and should be enforced,
and that the said Mineral Property is
subject to the general body of mining
laws vrhich may be in force in Peru
now or in the future.
The Government of His Britannic
Majesty, on the oi:her hand, contends
that the said Mineral Property has a
legal status distinct from that of
mineral property acquired and held in
the usual manner under the Mining
Ordinances or the Mining Code of Peru;
that the said Mineral Property is not
subject to the general body of raining
laws or to legislation inconsistant
with such distinct status, and that the
Supreme Resolutions or Decrees above
mentioned are invalid and cannot legally
be enforced.^
This document also stipulated that the Tribunal would be

composed in the following manner:

Peru and Great Britain

would each appoint an arbitrator, and the third jurist would
be the President of the Federal Court of the Republic of

Switzerland.

The subsequent articles of the Agreement

for Arbitration set forth the task of the Tribunal.

However,

in Article X, Paragraph II, was the key provision of the

agreement.
In case the Tribunal should, before
rendering its ax\^ard, suggest terms
which the two Governments may accept
The La Brea ^ Parinas Controversy Vol . I_ (International
Petroleum Company, February, 19^9 )t i^xhibit 2, p. 2.
,
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as satisfactory, or in
case the two
Goveraments should th^jr{^-^e~ rr—
Shall. In either case incorpo
|U£h settlement in an Award, ^Tti
vrhich
treated as the Award^
f^^lf
.

iil£unal./iimpahsis supplied/^

^h^

In other words, the Agreement
provided that should the
Peruvian sovernment and the British
government reach a
conpromise outside the auspices of
the Tribunal, the compromise itself would not suffice-it
would have to be incorporated into the award of the international
tribunal. What
was the reason for this peculiar
requirement?

The Leguia administration was willing
to settle for
a compromise even more favorable to the company
than the

agreement worked out in I915 and eventually rejected
by the
Peruvian Chamber of Deputies. Since the President had
no

legal power to reach a settlement without getting it
approved

by Congress, and since any compromise he forced down the
throat of Peru would only last as long as his stay in
power, the solution

-'/as

simple.

He would legitimize any

compromise he reached by transforming it into the award
of an international tribunal.

The compromise took the form of a bilateral treaty

between the governments of Peru and Great Britain.
2

Ibid .

,

p.

7.

It was

56

signed in Lima, rather than in
Paris where the Tribunal was
meeting.
On March 2. I922. the British
representative. Arthur Grand Duff and the Peruvian
Minister of Foreign Affairs. ^
Alberto Salomon signed the compromise
agreement, and on
April 2k, the Tribunal in Paris
issued the Lima agreement
as its award, over the signatures
of the presiding officer.
Fritz Ostertag. President of the Federal
Courts of Switzerland, the British arbitrator Robert
Laird Borden and his
Peruvian counterpart, Jose Varela Orbegoso,
In its first article,

"the High Contracting Parties"

agreed that the property comprised ^l,6l4 claims
of ^0,000
square meters each as the Peruvian government
had claimed

all along.

In the most important article, it stipulated
that

for a period of fifty years, beginning January
1. 1922, the

company would be liable for annual taxes of 30 soles per
pertenencia under exploitation and one sol per un-exploited
pertenencia

3
.

T-his

settlement was far more advantageous to

the company than the earlier compromise which had been

defeated by the Civilista-controlled Congress.

In the

earlier proposal, there was a graduated tax on the unexploited

pertenencias which started at one sol during the first ten
years and escalated to fifteen sole s during the last twenty

years of the fifty year period covered by the agreement.
^Ibid.. pp. 9-10.
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The Avrard of I922 also provided
that at the end of the
fifty year period for which there
was fixed taxation, the

property would "be subject to the tax
base on surface, tax
on production, royalties, and all
other contributions and
taxes which may be established by the
laws then in force.
Article V stipulated that:From the aforesaid consideration the
owners of "La Brea y Parifias" will
pay the Government of Peru the sum
of one million dollars (-?1, 000, 000)
American gold, which will include
the payment of all contributions
accrued up to December 31st, I92I,
and every other claim which may exist
in relation to the property "La Brea
y Parinas.
"^

For one million dollars. La Brea y Parinas was
granted a

clean slate so far as all possible claims to back
taxes

were concerned.

But why should the British owners pay Peru

a million dollars U.S. currency?

Perhaps the British played only a formal and symbolic

role in all the negotiations.

When an irate member of Par-

liament in London inquired who was going to pay for the

arbitration, the British Under-secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs replied that "the International Petroleum Company
have undertaken in writing, through their solicitors to

^Ibid .
^Ibid,, p. 11.

J
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indemnify His Majesty's Government
against any renumeration
of the arbitrator and agent
respectively."^
In fact, the

London and Pacific Petroleum
Conpany-of British registry,
had been under liquidation since
I916.
It was under the
direct control of International
Petroleum Company, and its
board of directors was dissolved in
I9I6.
The real
bene-

ficiaries of the Award of 1922 or Laudo
as it became known
in Spanish was the Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey

through its subsidiary International Petroleum
Company.
The profits of I.P.C. in Peru are
confidential, and
buried in a consolidated statement of the
company's
profits throughout Latin America.

study by

J.

However, an economic

Fred Hippy originally published in I959 was

most revealing.

After noting that most British investments

in Peru were disastrous,, the author noted the exceptions --

Lobitos Oil-Fields Ltd., and.

.

.

More remarkable still vias the financial
record of International Petroleum Company,
Limited. . . For three decades beginning
in 1921, International Petroleum paid
an average annual dividend of ^-0 percent
on a nominal capital of approximately
$36 mi Hi on i No year passed without a
reward to its shareholders; the return
was no less than 100 percent annually
for four consecutive years (1935-1938)
But English investors probably did not
As quoted in a dispatch from Robert T. Kennedy, American
Consul General in London to the Department of State,
February 15, 1922, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
No. 823.6363/59.
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own more than a fourth of
its
securities, perhaps not more
an equivalent of 2 million.^ than
While some Peruvians were aware
that the London and Pacific
Company had a tremendously
profitable operation,^ and
while they must have suspected that
I.P.c. was not any
less lucrative, they did not have
proof.
Secrecy
on the

part Of the company and partial
knowledge and suspicion
on the part of the Peruvian government
henceforth created

an atmosphere of mutual distrust.

Peruvians imagined the

company profits as astronomical.
With renewed confidence, Standard Oil
moved to simplify
the complex legal status quo of La Brea
Parihas.
y

In 1924-

it acquired title to that property and
thus terminated the

lease arrangement which had prevailed up to
that point.

acquiring La Brea y Parihas after the Laudo of

By

1922,' Standard

Oil's International Petroleum Company hoped to have a
clean
slate.

The company maintained that the arbitral award took

place betvjeen Peru and the British and that since the company
did not acquire the property until 192^, it had nothing to
7"

James Fred Rippy, British Investment in Latin America 1822 ^9^9 A Case Study in the Operations of Private ii:ntGrprise
in Retarded lie.-ions (2nd. ed.
riamden, Comiecticut
.-ircron
Books, 1966), pp. 131-132.
Ricardo A. Deustua showed data that London and Pacific Petroleum paid dividends of 37h'/^ and 20:^' of capital investment
in 191^1- and 1915. Ricardo A. Deustua, El Petroleo en el
Peru (Lima: Imprenta Americana, 1921), p."""6'8".

—

,

"

;

:
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to do with the agreement.^

Internatioml Petroleum Company
the 1922 settlement,

m

^med

only time with

192^. Royal Dutch Shell
took action

Signaling "the commencement
of a new campaign between
the
European and the A..erican oil
concerns for the domination
Of the Oil ^.,et...
The new offensive was to
center on
Standard's Peruvian production
and its distribution
in

Canada.

It did not take long for
Peru's President. Augusto
Legufa. to realize that the rivalry

would mean new oppor-

tunities for his regime.
In the Fall of I926, President
Legufa's son Juan departed
for Europe with the task of selling
the Roj^l Dutch Shell
Company a monopoly on the distribution
of gasoline in Peru.
Ample opportunity was given for
American interests to learn
of his intention, and I.P.C..S general
manager in Lima even
managed to acquire a copy of the proposed
contract.
In the
newest of Legufa's schemes, I.P.C. would
be allowed
to con-

tinue its operations;

however, it would have to sell enough

petroleum products to supply Shell's monopoly
at specified
rates, and under penalty of confiscation, I.P.C.
would
be

banned from marketing any gasoline in Peru.
9

The company

"El Laudo de La 3rea y Parinas y la posicion de
la International
^Petroleum," iToticias de Pctroleo XIII. Mo. 11? (Hay. i960).
J

.

Report from the Dutch press sent from the American Legation
in The Hague to the Department of State, September
24, 1924,
U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, IIo.'
823.6363/67,
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would remain free^to export
whatever oil surplus Peru-s
fields produced.
Legufa's plan became a casualty
of the dictator's
failing health. When, in 1927.
it became known that he
would need surgery, foreign capital
became fearful that
Legufa would die or be overthrown.
This fear was replaced
by the economic catastrophe in
1929-the Great

Crash-as

the major cause of lagging dollar
inflow into Peru.
"When
the inflow of capital stopped. .
.
Legula's downfall was
not long coming." ^ Leguia's demise
in power ended a sort
of carnival for foreign capital which he
and his son had
been running. Juan Legufa would travel to
New York and
arrange loans of up to fifty million dollars;
the banks
would charge exhorbitant commissions and then
sell the bonds
to the American public.
Juan Legufa usually got a percentage
of the proceeds and everyone benefited except the
Peruvian

nation and the Americans who bought the default bound
securities.

Six months after the end of Leguia's Onccnio,

Peru began to default its sizeable foreign debt.

The Sdnchez

Cerro administration indignantly pointed out that as of

January 1932, servicing the foreign debt would h^ve amounted
to

3^.3/i'

of the national revenues.

13

^-^Hemorandum from Leland Harrison, Assistant Secretary of State
to Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State, December 1^, 192(
U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.0363/91.

^^James

Carey, Peru and the United States, I90O - I962 (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 196^1), p. 62.
-'•^
Ibid ., p. 78.
C.
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International Petroleum Company
fared well during
the cataclysmic events of the
early 1930- s. The Peruvian
populace, which had a vague
understanding of Legufa's
pro-foreign business policy, struck
back by attacking American
businesses. The Cerro de Pasco
Corporation suffered heavy
damage from riots; however, in
contrast. l.P.c.'s installations
in Peru's distant Northeast
corner remained undisturbed.
The International Petrolei^ Company
moved cautiously to
protect its k5 million dollar investment.
The new nationalism
prevalent in Lima, with its xenophobic
connotations, was
very dangerous, but at the same time.
Peru's precarious
financial position presented many opportunities.

The government of Sanchez Cerro wished
to institute a
tough policy towards foreign companies and
I.P.C. in particular.
In the minds of most Peruvians, foreign
companies
had a long and guilty partnership with Augusto
Legufa— it

was thus politically attractive to hit these
companies hard.
On the other hand, Legufa left the country bankrupt
and
badly in need of funds— only the American capitalists
had
the cash to save the situation.

As a result of this dilemma,

the government followed a two-faced policy.

consumption, the Sanchez Cerro Administration

moves to invalidate the 1922 Award.

For public conmc^de

dramatic

But in secret, his

government continued Legufa's policy in an attempt to persuade
cajole and even blaclaaail I.P.C. into giving Peru financial

/
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support.

Sanchez Cerro had two weapons:

diplomatic assaults

on the Award, and a law passed by
the Legufa sovernment in
February I930 which authorized the
creation of a petroleum
marketing monopoly. Ironically, that
law was passed in anticipation of such an arrangement between
Peru and I.P.C. in
spite of its pious anti-monopolist
platitudes, the
U.S.

Department of State gave its blessing
to that proposed monopoly, and it even went so far as to
torpedo an attempt by
another American company. Standard Oil of
Indiana, to outbid
Jersey Standard's International Petroleum Company.

Reflecting its public policy, in April I93I the
Peruvian
government announced that it considered the 1922 Laudo
non-

binding since it had never been ratified by the Peruvian
Congress, and that it intended to collect 22,000 soles
in back taxes beginning with 1924, the year in which I.P.C,

formally purchased La Brea y Parinas,"^^

This action by the

government triggered a new offensive against I.P.C. by its

traditional Peruvian enemies, who once more had the virulent

backing of Antonio Hiro Quesada and his newspaper El Comerci

o.

As is often the case in Peruvian politics, appearances did
not tell the whole story.
TIi

For months prior to the new

See the diplomatic corresDondenc from Hay 2 to September
U.S. Department of' State Decimal Files, Nos. 823,6363/
1930.
*

111,

117,

120. 122.

125,

126. 127.

128,

^^Fred Morris Doaring, American Ambassador to Peru, to the
Department of State, April 7. 1931. U-S* Depajftment of
State Decimal Files, Wo. 823. 6363/133

Official pseudo-offensive a^inst
the company, the Peruvian
government reached what can only
be described as a cozy
modus Vivendi with International
Petroleum Company.
Shortly
after the Sa^nchez Cerro government
took power, funds dried
up and the government found that
it could not pay its army,
navy or police. As a career
military officer. Sanchez Cerro

knew that a sovernment which cannot
pay the Armed Forces
does not endure.
His solution was simple-get
the money
from a party you can trust and pay
off
those you cannot.

In late November or early December
I930, the "revolutionary-

government sent its Minister of Finance
to confer with a
most important American in Peru, the
general manager of

International Petroleum.

The minister pleaded for the

company to secretly advance the Peruvian
government one
and a half million soles. After urgent
consultations with
the company's high command, the loan was granted
and
the

government saved.
Unaware of the company's financing of the Peruvian

government, many of Peru's political leaders hastened to
the attack against I.P.C.

A Constituent Assembly was called

to draft a new constitution, and it took up the question of
La Brea y Parinas.

The same topic

V7as

simultaneously being

Fred Morris Dearing to the Department of State, December
19 and 26, 1930, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files,
Nos. 823.6363/131 and 132.
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considered by the Peruvian Congress.

Fearing that the situa-

tion would get out of hand, the Sanchez
Cerro government
anticipated the Assembly and the Congress
by a few

days and

cabled its representative in Geneva to
request the Permanent
Court of International Justice to revise
the
I922 Award.

Subsequently, the Peruvian Congress passed a law
authorizing
the executive to do what he had already done.
The Congress

explicitly outlined the reasons why the Award should be
revised.
First, the Award did not settle the classification
of property to which the subsoil of La Brea
y Parinas belonged.

Second, it did not have provisions for Congressional

approval of the arrangement.

Third, the Award legislated

on matters of taxation, and hence impinged upon the powers
of the Peruvian Congress, and finally, it exceeded the
limits set out by the Law of I9I8 authorizing the arbitration. 17
Of course, the Permanent Court of International Justice

had no jurisdiction over the decision of another International

Tribunal, or for that matter over any dispute unless both

parties to the dispute would be willing to submit to its
judgement.

Great Britain was not about to reopen the question,

and thus this move by the Peruvian government was purely
political.

If anything it undermined its previous position,

Starrett, American Charge d 'Affaires ad interim in Lima
to the Department of State, April 25 1932, U.S. Department
of State Decimal Files, No. 823. 6363/I5I.

^''h.P.

1
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for if Peru did not consider
the Award binding in I93I.
how
could it now ask that it be revised
in I932? Diplomatic
moves notwithstanding. Peruvian
politicians in the Constituent
Assembly now competed with each
other to see who would
champion the anti-I.P.c. crusade.
On March 21. the Assembly

approved appointments to a special
committee on the revision
of petroleum laws.
Eight days later Congressman Calmell
del
Solar introduced a bill which provided
for the construction
of ^.000 schools to be financed through the
profits
of a

petroleum monopoly.

18

Through all of this stormy political

situation. I.P.C.'s management remained notably
calm.

While

at times they wondered whether the situation
would snowball
out of control,

for the most part they knew that the Executive

branch was in their pocket.

diplomatic offensive

x^^as

In fact, while the pseudo-

going full steam ahead, the Peruvian

Minister of Foreign Affairs privately assured the company's
manager, Walter Reed, that "so far as he.

.

.

was concerned,

the matter of altering the treaty between Peru and Great

Britain was a closed issue.

"'''^

Not only did the company save the day for Peru's govern-

ment in December 1931. from that point on I.P-C. began to

regularly ?.dvance the Sanchez Cerro administration from 25,000
^°Fred Morris Dearing to the Department of State, Ilarch 21 and
31, 1932, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 823.6363/
1^6 and 1^8.
-'^Ibid.
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to 30.000 Peruvian Pounds
a month through an
Italian banl.
in consideration of furure
export taxes. When this
advance

allowance did not suffice, the
Minister of Finance pleaded
for larger advances from
International Petroleum and went
so far as to suggest that I.P.C.'s
Lima manager Walter Reed
deceive the company's home office by
stating that the

Peruvian government was forcing I.P.C.
to make larger advance
payments.
Walter Reed refused, not for ethical
but for political reasons.
He explained to Ambassador Bearing
that "in
view of the precarious nature of the
Government, the fact
that it might be forced out of office,
and that its successor
may not take it kindly that a foreign
corporation assisted
to prolong its existence by conniving with
it to deceive the
."^^ the International Petroleum
public.
Company would
not advance the Sanchez Cerro government additional
.

funds.

International Petroleum's involvement in Peruvian
politics reached even further than this incident indicated.
Sometime during the first half of 1932. the Minister of
Development and President of the Council of Ministers,

Francisco Lanatta, approached I.P.C.

's

manager and asked

for an advance on the customs pajnnents at a 1^% discount
to I.P.C.
20

The money was needed to get the Peruvian Navy's

Fred Morris Bearing to the Department of State. November 1^.
1932, U.S. Department of State Decimal Files, No. 721.23/511,
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Ship bottoms scraped.

I^natta enbezzeled the money.
a confrontation involving
several government ministers,
and
the President of Peru. Walter
Reed unmasked the corrupt
lanatta. was instrumental in
getting him fired, and established "very friendly contact with
the President "^^

m

.

It

appears that during this stage of
Peruvian history, many
members of the Council of Hinisters
consulted individually
with I.P.C.'s general manager about
their efforts
to meet

the payroll, carry out their programs
and even secure
personal wealth.

International Petroleujn Company was also
involved in
Peru's foreign affairs.
During the latter part of I932.
Peru's border dispute with Colombia flared up. and
when war
became a distinct possibility, the Peruvian government began
to seek weapons purchase money so it could fight the impendin
war.

V/ashington imposed an arms embargo on both Peru and

Colombia;

therefore, the Japanese and French arms dealers

were quite active.

In January 1933. the Peruvian government

asked I.P.C. for 3800,000 worth of petroleum, the value of
future export duties, so that Peru could use the oil to

buy French weapons.

The company ballsed, but the Peruvian

government pressed its request.

I-P.C.

claimed that it

___

See ^^nclosure No. 1 in a dispatch from Fred Horris Bearing
to the Department of State. April 6, 1932, U.S. Department
of State Decimal Files, No. 823. 51/821.
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had already. advanced the government
the equivalent of one
year's worth of taxes and export duties,
and the requested
sum of ^800.000 would pay in advance all
taxes for three
and a half years. While the company's
financial allegations
were technically correct, the foremost
reasons for its

refusal were political and diplomatic.

First, the American

Embassy made it known that "approval of the
proposal would
annul the effect of the Department's embargo on arms
"^^
plan.
Also of great concern to the company was the fact
that it
had operations both in Peru and Colombia, and it
did not

want to imperil its position in either country by
aiding the
other.

23

By the end of the Sanchez Cerro administration in
1933,
the pattern of interaction

betiNreen

the Peruvian government

and International Petroleum Company was established.

Unlike

during its relationship with Augusto Le^uia, the company
was not celebrated as the foremost foreign benefactor of
Peru.

Rather, I.P.G. was regarded as a kind of necessary

nuisance.

Privately, the government knew it could count

on the company for advance taxes with discretion.

In a

22

In a telegram to the Department of State, Ambassador Dearing
suggested that Standard Oil of New Jersey be informed of
the conseqaences of accepting Peru's proposals.
Fred Men is
Dearing to the Depart ment of State, January 13. 1933, U.S.
Department of State Decimal Files, No. 721. 23/729.

23

I.P.C.'s management expressed preoccupation with this point
to Ambassador Dearing, who in turn reported it to V/ashington.
Ibid.
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financially troubled nation such as
Peru this was an
important consideration.
International Petroleum Company entered
into similar
arrangements with succeeding governments
of Peru not because it was corrupt, but because
in a world of unmitigated
commercial competition it had to adapt to
the Peruvian

rules

of the game or risk being dislodged bu its
arch competitor,
Royal Dutch Shell.
The operations in Peru were extremely

profitable, but profit alone was not necessarily
the primary
motivating force behind corporate behavior. Rather,
there

existed a kind of corporate nationalism or "corporatism"—

devotion to the growth and well-being of the corporation.
This force drove the management of the company into what
can best be described as an extra-legal relationship—

a relationship which was doomed from the start, and would

eventually lead to a confrontation between Peru and Standard
Oil's International Petroleum Company.

Peru was a sovereign state, but within its borders
there existed another state

— not

necessarily an American

colony, but part of a multinational concern vrith supra-

national loj'alties.

To Standard Oil of New Jersey, the

United States was not necessarily the object of supreme
loyalty.

More often than not the company kept the Department

of State in the dark about its activities.

Corporate memory

is long, and the dismemberment order of I9II was a very
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painful blow to the international
giant of oil.
The company
informed the American embassy of its
activities only when
it was expediant for it to do so.
Peru's problems with the International
Petroleum
Company stemmed not from the fact that it
was an American
company somehow geared to exploit Peru on behalf
of the
United States, but rather from the fact that
its parent
company. Standard Oil of New Jersey, was a far
larger organization, and commanded more resources than the
Peruvian
state.

The United States broke up Rockefeller's oil trust

when the corporate giant seemed to be getting out of hand
domestically.

When Standard Oil, through I.P.C., moved into

Peru, the company was already too large and too powerful

for the Peruvian state to do the same.

For example, it

would be inconceivable for an American company to refuse
cooperation with the U.S. government during V/orld War II
because it might have had interests in Germany or Japan.
But it was possible, and actually happened that the Inter-

national Petroleum Company refused to cooperate with the
Peruvian government

v:hen it

anticipated a war with Colombia

because the company had interests there as well.
In theory, for Peruvians the state was majestic and

sovereign--the state was the supremo gobierno

.

In practice

the Peruvian government was a x^eakling in comparison with
one of its corporate citizens.

The incompatibility of this
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theoretical conception with practical
conditions made it difficult for both parties to function.
Peruvian nationalists
from the "right" and 'left" never forgave
I.P.c. for operating
in their country as if it were a banana
republic-buying off
cabinet members and even total administrations,
blackmailing
duly constituted legislatures into submission
to company
demands.

I.P.C. for its part, could not very well
accept

the constant threat of fleecing promoted by
corrupt Peruvian
politicians. After all, it was company expertise
and capital
which transformed La 3rea y Parinas from a barren
desert

into a boom town employing thousands of Peruvians and
indirectl

providing a decent living for many more.

The company attempt-

ed to bargain in good faith, only to discover that its
con-

cessions merely incited Peruvian chauvenisra to ever more

preposterous demands.

What was originally a difference over

taxes grew Into a giant of mistrust and hatred bridging two

generations of Peruvian political leaders.

As time passed,

this bitterness grew and the principal contending parties
froze their minds against compromise.

Who were there parties, and why did they act as they
did?

Besides the company and its constant ally, the American

embassy, there were three distinct croups in Peruvian politics

actively participating in the controversy:

first,

the

lilvo-

Quesada family and its Journalist friends, the traditionalists-
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nationalistic people with a long-standing
enmity for the
company, who seized every opportunity
to attack

and embarrass

the company;

second, the Peruvian leftist radicals,
who

naturally singled out I.P.C. as the most
prominent member
of what they considered the exploitative
club of American
capitalists in Peru;

finally, Peru's industrial and com-

mercial elite in Lima, which could and apparently
did profit
from the activities of International Petroleum Company—
the group which comprised the company's most important
Peru-

vian allies.

7^

CHAPTER III
FROM POWER BROKER TO BELEAGUHED
UTILITY:

THE REVENGE OF THE INCA

The influence of the International
Petroleum Company
on Peruvian politics reached
its peak during the I930.3.
Due to improved technology such
as deeper drilling and artificial stimulation of oil flow from
the ground, the production of
Brea y Parinas grew from a daily
average of
26.800 barrels to an all-time high of
^1.300 barrels daily
in 1936.
From then on. the production began a
slow descent
to about 1^.000 barrels a day in I968.
the year the property was finally nationalized.^ Though
internal oil prices
were artificially low due to government
price

controls, large

exports combined with a niniscule domestic
consumption managed
to produce huge profits for International Petroleum.
"

On the average Peru consumed less than 10.000
barrels
dai]y, and thus the company exported three-fourths
of the

total oil produced during the 1930

's.

In 1937.

for instance,

I.P.C. exported a total of 13-5 million barrels of oil from
Peru.

Given the relatively low labor costs, proximity of

"^Max E. Crawford. "Los Problemas de la Industria Petrolera
^en el Peru." FANAL VIII. No. 37 (1953). pp. 21-22.
.

Calculated from date in:
U.S., Department of State. Annual
Petroleum Report 1 967 Peru Department of State Document
No. A-592 (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office. I969).
Enclosure No. 1.

—

—

,
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the Oil fields to port facilities
and high quality of the
crude Oil. as well as the minimal
taxes set by the Laudo
of 1922, the company managed to
turn profits which amounted
to a 100^ return on the investment
for four consecutive
years (1935-1938).^ The I930 s
represented a golden era
for International Petroleum Company-an
era soon to disappear
under the stress of an antagonistic landed
oligarchy.
•

Tr.e

factors contributing to this erosion of the
company's poorer
were varied, but the most important was the
willingness of
the Peruvian government to make concessions to
the lower

classes at the expense of I.P.C.'s profit margin.
In 1939.

shortly after the beginning of World War II,

the Peruvian government imposed a price freeze on
most con-

sumer items.

After the war, the government hesitated to

lift the price controls for political reasons, but finally
in 194-9 it yielded to economic pressure and eliminated the

price controls on most items with two exceptions, bread

and petroleum products.

The government simply figured that

International Petroleum Company, the country's major

petrcle--ni

producer, did not wield voting power, and that in a country

where the populace had grown accustomed to low fuel prices,
these prions could not be raised without political repercvs^ ons
'

James Fred Hippy, British Investment in I^tin America 1-22 19^9 ~-'A Case Study in the Operations of Private Enternri ze in
Retarded Regions (2nd, ed.
Hamden, Connecticut: Archcn
Books. 1966), pp. 131-132.
,

;
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While the fact of frozen domestic prices
was not too
important at first since Peru consumed a
relatively small
proportion of the oil it produced and the rest
was sold

abroad at world markets, internal consumption
increased
dramatically during the 19^0 s and continued to

increase to

'

the present— in part as a result of artificially
low prices.

International Petroleum Company operated under two laws
which
had a pincer effect on its profits.
Law ^i^52, passed
in

1922, at the instigation of the Leguia government,
provided

that I.P.C. would have to satisfy Peru's internal markets

before selling abroad.

While this provision had little

Importance in 1922, by the middle 1950's Peru was consuming
as much as La Brea y Parinas could produce, and by the early
1960's the country had a petroleum "deficit"— it actually
had to import some oil.

The second government action

affecting profits was the previously mentioned price freeze
and subsequent government price control.

As a result,

petroleum derivatives in Peru remained at their 1939 level
until 19^8.

During that year, the prices of diesel fuel

and residual oil were raised, and in the following year the
price of kerosene was increased.
sene was

1930

'

s

a.f^ain

In 1953.

the price of kero-

increased and for the first time since the

the price of gasoline was raised.

were fixed in Peruvian soles

,

Since the prices

inflation had the net effect

"
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of actually reducing the price of
gas over the years.
Thus,
while the price of gasoline remained at 1^2
Peruvian cents
per gallon from 1934 to 1953. in U.S.
currency the price
went from ten cents a gallon in
193^ to about three cents
a gallon in 1953-

As a result of the artificially low
prices imposed by
the government, the consumption of kerosene—a
petroleum

derivative--rose steadily over the years.

In the 1960's,

it was claculated that 90% of the homes in the
Lima-Callao

area used kerosene as a cooking fuel.

People also used

kerosene throughout Peru for illumination, refrigeration,
heating, as a cleaning fluid, and finally, as a substitute

for more expensive fuels or as a cheaper additive.

About

1Q% of the 8,500 barrels of kerosene used per day in Peru
served as a substitute for more expensive fuels.

^

The

price of kerosene during the 1953 to 1959 period was 0.95
sol^s per gallon, or the equivalent of seven cents in U.S.
6

Even after the prices were raised in 1959,

currency.

Peruvian kerosene at
cheap.

.

.

C.

,

pp.

7
.

.

Peterson and Tomas Ungcr. Petroleo

(Lima: n.p..

^Ibid.

l.io per gallon /was7 extraordinarily

The prices in the world market /yieve/ two or

three times higher.
Harries

S.

"the

1964),

126-146.

p.

Hora Cero

:

301.

Ibid

.

,

p.

305-

"^Ibid.

.

p.

130.

.
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Prices were deliberately kept low
because the government knew that the lower classes,
particularly those living
in Lima-Callao, Cuzco and other urban
centers, relied on
these low prices, and any substantial
alteration could create
Civil unrest.
Tha oil companies were required by
Laws ^^152

and 11780 to provide kerosene for Peruvian
consumption.
F^d
it not been for this legal requirement,
the oil companies
would have used the petroleum to produce
gasoline, and diesel
fuels, and not kerosene.
Because the Laudo of

1922 set forth

the operating procedures of La Erea
y Parinas. these laws
had no technical application to the I.P.C. property.

However,

for political reasons and to its financial disadvantage,
the

company produced G6% of all kerosene in Peru, and the Talara

refinery processed over SQ% of it.
During most of the 1950'

s

8

the prices for gasoline, diesel

fuel and residual oil were not much higher than kerosene.

With the exception of premium gasoline which sold for

S.

per gallon, all other fuels sold at prices ranging from
1.05 to

S.

1.17 per gallon.

5. 20

S.

Not only were prices kept low

by decree, but the companies were forced to have the same
prices throughout Peru, regardless of varying costs for
t rans por t a t i on

Ibid

.

,

pp.

137-1'^!.
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These laws and regulations had the
effect of turning
the International Petroleum Company and
the British-owned
Petrolera Lobitos. the major private concerns
in the Peruvian
petroleum business, into virtual utilities.
Like an American electric or telephone company, I.P.G. had
to constantly

haggle over the price of its products and over what
would
be a reasonable return for its parent company;

but unlike

the American utilities which can count on stockholder
support
in their communities, I.P.C. had virtually no constituency

of its own other than the workers in Talara and their dependents

who proved to be more of an impediment than a help to the
company.

Beginning the the late 19^0

's,

International Petroleum

Company actively campaigned to get legislative changes introduced.

With alarm, the company pointed out that the petro-

leum legislation governing concessions in Peru was unattractive to foreign capital, and therefore no new companies had

explored for Peruvian oil since the administration of Augusto
Legufa.

Actually, Peruvians hoped that a government enter-

prise, founded during the administration of Oscar Benavides.

would carry out exploration and development of a state-owned
petroleum industry.

To begin this enterprise, the Benavides

government bought out several small petroleum companies with
dubious petroleum reserves.

In part, this move by Peru was
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prompted by the diplomatic proddings
of the Mexican legation.
Which was actively advocating the
emulation of Mexican nationalization elsewhere in Latin America.^ The
Peruvian company,
the Empresa Petrolera Fiscal, became
a viable entity, but
by the middle 19^0 's it was evident that
even when heavily
favored by the government's fiscal and
regulatory
policies,

the company could not. really take on the
task of rapidly
expanding Peru's oil industry.
The controversy over the concessions of the
Sechura
Desert, an area thought to contain rich petroleum
deposits

and contiguous to the La BreayParinas fields well
illustrated

Peru's dilemma vis a vis economic development and the
role
of foreign capital in the economic progress of a nation.

During the 19^0

's.

this Sechura concession came to the fore-

front of Peruvian politics.

The government decided to develop

the deposits, for it was increasingly clear that with the

rapidly

expanding Peruvian consumption, the day when Peru

would be forced to import oil was not far off.

The govern-

ment's first step was to order a feasibility study to find
out if the state-owned company could develop the field, or
if other Peruvian capitalists could do it.
Q

When the study

^Laurence A. Steinhardt, American Ambassador to Lima to the
Department of State, March 28, 1938, U.S. Department of State
Decimal Files, No. 812.6363/3380; February 2, 1939, I^o.
823.6363/196; March 20, 1939. No. 823. 6363/200.

.
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wa s reported, it placed a price tag
of

S.

100.000.000 for

exploration alone.

Neither the Peruvian treasury
nor the
Peruvian private capitalists could possibly
raise such a
sum

of money.

Since International Petroleum Company
had

the drilling equipemnt and personnel in a
location close
to Sechura. it soon became obvious that
if any foreign
company became involved, it would be I.P.C.-no
other company
could afford to imderbid it.
The question became

hov:

to strike a deal with the

alleged "thief" responsible for the 1922 Laudo. how to
develop the Sechura field vfhile protecting Peru's interests
from possible

I. P.O.

infringement.

President of Peru Jose

Luis 3ustamente y Rivero reached an agreement with I.P.C.
in

19^6— the Sechura Contract.

The contract became a sub-

ject for discussion first in the Aprista-dominated Peruvian

Congress, but in a matter of days, the discussion became a
cg^^^e

celebre

,

with every political group and both major

Lima newspapers jumping into the fray to guard the national
interest
Luis Miro ^uesada,

chief editor of El Comer cio

.

took

up the cause of his fallen brother Antonio, who led the
10

For reports of parliamentary action on this matter, see
"Camara de Senadores," El ComGrcio December 27, 1946, p.
,

2.
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11

Civilista schism in xy±o.
1Q18

^in^
The

^acontract
came under scrutiny.

With perhaps more pomp and circumstance
than the occasion
merited. El Comerciq reminded its readers
that
"after the

age of iron and coal, which were the
determining factors
of material power in the last century,
in our time the basic
"^^
factor of that power is petroleum.
Hiro Quesada at
first simply demanded that Peruvians give a
great deal of
attention to the matter of this oil concession.
He asked
that final consideration be postponed pending
this further
discussion.
The Peruvian Senate concurred, and within a
.

.

week of his first editorial, Hiro Quesada produced a
list
of specific objections.

Recounting the fact that the pro-

posed contract involved six provinces,
cities,

tv7o

departments, two

several roads, etc., Kiro Quesada demanded caution-

as if Peru was about to relinquish part of its territory.
He exhorted the citizenry to exercise "patriotic care,"

for the new concessions could affect Peru's commitments to

Hemispheric defense.

Finally, he specifically demanded that

Luis's brother, Antonio Miro Quesada and his wife were
assassinated by Carlos Steer, an Aprista fanatic on Hay
Luis rliro Quesada then became family mtriarch
15. 1935'
and editor of El Comercio
naturally, the ideological animosity the Hiro Quesadas felt for APRA before the crime xfas
afterwards magnified a thousand fold into a feud which knew
no truce.
.

12

Luis Hiro Quesada, "El Contrato sobro la zona Dctrolifera
de Sechura," 21 Gomercio, December 27, 19^6, p'. 7.
This
quotation and all others taken from Spanish materials in
this thesis were translated by this author unless otherwise
noted.

,
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the contract be limited to a certain
time period, after which
the Peruvian government or local capitalists
x^ould step in
and continue the development of these new
oil fields/"^

Miro Quesada rationally admitted that Sechura
should
be developed, and that only the International
Petroleum

Company had the economic and technological resources
to do so;
however, he could not emotionally accept an agreement
which
delivered what he imagined to be Peru's

2Q'th

century version

of the ancient Potosf mine to his hated enemy, the Interna-

tional Petroleum Company.

I.P.C. was needed for the initial

development but Peru deserved the fruits.

Noting these

objections raised against the contract, I.p.G.'s general

manager H.A. Grimes forwarded a proposal to the Peruvian
government declaring that I.P.C. would be willing to accept
a time limit on the concession of no less than forty years,

with a possible twenty year extension.

However, in exchange

for this concession, the company demanded that the tax rate
1^
be fixed for the duration of the contract
--a provision

which Miro Quesada and other critics of I.P.C. interpreted
as an attempt to usurp the taxation powers of the Peruvian

Congr e s s
13

See the editorial "El contrato sobre el petroleo de Sechura,"
El C omer cio December 30, 19^6, d. 2.
,

The text of this company demand is reproduced in:
Parlamentarios, " El Comercio. January '-r^ 19^7, p.

"Documentos
^.

8^
As the battle over Sechura
progressed, certain fact;;s
became clear.
Echoing objections raised during
the second
decade of the century, Peruvian
conservatives opposed the
agreement even while recognizing that there
x^ras no viable
alternative to an I.P.C. concession. At the
same time, the
government was in no position to stall in
developing additional oil sources in Peru, for ignoring Sechura
would only
cause an eventual energy crisis.
This battle of the 19^10 s
'

was not a carbon copy of the previous
controversy during
the Pardo administration.
One new factor was the Alianza

Popular Revolucionaria Americana, a political party
and
movement which did not exist in the early 20th century
but by the 19^0

'

s

loomed as Peru's dominant political force.

APRA was founded in 192^ by a young Peruvian student
leader,

Vfctor Raul Haya de la Torre.

At its inception it was a

radical movement— aiming for social reform in Latin America;
hovrcver,

its true strength was in Peru.

By 19^0. Apristas

had eschewed their early radicalism, and developed a gradualist progressive political party.

In addition to this new

factor of Aprista political pressure, the Peruvian Armed Forces
viere

invited to study the Sechura Contract and issue an

opinion.

Their report was conf id<=ntial, but the word soon

leaked out that the Armed Forces were not favorably disposed
tovrards International Petroleum Company or the proposed contract
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No sooner had the question of
Sechura and its potential
exploitation by the International Petroleum
Company come
to the fore as a clear political
issue than the Apristas
and the oligarchy began to maneuver
to place responsibility
for what was to be a necessary but
unpopular political act.
the Sechura Contract, in each other's lap.
Hiro Quesada,
who hated the Apristas for ideological and
personal reasons,
presented an ambivalent position.
On the one hand he stated
that the contract was of the gravest
importance and should
be given utmost consideration.
On the other hand, he Imew
that if A-PRA used its congressional majority to
railroad
the contract through, El Comercio would acquire a
major

weapon against the then radical party- -alleged collusion

with Peru's number one public

''enemy" and foremost repre-

sentative of Yanl^ee ''imperialism," the International Petroleum
Company.

Manuel Seoane, the leader of APRA's congressional forces,

was far too wise to make such a mistake.

Besides, the Apristas

enemies jumped the gun by accusing the party of collusion

before the Sechura Contract was even approved.

An opposition

senator argued that I-P.C. had "no moral responsibility whatsoever,

"

and therefore any agreement with such a company

would be immoral regardless of the conditions.
senator

Another

ventured to recount previously disproved charges

that I.P.C. had been defrauding Peru by carting off more

8.6

oil than it declared and even put a
price ta^ on the alleged
fraud. S. 5.000.000.000.
Still another critic of the agreement declared that "it reminded one
of the contract between
Mephistopheles and Faust, in which the
devil wanted to take
""^^
the soul of the contracting party by
all means.
Takin-^ note of the maneuvering of
his enemies, and

speaking for AFRA's senatorial delegation.
Hanuel Seoane
went on record stating that even though ^PRA
could simply
vote the Sechura Contract into law. it would
not do
so;

rather, it would vote for tabling the contract
as a sign of
respect for public opinion and democratic procedures.
Seoane

also attempted to disassociate his party from the
contract
and from I.P.G.. but with little success, for the
opposition,

now angered by APHA

•

s

tactical withdrawal, zeroed in on

the party.

The political forces opposed to the contract noted that
APPJi had

three cabinet members in the government including

Minister of Development Cesar Ellas, the public official responsible for negotiating^- the contract.

Time and again.

APRA was pinned with "moral responsibility" for the contract;

both conservative and leftist critics joined

ihands in

an

^^See the record of the Congressional debates as reproduced in
"Camara de Senadores," El Comercio January 3. 19^-7, p. 4.
.
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effort to embarrass the party.

The attacks of course cen-

tered on I.P.C. and "yankee
imperialism." though some of
the conservative spokesmen
carefully distinguished between
the North American people and
their political leaders on
the one hand, and the imperialist
trusts on the other hand/^
The intensive criticism carried
on by both major Lima
newspapers, El Conercio and la Prensa
as well as the negative attitude of the Armed Forces
convinced the Apristas
that the issue should be allowed to
rest and perhaps to die
in the forseeable future.
The coujd de ^race came when the
editor of
Prensa. Francisco Grana Garland, a
prominent
critic of the Sechura Contract and a relation
of Don Luis
Hiro Quesada was assassinated on January
7, 19^7, barely
three days after the bitter parliamentary debate
over the
.

17

contract.

The crime

v:as

eventually traced to APRA,' but

shortly after it occured. several political figures
implied
that the assassination

X':as

the result of Graha Garland's

opposition to the contract.
The controversy over the Sechura Contract had several

unforseen effects.

According to Fredrick Pike. APPJi's friendly

^

attitude towards International Petroleuni Company brought
Ibid.
17

Sir Robert I-Iarett. Peru (New York: Praeger, I969), pp. 172-173;
See the editorial in El Comercio January 8, 19^7, p. 2.
.
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about a change of attitude at the
Department of State.
From
that point on. the United States
regarded that party as its
18
^
favorite Peruvian political group.
Furthermore,
the issue

of Peru's need for increased petroleum
productivity got lost
in the fray.
When all was said and done, the Sechura
Desert
remained as forlorn as it had been since Oscar
Benavides

declared it a national reserve during the previous
decade.
Domestic oil consumption continued to rise, while production continued its slow but consistent drop— forewhadowing
the impending energy crisis all responsible Peruvians know
was inevitable.
APiiA

made its friends in the Department of State, but

it abandoned the cause of I.P.G. vjhen the political price

rose to prohibitive levels.

Peruvian conservatives and

leftists alike counted the whole affair as a victory against

APRA and I.P.C.

The Armed Forces, for the first time, showed

their hand, and it was commonly knovrn that they did not

approve of I.P.C.'s presence in Peru.

Not all developments

were equally as bad for I.P.C. for the assassination of
Graria

Garland brought a new editor to

_La

Prensa

Pedro Beltran.

,

a man who charted a course for his nevjspaper which

vras

metrically opposed to Hiro Quesada's El Comcrcio

La Prensa

.

dia-

TS
Fredrick B. Pike, The Ilodern History of Peru (New York:
Praeger. I967). P- 285.

,
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beoame^lnternatlonal Petroleum's friend
and Mlro Quesad.a

'

s

enemy.

The matter of petroleum development
rested during the
remainder of Bustamente's term in
office.
Having gauged
the depth of animosity which many
Peruvian harbored against
I.P.C., the company once again
attempted to project a low
profile in Peru, hoping that better
times would come again.
The fate of the Sechura Contract
illustrated the inability
of the Peruvian Congress to reach a
decision on the oil
problem.
While APIM had a clear majority, it
hesitated to
use its power in regards to the contract.
Consequently.
APRA's power was negated by a small aristocratic
group in
the Senate under the leadership of Hector 3oza,
who had the
help of El Comer clo. for a time la, Frensa and
the political
.

groups to the left of APRA.

After the assassination of Grana Garland, APIiA's
opposition became even more bitter.

Knowing that the Senate

could not function without an executive committee and that
in order to elect the coramittee two-thirds of the senators

had to be present, the anti-APRA mlnority--amountlng to

slightly over one-third of the Senate, did not attend the
19

I

Mlro Quesada's feud with Pedro Beltrsln reportedly originated
shortly after the latter assu-tned the editorship of La'Prenca
and publically favored an end to price controls.
iiiro Quesada.
whose ne^Tspaper benefited from such controls, opposed eliminating this system.
Beltv^n, on the other hand, was a
businessman viith varied financial interests, and he considered
price controls detrimental to business.
Confidential Interview
with I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables, Florida, Hay 26, 19V 1.
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session on the constitutionally appointed
day. July 28, and
consequently, the Senate was forced to
suspend its session.
Since the Chamber of Deputies could not
function unless the
Senate did. the entire Congress was effectively
de-activated,
thus cancelling APP.V s solid congressional
majority and
leaving Bustamente to rule by decree. AniA reacted
to this

situation by preparing a coup d'etat with the aid
of sone
Junior military officers— an unsuccessful coup which
took

place October

3,

19^8.

In response, the Bustamente govern-

ment repressed APRA and this action in turn created further
unrest.

Before the month was over, the military, under the

leadership of General Hanuel Odria, took over the government
of Peru.

Justifying this action by declaring that Bustamerte

had been unable to deal effectively with

20
APR.^.

Since Congress had effectively destroyed itself

•

the year before the coup, Odrfa did not even have to go

through the motions of dismissing it.
and once more, Peru moved ahead.

He ruled by decree,

The price controls which

had divided Don Luis Miro Quesada were eliminated.

El Comercio

had to buy its newsprint at the unregulated higher price,

improtected by an artificially low rate of exchange.
Pike,

21

pr).

21

286-290.

Since the official rate of exchange was S. 6.50 to the dollar
and the unofficial rate was S. 13-00 to the dollar, this
single act of the Odria regime caused the price of newsprint
Conercio felt severely and Belt ran
to double, a change which
Interview \Jith I. PC.
applauded.
Confidential
contrast
in
executive, Coral Gables, Florida. Hay 26, 1971'

^

91

Manuel Odr£a. who ruled as
dictator of Peru from
19^8 to 1956 had much in common with
August o

Legufa. and

hie regime was dubbed the Ochenio
(a period of eight
years)
in a manner reminiscent of the
Oncenio Legufa's eleven
year rule.
Like Legufa. Odrfa had a middle
class background,
and was a firm believer in the
laissez-faire principle.
He succeeded where other men
failed-he gained the confidence
of foreign investors and the economic
results of this confidence were impressive for Peru. The
flow of capital
from abroad quickly increased, and by the
end of the Ochenio
.

.

foreign investment in Peru doubled.

grew between 1950 and 1955-

Industrial productivity

As with the rest of the

economy, petroleum exploration and production
also boomed.

While the Korean War was partially responsible
for Peru's
groTrth,

the Odrfa regime did take decisive action to en-

courage foreign investors to come to Peru.

Probably with the technical advice of International
Petroleum Company, the Odrfa government passed a new pet-

roleum law, No, 11780 in 1952.

Odria had himself elected

President within the constitutional framework in 1950, but
APRA

— Peru's

m.ajor political party,

was outlawed.

This fact,

combined with Odria's military base of power, made it
22

Pike,

p.

176.
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impossible for the sort of
paralyzing obstructionism
which
had plagued prior administrations
in their attempts
to

deal With the question of
oil.

However, the regime did

embark on an after-the-fact
public relations campaign which
set out to make the new law
acceptable to the country.'^
I.P.C. seconded this campaign
with a public relations effort
of its own.
In one of its most influential
publications,
a magazine entitled FA^L, the
company published several
articles explaining and justifying
the new
legislation.

General Odrfa and his closest advisors,
including
the Minister of Development Carlos
Salazar. accepted the
arguments which I.P.C. had long pressed
on the Peruvian
government.
The official administration argument was
that
while petroleum production had remained static

at best, and

had even declined since its peak during the
1930

consumption had greatly increased.

's.

domestic

Thus, while in 19kO

domestic consumption amounted to only 27.770 of production,
in 1952 the level was raised to 58.8,^ of production.

The

government noted that while in 191^ Peru accounted for
35%
of all petroleum exports from the South American continent,
in 1952, Peru only exported 2% of the total continental expor
In 195^. ior example, the government published a colorful
pamphlet with the caption "deeds, not words" across the
cover.
It included several tables of facts and figures.
Peru, Direcci5n General de Informacion del Peru, Petroleo
(Lima:
n.p., 1955).

"
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of oil.

The consequences of this
stagnation were obvlcusPeru would soon need to
oil.
In addition, the company
iras losing out on much
needed tax revenues by leaving
potential oil lands unexploited. The
Odrfa administration Informed
the Peruvian Congress that a "modest
daily production of
2.000.000 barrels" would net the treasury
between 500 and
1,000,000 soles per year in taxes.

i„

The facts were clear and International
Petroleum Company
and the Peruvian sovernment concluded that
Peru should enact

legislation which would make exploration, development
and
exploitation more attractive to foreign capital. This
action
would bring about a reversal on the petroleum scene.
Odrfa

was quoted as saying:
The new law is inspired with the purpose of converting Peru into a great
petroleum exporter.
V/e need to be
exporters, so that great amounts of
dollars will come into our country,
dollars which will improve our currency
on account of the abimdance of foreign
exchange in our markets; thus the wages
of the worker and the salaries of the
clerks will have greater purchasing
power, and the governm.ent will be able
to deal with the great national problems which up to this time have been
.

X.

put off.

2^

Jose Parn.^a Paz Soldan,
FAIIAL

25

.

.

"Nacionali smo Constructive
VII, No. 35 (1953). p. 30.

,

Odria's remarks are extensively quoted in: International
Petroleum Company, "Petroleo en el Peru," FANAL, VII, No.
35 (1953).

94
Manuel Odrfa whose style of populist
authoritarian rule
has been compared to that of Juan Domingo
Per5n of Argentina.
definitely wanted to help the laboring classes.
He
was a

firm believer in the role of the state as a
stimulator of
the economy-but not as a direct participator.
He needed tax
revenues to carry out his costly programs of
public works.
So,

it did not take much effort on the part
of the always

influential management of I.P.C. to persuade Odr£a that a
new promotional petroleum law was all that x\ras needed
to

bring growth and tax money to Peru.
The law which was proclaimed on March 18, I952 was

indeed a piece of far-reaching and comprehensive legislation.

Peru abandoned the system of royalties which had been the
cornerstone of previous petroleum development.

Instead,

the state became a partner in all future petroleum development,- with a 50% share of all profits.

state a minimum of

22;^'

The law assured the

of the value of all petroleum exports,

whether or not there was a profit.

Peru also received a

surface tax which varied with the extension of the land

under exploitation.

A depletion allowance of 2^% was estab-

lished for domestic companies;

foreign companies received

Pike, pp. 291-292;
Torcuato S. EiTella, "Populism and
Reform in I^tin America," Obstacles to C hanr^o In Latin
Am.eri ca
ed. Glaudio Veliz (Kew I'ork:
Oxford University
,

Press. 1965), p. 67.
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one Of 15%.

27

The law provided that concessions
in the
coastal area of Peru were to be
granted for a period of
forty years, with a possible twenty
year extension-a proVision which closely paralleled the
I P. C, -proposed time
limit during the Sechura Contract
dispute.
.

Of course, the law had no immediate
effect on La 3rea
y Parinas, x-Jhich continued to operate under the rules
set by the laudo of 1922.

Why then was International

Petroleum Company so interested in a law which
it knew
would have no effect on its holdings? The
answer was twofold.

First, the company wanted more favorable
petroleum

legislation in Peru so that the Sechura Desert would
be
opened to all bidders, including I. P.
not under

C—

the

provisions of a particular contract, such as the one
which

aroused so much controversy in 19^6. but under a general
law applicable to everyone.

I.P.C. hoped to have an edge

27

The depletion allowance is a tax deduction which oil companies are commonly granted to permit them to build up cash
reserves which offset their diminishing oil supplies." If
company "X" makes a net profit of .;j!l. 000 000 it will be
taxed on a net profit of ;?750,000 assuming a 25,^ depletion
allowance.
In the U.S., the depletion allowance for oil
companies was 27/^ ^for many years, and in recent years it
was reduced to 2^v%.
In Canada, the allowance has traditionally been 25%, but the government, anxious to promote oil
development, is planning to increase the allowance to 33 1/3;^.
In corapaiison. then, the Peruvian law vras not particularly
generous vrith domestic companies and rather conservative with
foreign enterprises.
,

28

For a detailed description of the
FANAL VII, No. 35. PP. 30-35,

la.\i,

see:

,

Soldan,
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on its competition by virtue of its
established position,
and the company's critics could not very
well argue against
its entry into the development of the
Sechura Desert as long
as this was done under general law.
I.p.c. also hoped that
its special status under the Laudo of
1922 could eventually
be eliminated by "adapting" the company to
the general pet-

roleum laws of Peru.

Originally, the Laudo was quite profitable

for the company, but as time passed, I.P.C. became
a semi-

utility, supplying the domestic market at fixed prices.

The

Laudo was a guilded cage from which I.P.C. was anxious to
escape,
The Odria plan worked as expected:

several oil companies

applied for and obtained exploratory concessions in the
Sechura Desert and in other parts of Peru.

I.P.C. got sizeable

rights in the Sechura Desert, and during 195^, the company

feverishly drilled in the promising fields.

However, an un-

pleasant surprise awaited I.P.C. and the Odrfa administration-the Sechura Desert was a barren wasteland for oil.

I.P.C.

spent

over 120 million soles drilling six wells, and Lobitos Oil
poured in substantial sums of money with no positive results.

29

The unforseeable futility of this venture had a number

of very drastic effects.

First,

it dealt a severe blovj to

the rapport between I.P.C. and the Odria administration,

fo"^

after all, I.P.C, the technical wizzard of petroleum, had
2Q

"100 Anos de Industria Petrolera
and Unger, p. 1?;
en el Peru," FA HAL, XVIII, No. 68 (I963). p. 29.

''^Peterson

9?

assured Odrfa that if certain legislation
was enacted, exploration and development would make Peru a

second Venezuela.

The first installment on that promise
went on as expected,
but the second proved impossible.
Certainly. I.p.c. could
-not rationally be blamed for the
lack of oil. but then. Mother
Nature was not readily accessible for reproach.
Consequently,

many Peruvians who had been already predisposed
to believe
the worst of I.P.C. for historical reasons saw
the latest

development as one more trick foisted on Peru by the
clever
yankee capitalists.

Economically undermined, the Odria regime lost ground.
Without new sources of revenues, the far-fetched public

works program which had created a somewhat superficial sense
of prosperity in the capital could not be continued.

In

1956, Odria had to m.ake good on his promise to hold elections.

His own support dwindled, and a conservative former president.
Mantiol Prado, was elected to office.

Not only did the Sechura fiasco contribute to Odria

's

demise, it also forced I.P.G. and the Compania Petrolera

Lobitos into a merger which would prove as economically

successful as politically disa,sterouSc

As stated earlier,

Compania Petrolera Lobitos was a x-rholly-owned subsidiary
of Lobitos Oil-Fields, Ltd.

,

a London-based holding company.

This company entered Peruvian business in 1902, and operated

under the Petroleum Law 4^52 of 1922

— the

company had a
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concession to exploit oil in exchange for a
10% royalty
of its crude oil production.
From the beginning, the Lobitos company had
an interesting relationship with International Petroleum
Company.

For instance, both firms were represented by the
same agent
in

Lima— Hilne and

Cia.

,

3, A.

Lobitos Oil-Fields exploited

what became known as Concesiones Lima, a property contiguous to

Brea y Parinas.

Even though Law

required

Lobitos to satisfy the internal needs of the Peruvian market

before exporting any oil, the company exported its oil
anyway, and left I.P.G. to deal with the domestic market.
In 1950, Lobitos reversed its position and began marketing

operations in Peru.

It is possible that I.P.C.

pressured

that company into carrying its share of the unprofitable

domestic market.

Since Gompania Petrolera Lobitos (G.P.L.)

never had a refinery in Peru, all of its products for domestic
consumption had to be refined by I.P.G. at the Talara reAnd since at the beginning of its domestic operations

finery.

Lobitos Oil had no service stations of its o\m, I.P.G.

agreed to let that company use its own network of "Esso"
30

stations to market its products.

For a pair of competitors,

International Petroleum Company and GompafTia Petrolera Lobitos
^^

Ibid

.

,

pp.

5^-^3«
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certainly behaved in a surprisingly
cooperative manner.
The cooperation of the two
companies took a decisive
turn, when in Hay 1957 the two
consolidated

operations.
Companfa Petrolera Lobitos was badly
hurt by the Sechura
disaster, and diminishing returns
in a market of frozen
prices made it plausible for the two
companies to consolidate to the point that Lobitos Oil
itself became a
holding company with a 50% interest
in the Lima Concessions.
I.P.C. acquired the other 50% interest,
and assumed res-

ponsibility for the operations of the field.

The working

force of C.P.L. was simply absorbed by
I.P.G.

The two

companies divided the crude oil coming
from the Lima Concessions in half, but since C.P.L. did not
have a refinery,

all of the oil was refined by I.P.C.'s Talara
plant.

liilne

and Cia. marketed Lobitos Oil products, and when
all was
said and done,

Compania Petrolera Lobitos was little more

than a trade name

— it

had no personnel in Peru.

One of the immediate effects of the consolidation of

International Petroleum Company and Compahia Petrolera Lobitos
was that I.P.C.|s share of the petroleum business, which
had been a substantial 65%, suddenly increased to approxi-

mately 90t.
for I.P.C.

The irritation which Peruvian nationalists felt

increased commons urately.

This deepening resent-

ment had immediate and concrete consequences for International
Petroleum.
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In August 1957. I.P.C. applied
to the Peruvian

Ministry of Development for an
"adaptation" of La Brea
y
Parinas to the Petroleum Law of
1952 (Ho. II78O).

formal petition, the company stated.

In its

.

It is our belief that we should
seek
to exchange the special regime deriving from the.
^Arbitration i'mard for
that of the
Law.
Apart from
the several inconveniences which derive
from operating under a special regime,
the functioning of two different legal
systems,— that of the Arbitration Award
for La Brea y Parinas and that of the
Petroleum Law for concessions obtained
under that I^w.— will generate, as is
evident, confusion and TDroblems of a
practical nature, both for the officials
of the Government and for the Company.
.

In a covering letter,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Jack Ashworth, I.P.C.

's

general manager,

pointed out that the petition was accompanied by a
tax comparison illustrating the differences between the old
laudo

system and that of the new proposal.

The company would pay

slightly higher taxes under the new system, at least as of
1956.

'

After nearly two months, the company received an

answer in the form of a "Supreme Resolution:"

it is not

in the best interest of the Nation to permit the adaptation

requested.

.

.

it is therefore resolved:

To reject the
"^2

petition presented by International Petroleum

Co.

,

Ltd.

""
.

^^The La Brea ^ Parinas Controversy, Vol. 1 (International
Petroleum Company, February, I969), jJxhibit 3.
32ibid.

.
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After Its great efforts
promotins a new petroleum law,
I.P.C. was denied "adaptation"
of its property to the
new
system.

The Significance of this event
cannot be exaggerated.
For decades, the company
fought to maintain its special
status under the provisions of
tha 1922 Award and the original sale; now the company pleaded
to leave the arbitration
cocoon-to come out under Peru's general
petroleum
law.

However, the Peruvian government
denied this request, thus
condemning the company to a languishing
death under the
Laudo.
I.P.C. -s economic vitality was
nullified by price
controls, and the Peruvian government was
not about to

allow the company to rise like the mythical
phoenix out
of its own ashes.
Obviously, the political situation had changed
considerably.

In another day, the company would have
enlisted

the. support of the Department of State and the American
press
to condemn these "confiscatory" policies.

Or it might

have gone farther--pulling its ships out of service between

Talara and Callao.

Perhaps I.P.C. might have Influenced

the New York financial circles, asking them to demand prompt

payment on Peru's eternal foreign debt.

none of these things
from the 1920's.

— the

The company did

late 1950's were very different

For one reason. Standard Oil of New Jersey,

while still the giant of international oils, did not loom
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as large in American political
circles as it once had.
The
oil trusts, which durins the 1920's were
among the three or
four major industrial concerns in the
United States, had

become only one of the twenty or thirty
major industries
in the United States.
Now the petroleum industry competed
^•lith the auto makers, retailers,
electronics firms and many
more in their demands for governmental attention.
The

growth and diversification of American industry
dwarfed the
importance of the international oils such as Standard

Oil of

New Jersey.

Like the railroads which x^ere once a dominent

factor in the political economy of America and today are

only a sub-group on the Dow Jones transportation index, so
the international oils have become merely a part of the
"oil group," sharing their influence with domestic oils and

many other industries.
Another factor which diminished the bargaining power
of international Petroleum Company in Peru was its conversion

from an exporting industry to a supplier of domestic needs.
Obviously, the international oil companies derive their

bargaining strength from the fact that they are the intermediaries betvreen oil-producing and oil-consuming countries.
For example, if Venezuela nationa:! izes its oil industry,

will buy its oil?

vrho

The Venezuelans can take over the wells,

the pipes, the tanks, and even the refineries;

but the

—
10 3

tankers, gas stations and allied facilities
which constitute
the marketing end of the oil business are
primarily on

foreign soil and not subject to nationalization.

The Vene-

zuelans can and have pressured the oil companies
with very
good results without using their trump card—
nationalization.

Nationalization would be disastrous
but it would be even more disastrous

for the oil companies,
for Venezuela.

The

oil companies derive a great deal of strength from
the

knowledge that nationalization would be mutually destructive.

When International Petroleum Company changed from an
exporting to a domestic operation, it lost its most important lever.

By the late 1950'

s

and early 1960's. I.P.C.'s

operations in Peru were self-contained.
of

Oil was piMped out

Brea y Parinas and Lobitos, refined in Talara, and

marketed throughout the coujitry.

The Peruvian government

was in a position to take over the operations by merely

severing the umbilical cord x^hich connected
parent company. Standard Oil

America in Coral Gables.

— via

I.

P.O.

to its

Toronto and Esso Inter-

The Peruvians

x^^ere

not quick to

grasp this radical alteration of the balance of power
in their favor.

However, it was only a matter of time before

I.P.C. would be once more dragged out into the spotlight

this time nude of its traditional power.

International Petroleum Company did not stumble into
the 1960's vreakened by ignorance or self-abandon.

The
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company was aware of Its precarious
position and took steps
to counteract its unhealthy po^^erlessness
These steps
were in two directions; the development
.

of I.P.C. as a

model employer, and the efforts by the company
to win
acceptance in the Peruvian oligarchy via a wide-ranging

public

relations program.
The beginning of I.P.G.'s effort to become the
model

employer reached back to 193?.

In that year. Nelson Rocke-

feller visited Venezuela and went on an inspection of the
properties of Creole Petroleum Corporation, a company vrhich
like I.P.C. was owned by Standard Oil and operated in Venezuela.

Apparently appalled by the working conditions exist-

ing in Creole Petroleum's work camps. Rockefeller prodded

Standard Oil and its subsidiaries into a policy of broader
social responsibility.

Out of his visit to Venezuela and

he consequent social awakening, Rockefeller eventually

founded the International Basic Economy Corporation,

v:ith

the goal of bringing socio-economic progress to the under-

developed nations

and additional profits to the family

33
corporation.-^-^

The company still exists and in 1971 it had assets of
nearly :,;200 million dollars. The Rockefeller family still
holds a oO/o interest in the enterpi^ise, and its present
chief is Rodman C. Rockefeller, reputed top businessman
among Jolin D. Rockefeller's seven great-grandsons. See:
Joseph Engelhof, "Profit Necessary in Social Activity Too:
Rockefeller," Chica.-^o Tribune October 4, 1971, Section 3,
,

p.

7.

.
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Hockefeller's new social awareneess
filtered mto
Peru, and signaled a turnaround
In the personnel management
at Talara.
Up to the early igtto's the
«ork force of La
Brea y Parinas had. for the most
part, been housed In

barracks.

North American employees, mostly
Canadian, had
separate Quarters. Native Peruvian
workers led a generally
bleak life of common meals in mess
halls and little privacy
in the terracks.
There ,ras little opportunity for
advancement
In 19^0.

John Oldfield— the

man now in charge of I.P.C.'j

headquarters in Coral Gables, and Mike Roycko-now
president
of Humble Oil Company, Standard Oil's marketing
arm.
went

to Peru to construct a new town in Talara.

They brought in

town planners, anthropologists, and other specialists.
Streets were laid, and houses, hospitals, schools and parks

were constructed.
toT^nl"

To avoid the creation of a "company

in the more narrow sense of the term,

I.P.C. added vfhat

it called a "free enterprise area" where Peruvian merchants

were invited to set up shop.

The company went beyond con-

struction of a new town;

I.P.C. improved its treatment

of the Peruvian workers.

Free nursing and medical care

were extended to the working force

.

generous pension plans

were established, salaries were raised to the point that

they were the highest in Peru.

For the first time in Peruvian

a
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history, collective bargaining was
introduced.

The company

also made a conscious effort to diminish
anti-foreign sentiments by reducing foreign personnel to a
minimum.

By the early I960

•

there were

s

if,

Their basic hourly wage was 6.12 soles

990 workers in Talara.
,

but with indirect

payments such as overtime included, the average
wage was
7.89 soles per hour.
Industrial workers in Lima-Callao
earned an average of 5.68 soles

received wages which were
best paid workers in

2>9%

;

therefore. I.P.C. workers

higher than those of the

Peru— those

in the Lima-Callao area.

According to the company, the workers received other benefits
amounting to between

205%'

and 2k6% of their basic wages—

credible assertion considering that the company gave free

benefits to virtually all of the relatives living with any

Talara worker.

The I^tin American extended family frequently

includes not only wives and children, but grandparents,
brothers and sisters, and aunts and uncles.

workers in Talara. there
a total of

x^^ere

29,50^1-

With ^,990

such relatives, making

Peruvians receiving such benefits as free

medical attention and medicines, and heavily subsidized
housing.

V/orkers in Talara paid 6.50 soles a month for a

two bedroom house, the equivalent of less than one hour's
3^5

Interview with John Oldfield at Esso Inter-America, Coral
Gables, Florida, May 2k, 1971.
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wages, and 10.00 soles per month for a
three bedroom houseabout one and a half hours' wages.
The company provided
generous pensions and sickness compensation, and
it built
twelve schools for the children of its workers.
I.P.c. paid
the salaries of the teachers, vjho were supervised
by the

Peruvian Ministry of Education.

The company even paid these

teachers bonuses for their work in Talara.

policy

vras

35

The company's

clearly to go well beyond the benefits which,

in theory, the Peruvian government required all employers

to provide for their workers, and therefore by Peruvian

standards, the workers of I.P.C. were a pampered elite.

Pampering, hovjever, did not necessarily render the
I.P.C. work force into a mindless and grateful herd.

mately

85;o

Approxi

of the x^^orkers belonged to one of two unions

operating in Talara.

One of the unions reflected the Aprista

philosophy and was affiliated

vxith the

Confederation of

Workers of Peru, the International Workers of Mexico, and
the International Union of Petroleum Workers, a United States

based organization.

This Aprista union had traditionally

been strongest among the more educated refinery workers
living in Talara.
35

The other ujiion, claiming a "socialist"

This information was supplied by an issue of the company's
International
newsletter dealing x-Jith its working force.
XII,
No. 115
Petroleo,
de
Noticias
Petroleum Company,
(February, I96O).

-
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Philosophy although it opposed
nationalization of the
leum industry, originated with
the field workers

pet:

who were

stationed at the various wells
and supporting installations
throughout La Brea y Parinas. After
World War II. the
company was able to purchase
vehicles and tires,
and the

field workers were gradually brought
to Talara
they continued to support their
separate union.

;

however,

Until I957.
the Aprista union was the largest,
but in that year I.P.c.
incorporated Lobitos into its operations,
and these additional
workers swung the balance and the "socialist"
union became
the largest.
During the early 1960's, the Aprista
union
counted about I.300 members, while the
"socialist" union
had a membership of 2.^00.
These unions often competed

with each other in degree of militancy.

Since I.P.C. was

the largest petroleum producer in Peru, the company
endured

every strike which took place in the oil industry.

The

other petroleum companies merely followed the general outlines of the I.P.C. settlements.

From the middle 19^0

1968, I.P.C. was struck four times,
36
een days each time.

's

to

for an average of eight

3^
This information vras provided in a confidential interview
with an I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables. Florida, Hay 25, 2971,
See also:
Peterson and linger, pp. 230-232.
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The good treatment International
Petroleum Company
accorded its employees paid off. for
during the times of
crisis from 1959 to I968. the working
force supported the
company's position and consistently
opposed nationalization.
However, the fact that the Peruvians
who derived such great
benefits were relatively few in number—
less than 35.000.
and lived in isolation at Talara.
minimized their effect on
the controversy.
Therefore, the price which the company
paid for its happy workers was high— its cash
outlay was

considerable.

For instance, from 1952 to I962. the cost

of living went up by 100;^ in Peru^
y Parinas increased by

3O70.

collar employees went up
increase

vias

about 250^.

300^^

productivity in La Brea

However, salaries for white

and for the workers, the

Since the I.P.C. personnel had

excellent conditions and wages, they tended to stay with
the company;,

but the early 1960's the company had 1,450

retired employees collecting the equivalent of

active payroll.

10/6

of thei^

37

In a broad political sense, the town of Talara was
to Peru what West Berlin in to East Germany and the Soviet

Bloc

—a

living reminder within their own borders vrhich il-

luminates by contrast their own poverty and under-developraent
37

Peterson and Unger, pp. 234-235.

•
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Talara was a slaring example to the
poorly paid su^ar workers
and even the workers
Lima, of how it would be possible
to live if the affairs of Peru were
administered as were
the affairs at La Brea y Parinas.
To add insult to injury,
the employees of the state-owned Empresa
Petrolera Fiscal
lived under far inferior standard conditions
in the state
oil fields right next door to La Brea
Parinas.

m

y

To Don Luis Hiro Quesada, who wrote his
doctoral dis-

sertation on labor at the University of San Marcos at
the
turn of the century— a nan who considered himself an
authority
on labor. International Petroleum Company's labor policies

must have seemed nothing short of blasphemy.

38

The same

was true for many upper class employers in Peru, who saw
I.P.C. as a dangerous spoiler of their labor supply.

In

time the company's management realized that they had gone
"too fast, too soon" in improving the lot of their workers.

John Oldfield confessed that the labor policies of I.P.C.
lost it friends in the oligarchy, to the point that the

10;^

of the population which comprised the social and political

power base in Peru decidedly opposed the company.

_

39

_

Luis Niro Quesada considered himself a pioneer in the field of
labor, but his attitude was extremely paternalistic.
Until
the military junta headed by currciit Peruvian President Juan
Velasco Alvarado ordered a union for the workers of Zl Conerci o,
they had been unable to form one. Hiro Quesada 's dissertation
and other philosophical writings appear in: Luis Miro Quesada,
Albores de la Re forma Social en el Peru {Lima: Talleres Graf i cos
P.L. Villanuevai I965
)

39

Interview with John Oldfield, Coral Gables, Florida, May 2?, 1971.
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In public relations the company
proved to be quite
proficient.
Its efforts ran the gamut of
Madison Avenue

advertising techniques adapted to suit
the particular circuinstances in Peru.

International Petroleum published a

hefty magazine and a v:idely-circulated
newsletter.
The
magazine. FAKAL. was an expensive, high
quality and fairly
large publication devised to appeal to
Peru's intellectual
elite.
The articles in FAIJAL were timely and
of high

literary quality;

the subjects were of historic or liter-

ary importance and usually stressed Peruvian
themes.

Oc-

casionally, the company did press its point of
view in an

article;

even then, the article was well informed and
v^ell

written.

Through FAMAL

.

I.P.C. tried to reach the influential

elements of Peruvian society.

In 195^,

for example, on

the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Superior

War College, FAMAL carried an article tracing the history
of the institution, listing its contributions to the Peruvian

nation, and relating the merits of various directors of the

college and distinguished alumni.

^0

FAMAL was not merely a vehicle for the company to
praise military institutions and leaders.

—

Given the difficulties

"La Sscuela Superior de Guerra
Cincuenta anos al servicio
del Ejercito." FAMAL VIII, Mo. 38 (195^), pp. 36-38.
.

s
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Which Peruvian intellectuals faced in
getting their work
published in a country of limited resources.
FANAL provided
a place for Peru's most distinguished
writers to appear in
print, and to do so at a profit.
Articles by Peru's leading
intellectuals appeared in this publication
during the
I950

and into the 1960's.

In fact,

'

in 1955. zhe publication

carried articles by two members of the Miro Quesada
family—
their more serious work did not fit into the casual
format
^1
of El Comerclo's Sunday supplement.
The anniversary of
FANAL'

s

publication prompted I.P.C. to collect testimonials

for its publication.

The list was most impressi ve--the head

of the Lima Bar Association, a prominent Army general, the

Chief librarian at the Lima National Library, the senior

professor of the Liberal Arts Faculty at the University of
San Marcos, publisher Pedro Beltran— the editor of la Prensa,

Aurelio Hiro Quesada, Raul Porras Earrenechea, President of
the Peruvian Senate, and a score of prominent writers,

poets and clergy.

In short, the intellectual elite of

Peru was called upon to express in writing its gratitude
for a publication dedicated to them and SDonsored by I.P.C

they responded generously.
iTi

,

Aurelio uiro Quesada,

"El Inca Garcilaso, ejemplo de sintccis,"
FANAL, X, No. 43 (1955). PP- 28-31;
Luis Niro Quesada Garland,
"ii^volucion de la Arquitectura Peruana." FANAL X, No. 45 (1955).
pp. 28-31.
,

^^•"Fanal' Alcanza Cincuenta Ediclones,"
(1957).

FANAL. XII, No. 50
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Less than ten years later the company
was badly in need
of support, and called for similar
testimonials.
This time
there were none from the Hiro Quesada
family or from Pedro
Beltran. and while prominent Peruvians
still lavished their
praises on FAHAL. the truly influential
testimonials
of

1957 were missing.

However, the company gained considerable

support from an intellectual elite which v^ould
otherwise hav

been

at

the forefront of the anti-I.P.C. campaigns.

In-

stead of the customary acrimony with which Latin
American

intellectuals often shower American companies, a Peruvian
Journalist

vias

moved to write;

"If other povrerful enter-

prises did what I.P.G. does, editing magazines v;ithout

aim of profit, the Peruvian culture would be greatly benefited.

^
"

International Petroleum Company also published a

monthly nexfsletter, Hoticias de Petr<5leo
this more widely circulated publication

.

v;as

The purpose of
to inform the

public about technical developments in the oil industry
and more importantly, to promote relentlessly I.P.C.'s point
of view regarding the role of private companies in the oil

industry and more specifically its own role in the Peruvian
econoiay.

The publication reminded its readers that the

^^Elsa Arana Freire,

"Testimonio sobre FANAL,
No. 26 (1965). pp. 22-25.

"

FANAL

,

.CX,

Ilk

Russians, for Instance, paid three
times as much for their
gasoline as did the Peruvians.
i.p.c. made it a policy
to harp constantly on the
shortcominss of state-owned petroleum enterprises in Mexico. Bolivia.
Brazil, and Argentina.
For example. Noticias de Petr6leo
reported that "under the
state monopoly" Mexico produced half
as much petroleum in
1959 as it had back in I921 and 1922 under private
initiative.''^

Positive news dealing with private
enterprises always appeared
in Noticias. as if such reports tended
to prove the contention that state-owned companies were failures
by contrast.
On at least one occasion. Noticias de Petroleo
carred a

reprint of an article which was extremely
critical of Petrobras. the Brazilian oil enterprise, accusing
it of gross

mismanagement and of pro- communist dealings.
One constant theme in both of International Petroleum's

publications, as well as in coujitless special editions

ranging from pamphlets to book length treatises was the
justice of the company's position vis-a-vis ownership of
La Brea y Parinas, petroleum prices, and other touchy subjects.
il.il,

;._

'Los sovGitcos pagan por la gasolina mas del triple que los
peruanos,'^ Noticias de Petr6leo XII, No. II3 (September, 1959)
^^"Bajo el Monopolio estatal Mexico produce hoy solo la mitad
del petroleo que producia en I921 y 1922," Noticias de
Petr6leo, XIII, Mo. II7 (May, 196O}.
,

^^The article was originally published by 0 Globo
Eugenie Gudin
"Petrobras:
desperdicio e incamcidad," Noticias de Petroleo
XIV, No. 123 (August, 1961).
.

,
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International Petroleum Company did
not limit itself
to publishing in its attempt
to influence that powerful
lo;^
Of the Peruvian populace.
Periodically, the company

sponsored literary competitions, providing
prizes for the
best compositions on a certain theme.
The company sponsored
one such competition in 1953. when
Peruvians were invited
to compose a poem extolling Ramon
Castilla, a 19th century
military hero and former president of Peru.
Presiding
over the selection jury was Aurelio Miro
Quesada.
In I955.
I.P.C. sponsored a similar contest— this
time with the

objective to write an essay on "the independence
of Peru
and the Peruvian contribution to the freedom
of the Spanish
colonies in America." In I965. the "Esso competition
of

young artists" was held.

All painters and sculpturers

under forty were invited to participate.

International Petroleum Company also aided the
Peru'^ian government in its quest for international prestige

and recognition by providing financial support for the

Peruvian exhibition in Paris in 195B.

In recognition for

that help, the Prado administration bestowed the Order of
Merit for Distinguished Service on Jack Ashvrorth, I.P.C.

's

general manager.
57

See "El Gerente de International Petroleum Co. condecorado
con la orden 'Al Merito por Servicios Distinguidos
FANAL XIV, No. 55 (1959).
1

.

1I
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The company was sensitive to Peru's
Catholic traditi,.ons.

All religious holidays were observed
in Talara, where the
company had built the churches. Management
saw

to it that

every new I.P.C. facility, including every
gas station in
the country, was duly blessed by the
competent ecclesiastical
authority in the community.
I.P.C.

provided speakers for groups such as the
chamber
of commerce and labor unions, for these meetings
provided
a forum for the company to explain its
position on various
issues.

The importance of these efforts was clear,
con-

sidering that the lecturers were often the company's
highest
executives in Peru, including the general manager.

One

particularly important group to which these lectures were
given regularly was the student body and staff of the Center
for Higher Military Studies (C.A.E.K.). .This military

school eventually proved very important in reshaping the
social philosophy of the Peruvian armed forces.

Evaluating the effectiveness of I.P.C.

's

public relations

efforts and more particularly its courting of the Peruvian

intellectual elite is difficult, for it is impossible to

know how the population at large and the intellectuals in
particular would have acted had there been no FAWAL,
de Petroleo
ever,

.

Notic:"'

and no literary and artistic competitions.

as

How-

it does seem fair to state that the company succeeded in

—
11?

at least blunting a potentially
leading adversary, a fact
which might help to account for the
prolonged stay of I.P.c.
in Peru throughout the 196o«s.
in spite of official and
popular hostility.

International Petroleum Company did not
play the role
of "ugly American" in Peru.
Quite the contrary, while the
company made tactical errors such as its
radical labor
policies, beginning with the 1950 s it showed
a great deal
of sensitivity to Peru's customs,
institutions and national
pride.
If anything, the company can be criticized
for going
too far in its efforts to cater to Peruvian
nationalism,
'

as for example, when I.P.C. decided to change
its name to

Petroleos Viru— Viru was the Inca word from which
the name
"Peru" is presLimed to have evolved.

Harries Peterson and

Tomas Unger put it well when they remarked:
In spite that in recent years I.P.C.
has carried out an impressive job of
public relations, we feel they have
omitted giving the country a true image
of itself.
La Brea y Parifias. the low
export prices, the high taxes, the
price controls, the grox^ing costs of
production, etc
many of these factors
beyond the control of the Company
have led I.P.C. to take an apologetic
position, frequently giving irritating
apologies which were never requested.^

The new name was actually put on some products, but the
project was dropped when El Comer cio got wind of the story
and ridiculed it.
Interview vjith John Oldfield. Coral Gables
Florida, Hay 2?. 1971.

^Peterson and Unger, pp. 5^-55.
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Would it have been better
ucuoer for
lor

T P r
i.i^.L.

to clearly state that
-.

its reason for existence was to
produce profits for its
parent company. Standard Oil of New
Jersey? By portraying
itself as a sort of philanthropic
organization with a. side
Interest in the production and
distribution of oil. the
company generated more mistrust then
it really
deserved..

However, while the company engaged
in wide-ranging efforts
to soothe Peruvian nationalism. I.P.C.
stubbornly held on
to its own form of nationalism— corporatism,
in areas which
would eventually render compromise an unreachable
goal.
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CHAPTER

IV

A MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION

PLAYS LATIN AMERICAN POLITICIAN

Three candidates presented
themselves to the peopl,
during the Peruvian presidential
election of 1956, and since
President Odrfa outlawed the Alianza
Popular Revolucionaria
Americana (APRA). all of the candidates
were drawn from
either the more traditional political
elements of Peru or
from a new breed of young, moderate
reformers, usually Catholic
inspired by the liberal Papal Encyclicals
of John XXIII calling for social justice.
In Peru, these reformers organized
a party, the National Front for Democratic
Youth, which was
led by a Texas educated architect, Fernando
Belailnde
Terry.

The other candidates for election in I956
were Manuel Prado.
a former president (1939-191^5) who appeared
as the standard

bearer for a hastily organized political party called
the

National Coalition, and Hernando de Lavalle. President Odrfa
's
personal choice, leading the Union Nacional.
Prado and Lavalle had no substantial political organization, and the recently formed National Front of Democratic

Youth had not been tested in a national election.

The un-

known election factor was the only Peruvian mass political
party, APRA, and its leader Victor Raul Haya de la Torre.

The Apristas v/anted to play a legal role in Peruvian politics,
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and the party leaders contacted
all the presidential candidates in order to discern
their post-election intenti<
.ons
towards ATRA.
Prado promised to legalize A^RA
as his first
Official act, and he subsequently
won the election by a
substantial margin.
He immediately carried

out his promise.
What won Prado his election-the
deal with APRA-also
won him a most persistant enemy.
Don Luis Hiro Quesada and
his newspaper El Comercio.
' Mir6 Quesada. whose
personal
feud With AFRA was a notorious factor
in Peruvian politics,
considered any compromise with that party
immoral-a personal
affront to his dignity.
Henceforth, the Prado administration
did nothing well in the eyes of El Comercio.
and even further.
Prado soon became the primary target of the
old Lima sage.

Manuel Prado inherited Odrfa's Peru, but without
Odrfa's
good fortune.

The Korean War and its consequent boom for

Peruvian exports had long since been terminated;
Desert had proved an economic fiasco.

I

the Sechura

The International

Confidential sources familiar with the inner workings of
the oligarchy maintain that Luis Hiro Quesada had a grudge
against Prado for personal reasons. According to this source
Prado married one of the Garland girls. Mlro Quesada 's sisterl
in-law.
The marriage did not work out, and Prado is said to
have had a well laiown extra -marital affair with a woman high in
Lima society.
In tine the marriage was annulled, but not before
the Hiro Quosadas added another enemy to their list.
Sinc^ the
Peruvian oligarchy is relatively small, and inter-marriages
abound, personal problems tend to play a far greater role than
it might be assumed.
While it is difficult to deal with this
kind of information, it should not be ignored.
Confidential
interview with I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables. Florida,

May 25, 1971.
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Petroleum Company, which had given
advance money to the
government of Peru in consideration for

future taxes begin-

ning during the Sanchez Cerro administration,
discontinued
this practice during Odrfa's rule.^
Manuel Prado
faced a

shortage of government revenues and
deteriorating economic
conditions; many difficult decisions
confronted
him.

Prado'

first Minister of Finance. Jose Pardo
y Sarreda. the grandson
of Peru's first Civilista president, insisted
on sustaining
the sol at a fixed rate of exchange, I9 soles
to one dollar.

Since this rate was quite unrealistic given the
actual

economic condition of Peru, this policy caused a
run on
the sol, and consequently a sharp drop in Peru's
foreign

exchange reserves.

By early I958 the situation was desperate

for the Central Bank was nearing the end of its dollar
reserves, and the government was under daily attack not only

by El. Comer cio

.

but by Pedro Beltran's

Prensa

3
.

Both

of Lima's prominent newspapers criticized Manuel Prado.

Once m.ore, the old arguments concerning price controls

which had first been taken up during the Bustamente administration were dusted off and brought to the fore.

Miro

According to a company executive, the last loan advanced
to the Peruvian government was made in 1953.
Confidential
intervisT".
Coral Gables, Florida, May 25. I97I.
,

Pedro Beltr^n received his training at the London School of
Economics.
He is reportedly a firm follower of Adam Smith,
and consequently a strong upholder of sound finances and
laissez-faire.
Sir Robert Marett. Peru (New York:
Praeger,
1969). pp. 181-182.
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Quesada benefited from a fixed exchange
rate-he could purchase dollars to buy newsprint abroad, and
he opposed devaluation.
Pedro Beltran. with his multiple business
interests
involving exports, favored a more realistic rate
of exchange.

On January 22. 1958. the Prado government
suspended the sale
of foreign exchange by the Central Bank, in
effect, floating

the sol.

During the month of January. El Comercio published

several editorials attacking the Prado government for
its
failure to "defend" the currency.

El Comercio also attacked

"the official organ of the exporters," la Prensa

.

Not only were the old arguments on government controls

revived, but the problems of the petroleum industry once

again haunted the Peruvian president.

During the twenty

years preceding 1958, production of crude petroleum had

grown 10% while consumption had groxm

^00;^.

Petroleum and

it derivatives accounted for 75% of the energy consumed in

Peru, and given the government -imposed

lox-J

prices for oil

products, there was virtually no chance of altering this
6

proportion.

International Petroleum Company obtained and

Tf

"hi Banco Central de Reserva suspende la Venta de Certificado
de Divisas," El Comercio January 23, 1958, p. 3.
.

5

See El C omercio articles entitled "Defender nuestra moneda,"
and "Nueva maniobra del organo ae ±os exportadores " January
24, 1958 and February 2, 1958 respectively.
^"El Petroleo
o alza de precios o crisis," Noticias de
Petrdleo. XI, No. 10? (1958).
,

:
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published testimonies from coal industry
executives and
technicians stating that the artificially
low prices of
petroleum derivatives precluded any
meaningful growth of
the coal industry, for the latter
could not compete with
the controlled prices of petroleum.*^
Low
prices. I.P.c.

maintained, prevented the company from
making heavy investments in development and improvements,
thus guaranteeing
a rapid decline in productivity at La
Brea
y PariHas.

Mindful of the critical situation, Prado devised
a
clever scheme to raise the price of gas and also
to raise
taxes.

Knovjing that an increase in the cost of
petroleum

derivatives would be hard to sell to the Peruvian people,
the Ministry of Development started a publicity campaign

aimed at explaining the reasons for the hike well in advance
of the actual increases.

The advertisement placed in

various Lima newspapers attempted to explain how the new
prices would affect transportation.

For example, the

increases in the bus fare from Lima to Trujillo were ten-

tatively posted.

The increase was justified in terms of

the highway construction program.

This advertisement

specifically promised the construction of nine highways in

—

industna carbonara del pafs no puede progresar so lo
implden los ba.jos Drecios artiflcales de los productes de
petr(5leo." FANAL XIV, No. 5^ (1958), p. 22.
"La

,
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the easternmost Selva section of the
country, ten In the
Sierra, and the completion of the Pan-American
highway,
which ran down the coast of Peru. It ended
with a patriotic
plea:
"the progress of Peru is well worth a
few pennies."^
Within one ;^eek following the opening of the
publicity
campaign, people began to hoard gasoline in
anticipation

of the price increase;
stations.

long lines were reported at gas

By January 1^, there was a severe scarcity of

gasoline in the city of Cuzco, and I.P.C. was reported to
be speeding shipments to the area.

Organized opposition to the gasoline price hike, and
the gasoline tax increase, was quick to react.

The Teamsters

Union met January 13. 1958. and their first meeting ended
in a brawl when a delegate from Chulucanas accused the more

moderate Union of Public Service Drivers of Lima of being
an institution in the service of Standard Oil.

9

With

the teamsters apparently divided, the administration moved

quickly.

On January 23, the Chamber of Deputies passed the

gasoline price increase, with only the Christian Democrats

making a significant effort to stop

it.

However, the Teamsters

_
El Comercio
9

.

January 10, 1958,

p.

9.

"En gran <iesorden termino la Premera Reunion Nacional de
Sindicatos de Choferes," El Comercio January 15. 1958. p.
,

3-
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Union managed to pull together and
publish a paid announcement carried by the Lima dailies, denouncing
the price increase on gasoline.
The Teamsters argued that since 1^% of
all passengers

and cargo were carried by car. bus or truck
in Peru, a gasoline price increase would have a very deleterious
effect

on the general welfare of the population.

More specifically,

the union noted that while the Prado administration
was

asking the Congress for an increase in taxes amounting to
between 25 and 30 cents per gallon, the Ministry of Development was announcing price increases of 65 to 70 cents per
gallon.

To whom was the difference going?

The union argued

that the petroleum companies, primarily I.p.C, would

pocket the difference, and in passing they charged I.P.C.

with being a "virtual monopoly" since its acquisition of
the Lobitos fields.

"^^

Miro Quesada immediately recognized the union's argument
as a potential source of embarrassment for the Prado administration.

In the afternoon edition of El Comercio that

same day, the gasoline issue was moved to the first page

with a prominent headline:
of gasoline."

"Increases of taxes and prices

The follovring day,

January 26. El Comercio

See the paid advertisement. "La Federacion de choferes
del Peru, a todo el Gremio y al Pueblo." El Comercio
January 26, 1958, p. 2.
.
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carried an editorial which to a large
extent incorporated
the arguments put forth by the union.
It also added its
own interpretation— the government's proposal
would in
effect open the doors to price increases at
I.P.C. discretion.

This was an inaccurate interpretation unless
the

assumption was made that the government would order
higher
prices as per I.P.C. demand.
The editorial also emphasized
that I.P.C.

profits

's

vrere

re-invested not in Peru but in

distant lands and that the price increase of gasoline

x^rould

have a drastic effect on the cost of living index in so
far as food and clothing prices would reflect the new in11
crease.

By now in hot pursuit of what was shaping up as a major

weakness in the Prado administration, El Comer cio dug
deeper

into the government's argument that a tax hike was

necessary to carry on the construction of highways.

In the

January 2? editorial, Miro Quesada noted that since the
Peruvian government had previously borrowed large amounts
of money, including ten million dollars from I.P.C, and
had pledged the revenues from the gasoline tax to serve this
debt, the future gasoline tax revenues would have to be used

for the most part for debt payments.

More specifically,

proyecto sobre el alza del precio de la gasoline,"
El Comercio January 26, 1958, p- 2.

"^"^"El

.

,
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out of one and a half billion soles
in estimated gasoline
tax revenues, over 800 million soles
would have to be used
to serve the pre-existing debt, thus
leaving some 722 million
soles to be used in the highway construction

program/^

In a succeeding editorial, Mir6 Quesada
warned the Senate

against passing the government's bill.

With the intensified heat generated by the
opposition,
APRA did what it had done before— the party
attempted to

disassociate itself from the price increase.

Almost as a

test of APRA's intention, the Christian Democrats tried
to

resurrect the issue in the Chamber of Deputies, only to
be rebuffed by the APRA majority.

In spite of its verbal

retreat, APRA wanted to stick by Prado on the gasoline issue.
On January 28, the Senate passed the government's bill,

and almost immediately, Hiro Quesada lambasted the government editorially.

13

But Miro Quesada was merely playing the issue;

the

real confrontation came between the government and the

Teamsters Union.

On January 30, after the government's bill

had been passed by both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate
the Federacion de Chcferes del Peru (Teamsters Union)
12

"El Plan Jacional de Carreteras
1958, p. 2.

El Gomorcio

,

January 27,

13
^See the articles:
"Despues de agit lo decate se aprobo alza
"Alza
de la gasolina." SI Comer cio January 29, 1958, p. ^;
lesiva para nuestro pueblo, " El Comerclo January 30, 1958,
.

,

"

128

published a communique calling for a
meeting to consider
the -grave situation" created by
the passage of the bill.
With the absence of the more moderate
Drivers of the Public
Service of Lima, the Teamsters Union
issued an ultimatum
stating that they would go on an indefinite
strike the day
after the price increase was promulgated
into law.^^
The threat of a strike

XNras

enough to cause the Prado

government to delay proclamation of the price
increases.
Prado opted for a cooling off period hoping
to diffuse
unionist anger.

But El Comercio kept up its campaign.

In

articles and editorials, the paper denoLinced the
impending
price increase.

Tx^ro

months went by from the time the bill

was approved by Congress and its promulgation.

In early

April the price increase was finally officially approved

by Prado, and as announced, the Teamsters Union began a
15

strike.

The strike was particularly effective in the south of
Peru,

especially in Arequipa and Cuzco, that area's two major

cities.

It soon became clear that the severity of the

teamsters' walkout would complicate the lives of Peruvians,
for other workers joined the boycott.

On April

9,

the

vendors of the Central Market of Curco held a rally to

15

"Choferes de todo el pais senalan plazo de huelga,
El Comercio January 31. 1958f
3-^"Choferes inician huelga manana por alto de gasolina,
El Comercio April 10, 1958, p. i.
.

,

"
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decide whether to go on strike in support
of the Teamst GTS
Union.
The local police attempted to disperse
the rally
and violence errupted. A twelve year old boy
was killed,

and the ominious threat of widespread rioting was
in the
air.
The army and the police began patrolling
the

streets.

In Arequipa,

the strike spread to blue and

x^rhite

collar

workers, but order was maintained.
In Cuzco the situation was different— conditions

worsened to a point little understood in Peru, and for the
most part unreported anywhere else.

Of all the recent works

on Peruvian history or politics, the 1958 events at Cuzco

remain unmentioned with the exception of a book by British
scholar and former British Ambassador to Peru Sir Robert
Marett, who dedicates a whole sentence to the crisis.

17

The management of International Petroleum Company and the

Prado administration, however, recoa:nized the significance

.

18

of the crisis.

According to I.P.G. management personnel,

the city of Cuzco was in the hands of rebel militia composed

of Teamster Union members and other radicals for three days;
the Peruvian government was able to re-take the city only
stated: "In April 1953 the city of Cuzco, in the heart
of the Northern Andes, was taken over by what were probably
communist-inspired rebels, their cause being supported by
Belaunde's Accion Popular, as also by the normally right-wing
El Comercio " Marett, p. 181.
^^I.P.C. management brought these events to the attention of
Virtually nothing vxas xiritten at the time
this researcher.
of the uprising, but it is not clear whether the Peruvian
government intended to keep this crisis out of the public eye.
•^^Ilarett

.
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because the rebels failed to occupy
the airport, and loyal
troops were rushed in by air/^ Even
Miro Quesada must have
become alarmed by the events, for El
Comercio failed to

carry news stories on the Cuzco uprising.

Only in an edi-

torial published days later did that paper
hint at the
urgency of the Cuzco events. According to El
Comercio the
Cuzco rebels formed a "popular Committee" to
rule the city.
.

and only the desperate appeals from high clerics
and other

respected leaders prevented a bloody confrontation.

20

The

Prado government strengthened its hand when troops arrived
in Cuzco, and consequently the government was able to bargain

successfully for an end to the revolt.

won concessions.

However, the rebels

Teamster Union leaders were granted safe

conduct to fly to Lima to negotiate with the government on
the price increase.
Prado' backed down.

The end result of the uprising was that

Gasoline taxes were increased by 25 cents

for regular and 30 cents for premium;

but the ^0 cents per

gallon price increase for the companies

vias

cancelled, thus

creating a critical situation for International Petroleum
Company.
19

Confidential interview with I.P.G. executive. Coral Gables,
Florida. May 26. 1971-

20
"El deber del Gobierno en hora actual,
April 13. 1958, p. 2.

"

El Comercio

,
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This brief uprising in Cuzco is
of utmost significance,
for it tends to undermine a whole
body of scholarly literature about Peru and about Latin
America in general. First
there is a common notion that Latin
American oligarchies
function as the agents of international
capitalism.
A
good example of this thesis comes from
Irving Louis Horowitz.
In terms of an international stratification system the masses are
those portions of the underdeveloped
society that are exploited by the
very national classes— the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat alike— that are in
turn subject to the severe pressures
from an international cosmopolitan
"center. " The Decking order enriches
the national "class" sectors at the
expense of the internal "mass" sectors,
while it weakens the nationalist's resolve to seek revolutionary methods
for pressing economic and social demands.
21

How does this statement apply to Peru?

Peru is a rather

"typical" latin American nation— it has a large concentration
of Indians, high illiteracy, and a low participation ratio
in politics.

The International Petroleum Company is a sub-

sidiary of the actual prototype of international capitalist
institutions

— Standard

Oil of New Jersey.

According to

Horowitz's thesis, the organized vforkers of Peru should have
supported or at least acquiesed to the price increase in
21

Horowitz writes this in his own introductory chapter of his
edited work.
Irving Louis Horowitz, ed.
Masses In Latin
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 13.
'

,
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deference to the "cosmopolitan center"
(Standard Oil).
In
the "pecking order," the unions enriched
themselves at the
expense of the "internal 'mass' sector."
Yet in Peru it
was a labor union which disregarded this
"pecking
order"

and nearly unseated the government of the
"national 'class'
sector." pressures from the "cosmopolitan center"
notwithstanding.

Scholar Julio Gotler notes that labor unions "have
fallen into new patterns of dependence as their demands
for
improvement and benefits are directed exclusively toward
the unionized--without taking into consideration the national
22
context."
However, the Teamsters Union in Peru opposed

the price increase and had a rather sophisticated and well-

developed argument which involved a definite conception
of the national interest.

Both the opinions of Horowitz

and Cotler do not fit the context of Peru.
Of the Prado administration, John Gerassi said that

for six years they "ruled the country as they wanted because

the Apristas in Congress backed them.

23
"

However, the

supposed Aprista influence on labor must have fizzled out;
the Prado government was powerless to finalize a gasoline
22

23

Julio Cotler, "Internal Domination and Social Change in Pjiu
Horowitz, p. ^-29.
John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America (London:
Colli er-HacHillan, Ltd. .~19^5T7 p. 136.
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price increase-an Aprista-backed
prosram.

Even moderate

students of Peruvian politics are prone
to refer to the
"forty families" which ruled Peru, and
which presumably
in 1958 were still in charge even if that
country was in
a "transitional"' stage.
The management of International Petroleum
Company

paralleled scholarly opinion by continuing to
think in
terms of the fallacy that it was the upper
10% imioh "counted."
Yet,

the evidence suggests that in the 1950

a country where a tiny oligarchy ruled;
in fact a deeply divided group--it

vras

's,

Peru was not

the oligarchy was

deeply divided in

1918, and it was divided forty years later over the policies

which Peru should follow regarding foreign, particularly
American, capital.

To advance the notion that the oligarchy

ruled disallovrs the veto power which organized labor by now
had achieved over certain policies, unless the definition
of the oligarchy included truck drivers and market vendors.'

Although the rebellion in Cuzco was hushed up with a
surprising degree of effectiveness, the fact that the government
was forced to back down, and perhaps of equal importance,
the fact that the military

vjas

forced to bargain with rebel

leaders was deeply humiliating for both the Prado administration
2^

Rosendo A. Gomez, "Peru: The Politics of Military Guardianship,"
Political Systems of I^atin America ed. Martin iMeedler
D. Van No strand, 196^), pp. 29I-.316.
(Princeton, N.J.:
,

13^

and for the military.

El Comercio could draw only
limited

comfort from the knowledge that
I.P.c. had been foiled.
The lessons of Cuzco went
unheeded, and neither the proI.P.C. factions nor the anti-I.P.c.
factions of the old
oligarchy realized that a protracted
struggle over the
petroleum issue endangered the structure
of Peruvian society.
The International Petroleum Company's
position, which
had been until then very difficult,
became critical during
Costs rose while prices remained fixed
1958.
in soles
,

which meant that prices actually declined
rapidly.

The

company reversed its tactics from quiet persuasion
of the
government's top executives to a broad campaign aimed
at

influencing Peruvian public opinion.

Both FANAL

c\nd

Noticias

de Petroleo. the two company publications, began to
carry

articles which clearly and unequivocally had one message:
prices must

,be

would collapse.

raised or the Peruvian petroleum industry
The facts were the

same— the rapid rise

in domestic consumption and stagnant production

arguments were strengthened.

— but

the

Since the 190I discovery of

the Lobitos fields, no significant new oil fields had been

developed in Peru.

To liope for new fields in eastern

Peru as a solution to the immediate supply problems was
unrealistic, for a trans-Andean oil pipeline would cost at

least 100 million dollars
The only

vjay to

— money

which Peru did not have.

keep production from falling at La Brea
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y Farinas was to employ costly methods of

"secondary

recovery."

paced with low prices, the company
found it
increasingly difficult to justify the
investments required
in order to keep up production.
In the past, petroleum
exports had in effect subsidized domestic
consumption, but
in 1957 I.P.G. was able to export only
one third the oil it
exported in 193?. With Chile. Bolivia and
Ecuador developing

oil of their own, the company's profitable
exports to these
countries were doomed in any case, and I.P.C.
would now have
to compete in distant markets, where transportation
costs

diminished their profit margins.

The company argued that

since the last price increase in 195^. the costs of its

operations had gone up 60%.

The sol drifted lower and lower

in relation to the dollar, and nearly all of their equipment

had to be purchased in dollars.

-According to the company,

I.P.C. received only 93 cents of the 2.23 soles per gallon

of regular gasoline--the price people paid at the stations.

Ninety-six cents went toward payment of various taxes,

Ik-

cents paid for transportation from Talara to Callao. and 20
cents went to the local gasoline dealer.
25

International

"Secondary recovery" or "technical rejuvenation" of an oil
field involves artificial stimulation of the oil flow. Various
means can be used to accomplish chis end: water flooding,
gas injection or repressurization, steam stimulation, or "in
situ combustion" fire flooding.
Repressurization with water
or gas involves a fairly simple but costly process whereby
vrater or gas is forced into the underground deposits so as to
force the oil out, much like liquids are forced out of an aerosol
can.
Steam or fire flooding involves heating the oil-saturated
rock so that oil will flow out and into underground reservoirs
from where it can be piped.
The latter is the most costly method,

—
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Petroleum argued that it could not
produce, refine, store
and distribute gasoline at the rate
of 93 cents per gallon.'^
One of I.P.G.'s worst years was
I958.
By early Fall
it was evident that the company
would be able to export

only 2.5 million barrels of oil. in
contrast to the wellover four million barrels it exported
in 1957.
With rapidly
dropping profit margins, the company was
ever more anxious
to Impress its point of view on the Peruvian
public.
During
the previous five years (1953-1957). I.P.C.
invested 6k million
dollars on new drilling and secondary recovery
just to
main-

tain production levels.

I.P.C. argued that it would have

to invest ^;;8,600,000 in production;

since the company could

allocate only $6,000,000 in its budget, the difference would
have to come from

;?3.

300,000 of the year's estimated profits-

leaving only ^151.200,000 profit.

This sum represented a re-

turn of less than one percent on the company's 180 million

dollar investment.
table.

27

Thus.

I.P.C. laid its cards on the

Even questioning various aspects of I.P.C.

the fact remains clear.

's

argument,

Peruvians paid the lowest prices

in the world for gasoline;

even Venezuelans paid the equi-

valent of 3-00 soles per gallon while Peruvians paid only
2^~~
"La verdad sobre la situacion de la industria petrolera
peruana," FANAL XIV. No. 5^ (1958), pp. 17-21.
27
"La industria petrolera necesita un sistema de precios
adecuado." FANAL XIV, No. 55 (1958), pp. 19-22. This same
article was reproduced in Noticias de Petroleo XI, No. 107
(October, 1958).
.

.
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2.23 soles.

North Mericans and Chileans
paid the equivalent
Of 7.50 and 8.10 soles respectively.^^
Furthermore, the

company calculated that the small
profit of I958 would turn
into a deficit within the next two
years.
By I961, l.p.c.
anticipated an annual loss of two
million dollars per yeara loss which would grow rapidly
if a price increase was not
allowed.
To deal with this situation, the
company adopted
a new policy.
Beginning in 1959. I.P.G. ceased all new
drilling, and relied on the output of La Brea
y Parinas and
Lobitos regardless of the total production-consumption

ratio.

Manuel Prado's second term in office reached
its lowest
level of political credibility in late I958 and early
I959.

Numerous labor strikes an economic crisis of major proportions,
.

and attacks by both major Lima newspapers were more than
the government could endure.

Boxed in by the Teamsters

Union' on the one hand and I.P.C.'s no drilling policy on

the other hand, Prado desperately searched for an imaginative

solution to his multiple political woes.
1959 he struck upon
course of action:

i-ihat

In the middle of

must be considered a most innovative

he invited Pedro Beltran, the editor of

La Prensa and an arch-critic of his administration, to take

2B

Ibid

.

,

p.

20.

Ibid

.

.

p.

22.

29
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the reins of government as
Prime Minister of Peru.
At
first Beltran balked at the
offer, but assured by Prado
of
a free hand in dealing with
the problems of Peru, he
yielded
and became Prime Minister in July
I959.
It was as if Lyndon
Johnson had picked the editor of
The New York Times or the
Washington Post or .J. B.C. News to
become his Chief of Staff
at the height o.^ the Vietnam War
protests.
Now Beltran
had to cease attacking the government
-this in itself was
a Significant relief to the beleagured
Prado. and begin to
think in more positive terms about possible
and practical

solutions to Peru's problems.
Since the petroleum controversy had a very
high priority
on the list of problems faced by the government,
one of the

first official acts of Prime Minister Beltran was
to order

a committee to study the petroleum crisis.

Article

2"o8R of

the Petroleum law of I952 (No. II78O) established that the

government would determine petroleum prices by adding up
the costs of production, transportation, storage, refining,

distribution, sales and taxes, plus "adequate" profit margins

commensurate with the investment. 30

The International Petroleum

Company had long ago ceased to receive an "adequate" return
on its investment, but neither El Comercio nor the Teamster.^
30

Harries Peterson and Tomas
(Lima:

n.p.

,

196'-^-),

pp.

linger,

301-302.

Petroleo

:
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Union were sympathetic to the
plight of the American company.
Their ability to veto any up.^rd
price adjustments in favor
of the company had been demonstrated
as recently as I958.
Pedro Beltran proved as imaginative
in dealing with
the problem as his nominal boss
Manuel Prado had been in
making him Prime Minister. In consultation
with the committe
Beltran determined that an -adequate"
return for the company
would have to be in the area of 6.6% even
though in most
countries the oil industry had yields closer
to twice that
rate.

However, even instituting a 6.6% return
for I.P.C.

would require a very substantial price increase.
this be made acceptable to the Peruvian

x-;orkers,

How could

especially

the teamsters, a consideration which obviated the
thesis

that the workers do not "count" or participate in the
poli-

tical process of Peru.

Beltran decided to destroy the traditional hierarchy
of prices for petroleum products;

.

prices were not to be

raised across the board, but selectively so as to minimize
the impact on the neediest Peruvians.

By a decree dated

July 25, 1959. Beltran dramatically increased the prices of

petroleum products.
creased by

I'lD/o;

The price of regular gasoline

premium gasoline was raised

was to be distributed under two prices.

205/^«

vjas

in-

Kerosene

Domestic kerosene,

the important source of energy in cooking and heating for

s

1^0
the lower classes of Peru

vras

raised only

15;^.

On the other

hand, kerosene used in industry was
increased a large 2i,Qi?'^
Reaction to the price increase was swift.
As they had done
in 1958. the teamsters went on strike.
El Comercio once
more could be counted on to attack Beltran's
decision.
However, unlike the strike in 1958. this
one in I959 failed
to arouse widespread sympathies.
Beltran suspended consti-

tutional guarantees and arrested several labor
union leaders.
In a matter of days, the situation was completely
under
control, and the price increases were an accepted
fact of

daily life in Peru.
Beltran 's ability to deal with the petroleum crisis
stabilized the political situation considerably, but it also

angered the government's opposition, which had grown accustomed to using the petroleum issue as a major source of

embarassment to the government.

Furthermore, the price

increase provided ammunition for Miro Quesada,

vfho

now em-

barked on a crusade against what he perceived as an unholy

alliance of Manuel Prado,

-APRA,

prime competitor, la Prensa

.

I.P.C., and El Comercio

To the aging Don Luis,

'

it must

have seemed as if all of his enemies had joined hands to

ruin him

ar.n

^"^Ibid.

p.

,

Peru.
305.
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One Of the developments
which most angered the
oppositi on
was Beltran's effort to open
up the door of "adaptationfor
I.P.C.
In 1957. the company
petitioned the Odrfa admi.nlstration for "adaptation" or inclusion
of La Brea y PariHaLS
under the general Petroleum Law
of 1952;
that petition was
denied.
In Article 6 of the July
25. 1959 decree, Pri.me

Minister Beltran established his intention
of granting I.P.C.
adaptation, for he was not satisfied with
a mere solution
to the immediate crisis.
Beltran wanted to
solve the pro-

blem of La Brea y Parinas once and for all.
on August

8.

1959.

I.P.C.

>s

Accordingly,

general manager Jack Ashworth

submitted a formal document to the Ministry of
Development

agreeing to pass its rights over the subsoil of La Brea
y
Parinas to the Peruvian state, as soon as the law
authorizing
the adaptation of the property had been promulgated."^^
In the opinion of Augusto Zimmermann. a protege of

Don Luis i4ir6 Quesada and the only non-member of the family

to hold an important position with El Comercio

,

the Decree

of July 25 signaled the beginning of the final battle over
La Brea y Parinas.

He stated:

At the instant in which the Decree
was first known by the public, the
32

Augusto Zimmermann Zavala, La Historia Secreta del Petroleo
(Lima:
Editorial Grafica Labor, I968), p. 22.
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act of recuperation of La 3rea v
Farinas comenced. Without
ing the consequences, vrithoutsurmisima^inxng the long chain of -vents
would follow, the President of which
the
Council of Ministers opened the
door
so that the country would
begin to
form a clear consciousness of the
Importance and significance of La
Brea
y Parinas.
33

That July 25 Decree brought together
an unlikely coalition
of radical leftists, conservative
nationalists, and the
armed forces.

The leftists were members of several
parties, including
some radicals from within the ranks of Fernando
Belaunde's
Accion Popular.
In fact, the initial offensive
in the

Peruvian Congress was carried out by an Acci6n
Popular senator
from Bela{mde's home tom of Arequipa, Alfonso Montesinos.
In the Chamber of Deputies, the anbi-I.P.C. campaign was

spearheaded by a Deputy from Lima, Alfonso Benavides Correa.
The July 25 Decree prompted Benavides Correa to take the

floor of the Chamber of Deputies and recount the long history

of I.P.C.

's

activities in Peru.

As might be expected, he

projected I.P.C. in the worst possible light.

However, the

company's detractors really presented no factual information

concerning I.P.C.
33

Ibid

.

,

p.

21.

's

actions from I917 to 1939.

1^3
On August 27. Alfonso Montesinos
initiated a similar
campaign in the Peruvian Senate, recounting
the diplomatic
interventions of Britain and the United States
in Peru's
affairs.
He questioned the company's
presentation of. the
facts, and alledged that the value of
I.P.C.'s investment
in Peru was between 98 and 103 million
dollars and not 21?
million dollars, as I.P.C. had claimed of late."^^
According

to his calculation, the company would be receiving
a return
a 26.?^ profit over the value of the investment
under the

Decree of July 25.

35

Clearly, Hontesinos hoped to confuse

the issue as far as possible.

By using the "book value"

of the company's investment, he hoped to create the impression
that the company

vjas

doing in 1959 what in fact it had done

during the 1920's and 1930
out of Peru.

'

s— squeezing

a very large profit

Montesinos availed himself of the company's

past record in hopes of demolishing I.P.C.'s arguments one

by one. from the most technical figures on the cost of
drilling wells to the more general matters of return on an
investment.

More importantly, citing a forum on petroleum

^^Montesinos claimed that his figures came out of U.S. Department
of Commerce publications.
His opponents noted that these
figures reflected the value of the property and equipment vrhen
purchased and did not take into account the current values or
The refinery might have cost 5 million dollars to juild
costs.
early in the century; in 1959 it would have cost several times
In figuring the value of the investment Hontesinos used
that.
For a
the first figure, and the company used the second.
transcript of Montesinos s congressional presentation and the
various interruptions, see: Ibid
pp. 5o-59'
'

.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

66.

,

1^4

held at the University of San Marcos
in Lima, Montesinos
Claimed that I.P.C. took one thousand
million soles out of
Peru under the aegis of an illegal
international award, and
that by "adapting- the company to
the general petroleum law.
the Prado administration wanted to
grant the company the
right to take sixty billion soles more.^^
Both Montesinos
and Benavides Correa contended that the reason
I.P.C. and
the government were in a hurry to reach an
"adaptation"

agreement was that the 1922 Laudo had a fifty
year life
span set to expire in 1972.
At that point, ownership

of

La Brea y Parinas would revert back to the
Peruvian state.

Soon after the initial congressional offensives of August
1959. the price issue was dropped as the primary point of

the dispute and the legitimacy of the company's title over
La Brea y Parinas became the target of the anti-I.P.C.
campaign.
On September 7. 1959, Beltran sent his Minister of

Foreign Affairs to face a parliamentary interpellation.

Minister Raul Porras Barrenechea, in an effort to placate
the opposition, made a statement which would henceforth

represent the position of the Prado-Beltran government:

Although Peru has vigorous moral reasons
which we all know and share to invoke
the intrinsic invalidity of acts vjhich
have affected the national interest, the
•^^

Ibid

.

,

pp.

7^-76.
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acts precisely for their
international
character are of a definitive nature.
International life would be unstable
and
hazardous if unilateral action
in international matters were to be permitted
In his own obscure way. Porras
Barrenechea meant to state
that the 1922 Award was invalid but
that its unilateral

abrogation would set a dangerous precedent.

Instead of

calming the opposition, the government's
statement merely
encouraged it to intensify the assault.
Answering the

arguments of Porras Barrenechea, Benavides Gorrea
stated
that the 1922 Award was null i£so ,1ure. and
hence did not

bind the Peruvian state.

Taking off on a very imaginative

tangent, the deputy for Lima surprised the government
and
I.P.C. by stating that the Laudo did not in fact
exist,

wherexnth he challenged the government to come up
copy of the agreement.

vrith a

Upon a search of its archives,

the

Peruvian government found no trace of the celebrated document
Concerned with the absence of the Laudo of 1922, personnel

from the International Petroleum Company travelled to London.

They contacted the appropriate officials at the British
Foreign Office and they produced the originals of the signed
documents.

The Peruvian Consul

v;as

asked to verify the

authenticity of the documents and copies were promptly forwarded to Lima.
^"^Ibid.

,

p.

78.

However, this clarification came weeks after
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the orlsir^l allegation had
taken its toll
public distrust
Porras Barreneohea
s statement Illustrated serious weaknesses
the government's position, and
Benavides Correa's attack
Showed the ability of I.P.c.
opponents to capitalize on thos e
weaknesses and to go further in their
attempts to shook

m

•

m

Peru into a drastic solution to the La
Brea y Parinas controversy.
During the remaining months of
1959 and In early i960
the battle raged.
El Comercio magnified every attack
on
I.P.C, and the government and La Prensa
counter-attacked,

suggesting that Benavides Correa should have
failed his
first year of law school If he could not
recognize
the

validity of the Laudo.
attacks.

I.P.C. was quick to react to these

Responding to Benavides Correa 's charge that the

company had taken one thousand million soles out of Peru.
I.P.C. suggested that "the fantastic figure" "was born
of

some heated mind;

that It had sprouted, like Minerva from

the head of Jupiter, definitive and round."

But, after

ridiculing the charge, I.P.C. presented a detailed argument
loaded with facts and figures and stated that the company
had taken only 1^5 million soles

,

an amount which it believed

quite reasonable considering the investment it had in
33

Interview with John Oldfield. Coral Gables, Florida,
Nay 24, I97I.

1^7
39

Peru.

I.P.C. was very disturbed
by the assertion that in
1972 La Brea y Parinas would revert back to
the state, and
it began a public relations campaign
designed to counteract

this assertion.

In articles and pamphlets,
the company

contended that the Laudo of 1922 merely
covered the matter
of taxes, and that after 1972. if no
adaptation had taken
place.

I.P.C. would continue to own both
the subsoil and

the surface property of la Brea
y Parinas. and would continue extracting oil subject to whatever
general legislation
in effect at that time.
In a way the company over-reacted to the attack.

The

publicity campaign stating that the end of the Laudo would
have virtually no effect on its ownership or modus
operandi

was a tactical error of major proportions, for its was
un-

doubtedly interpreted as a hardening of the company's position,
and a blatant statement of its intention of continuing oper-

ations regardless of the Laudo 's termination.

who might have hoped to avoid a confrontation

Peruvians

mth

the

company during the 1960's on the assumption that I972 would

bring an automatic solution to their problems, had those
39

"El Ilito de los Mil Hillones." Noticias de Petroleo
Wo. 113 (September. 1959).
"La Brea y Parinas revertira al estado en I972?"
de Petroleo XII. No. 11^ (November, 1959).
.

.
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hopes dashed.

International Petroleum Co:„pany
was not merely
a fifty year guest, It was a
self-proclaimed permanent
resident.'

During January i960, the acrimony
rose to unbelievable
levels.
The more radical parliamentarians,
particularly
those belonging to the small but
militant Hovimiento Social
Progresista joined hands with Benavides
Correa and Montesinos
in their attacks on I.P.C. and the
government.
In
late

January, Benavides Correa introduced a
bill declaring the
1922 Laudo invalid, and therefore not binding
on Peru.
This
was but the first of a series of ten
similar bills submitted
by various combinations of radicals with the
same intent.

At first the Prado-Beltran government
remained calm.

After all, these were the desperate efforts of
radicals
who were a very small minority in a parliament
dominated

by what they called the apro- praGismo - beltranismo --a coalition
of APRA, Prado's supporters and Beltran's friends.

Beltran's calm came to a sudden end on February

2,

However.
i960,

when a commission of Army chiefs issued a document stating
that the 1922 Laudo was null and void on various legal
grounds, principally that Law 3016 had not authorized the

Laudo of 19?2, and that no Peruvian representative had been

instructed to cede rights over the subsoil to I.P.C.
fore, the Army officers recommended that the Laudo be

There-

1^9

excluded from the Peruvian registry,
and that "international
Petroleum Company pay the exact total
of taxes due from
the 1st of January of 1915."'^'''
The Army's stand came as a shock to
all involved in
the controversy except the Social
Progresistas and some of
the more radical members of Accion Popular;
both parties
had been courting the military during the
preceding years.
On the day folloxfing the army announcement,
Prime Minister

Beltran went to Array headquarters to request an
interview

with the commanding general. Alfredo Rodriguez Martinez.
He tried to persuade the general that Benavides Correa
and

his allies were political agitators in the service of the

international Communist movement;
so.

however, he failed to do

He then sent various Cabinet members on the same

mission on several occasions during early February.

Feb-

ruary' 5, General Rodriguez Martinez issued a second com-

munique, this time in the name of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, condemning the 1922 Laudo as injurious to the national
sovereignty^.

This communique ominously demanded that in

keeping with Article 213 of the Peruvian Constitution, the
Joint Chiefs expected to have any proposed solutions to the
La Brea y Parinas controversy submitted to them for study

¥1

The text of this "internal" coromunication is reproduced by
See:
Zimmermann, pp. 81-82.

August© Zimmermann.
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so that they could issue an
opinion on the matter.

Prado and Beltfan needed no
further

writing was on the wall.

word.;

the hand-

Obviously the Army would veto

"adaptation- unless the International
Petroleum Company paid
the back taxes which Benavides Correa
and Montesinos claimed
the company owed Peru.
Furthermore, a mere continuation
of the laudo wa^ not acceptable to the
Army
chiefs,

for

they conceived of it as injurious to the
national interest.
Clearly then, Beltran had over-reached
himself.

While

his attempt to put through a price increase was
clever
enough, the Army simply would not tolerate

concessions to I.P.C.

any further

However. Pedro Beltran had an amazing

capacity to find his way out of bli

id

alleys.

His first

step was to effect a tactical withdrawal from the planned

adaptation, thus avoiding a confrontation with the Army.
He then embarked on a two fold policy designed to produce

a compromise acceptable to the Army, and also to discredit

Miro Quesada, El Comercio and its radical allies.

between la Prensa and El Comercio

v;as

The war

destined to escalate

to previously unimagined levels.
On January 21,

just prior to the Army communique on

the Laudo, the Chamber of Deputiec called for yet another
1^2

For a photostatic copy of the document, see:

Ibid

.

,

p.

85-
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study of the

Brea y Parinas controversy,
this time by
the Advisory Commission of Foreign
Affairs-a group composed
Of distinguished Peruvians, former
presidents and ministers
of foreign affairs.
On Hay 10 the commission issued
its
report, and concluded that even though
the Laudo i.as essen-

tially defective, it could not be ignored
after it had been
in effect for thirty-eight years.
The commissions rejected
the possibility of taking the matter to some
international
judicial body, and instead suggested that the
President
should study the matter and then propose a new law
to the

legislature

"would establish a new regime in replacement

x-xhich

of the present one."

The commission also rejected the

alternative of nationalization, but it specifically said
that whatever the solution arrived at, Peru should contem-

plate "obtaining compensation for the small yield the country
has received."

The idea of compensation— first suggested

by the radicals— began to gain respectability in Peruvian
circles.
On August 30, Prime Minister Beltran sent a bill to

Congress incorporating the recommendation of the Advisory
Commission.

In essence,

the bill proposed that from that

point on, I.P.C. would hold

Brea y Parinas as a concession

^-^The full report is included in"

The La Brea y Parinas
ControvGrG\% Vol !_ (International Petroleum Company,
February, I969) iixhibit ^.
.

,

;

;
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for thirty years, extendable to
forty.

A complicated

system of taxes and royalties was
set forth.
In practice,
the company would be subject to a
regime very similar to
that established by the General
Petroleum Law of I952
however, the taxes would be higher, and
certain annual
bonuses would be paid by the company. Ho
doubt these provisions were designed, to comply with the
judgement of the

Army and the Advisory Commission, stating that
I.P.C. should
make restitution to Peru for their previous oil

exploitation

under the "defective" Laudo.
The reactions to Beltran's proposals were predictable,
the Prime Minister's own newspaper la Prensa greeted
the

bill with jubilant front page headlines:

"Government sends

to Parliament bill which puts an end to the Laudo:

Immediate

vindication of the subsoil of Brea, Parinas and Lobitos
Concession to I.P.G. for 30 years and nationalization without payment at the end;

I.P.C. will pay the State 300

million in cash imjnediately and 950 on term;
receive

of the profits;

6C70

hectares;

Concessions limited to 100,000

66.000 will go, without payment to Petrolera Fiscal

/Peru's state-ovrned oil entcrprise7
stallations.
Ibid.

,

the State to

^5
"

"-Tith

This headline was in itself a good summary

jjxhibit 5*

^La Prensa

.

its wells and in-

September

1.

i960, p. 1.
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of the contents of the government's
bill, except for the
fact that the bill refered to
"nationalization" only
the loosest sense of the word.
Extensive articles elsewhere
in that same issue of La Prensa argued
in detail that indeed
this was a solution highly favorable to
Peru;
that it went
beyond what the Advisory Commission had
recommended

m

in its

Hay 10 report, and that I.P.C. would be
paying some of the
highest oil industry taxes in the world.
The editorial
from the following day's issue further emphasized
that
I.P.C. 's profits would be split on a 60-^0
basis, with

Peru receiving

60;^

of the profits.

La Prensa stated that

nationalization was inevitable and in short, the proposal
was highly favorable to Peru.
The reaction of the congressional opposition was as

predictable as that of la Prensa

;

furthermore, it

negative as l& Prensa 's was positive.

Once again.

x^as

as

Deputy

Alfcnso Benavides Correa led the anti-I.F.C. campaign.
He charged that the Beltran bill

"covert adaptation,"

V7as

nothing more than

He based his allegation on the fact

that the bill merely outlined a contract to be concluded

between the goveriiment and the company.
w> "^1

In other words,

^

Proyecto va a un mas Lejos de lo que Planteo la Consultiva,"
and "Ahora IPA Pagara Una de la Tributaciones m.as altas del
mundo," l£ Prensa September 1, i960, pp. 6,7.
'"La Revindicacion del Petroleo, " La Prensa September 2,
,

,

i960, p.

2.

15^

passage of the bill did not
nean that its provisions were
automatically put into effect, but
that they awaited I.P.C.'s
approval.
Benavides Correa went on to state
that the government put forth the proposal because
I.P.C. had already

agreed to the terms of the contract,
and that the bill represented nothing but a "bilateral" contract.
In addition,

he argued that the proposal merely
brought I.P.C. under the

provisions of the General Petroleum Law of
1952-action which
I.P.C. had long sought.
He noted:
it turns out that the great conquest,
the extraordinary conquest of Sr.
Beltran of vindicating for Peru its

unalienable, imprescriptable and sovereign right to the mineral subsoil of
La Brea y Parinas. was already a proposal which, before Sr. Beltran. the
Ministry of 'Development and Commerce
and the Premiership, International
Petroleum had offered in August of
195?.^^

For Benavides Correa and his allies in Congress, the

real dilemma was simple:

"to collect,

or not to collect

the debt" which I.P.C. owed Peru for all past exploitation
50
^
of La Brea y Parinas.
Benavides Correa did not limit

himself to an attack on I.P.C. alone;

he identified the

culprits as a clan, which was "the union of banking capital
Host of Benavides Correa
pp. 110-135.
^''^

50

Ibid

.

,

^.

12^.

Ibid.

,

V.

126.

'

s

speech is reproduced in Zimmermann,
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With industrial and commercial capital,
and union of both
parties with the country's government."
And.

as the axis of

this clan, the radical deputy identified
Felipe Thorndike
Beltran. nephew of the Prime Hinister-a
man with multiple
interests in the petroleum business and
in the newspaper
business.

More specifically. Beanvides Gorrea
identified

Felipe Thorndike Beltran as a first cousin
of the editor
of Ultima Hora— a Lima newspaper which like la
Frensa

supported the government, as a former manager of
Petrolera

Peruana— an oil company recently purchased by American
interests, as a member of the Board of Directors of the

Compania Petrolera Lobitos, and as a member of the Superior
Council of Petroleum--a private group of oil entrepreneurs.

Benavides Correa charged that Thorndike Beltran acted as a

link betxfeen all these organizations and Prime Minister
Beltran, and since he was the Prime Minister's only nephew

and Beltran had no children of his
Felipe was Beltran'

s

heir apparent.

ov7n,

he ciiarged that

In a book which ho

published after the congressional debates, Benavides Correa
expanded his charges, and included long lists of the enterprises to which Beltran 's neiDhew was connected.

51

Alfonso Bena^/ydes Correa, 21 Petroleo'
Ibid
pp. I29-I3I;
Papel Grafica
(Lima:
Peruano, 5"la a utopsia de un clan "
Editora, 190T)
pp. I52-I65.
.

,

,
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Similar charges were made in the Senate
by Acci5n
Popular Senator Alfonso Hontesinos, and of
course, El

^^"^^^^^^

counted on to provide a forum for opposi-

tion to the sovermnent

•

s

policy.

In sharp contrast to

La Prensa's headlines for September 1st. El
Comercio

front page proclaimed:

's

"Senator Hontesinos accused the.

Beltran Cabinet of plotting with International Petroleum;
the Cabinet is made responsible for recognizing 100
million

dollars more than I.P.C. had invested in the country."

Another headline read:

"The Executive proposes that I.P.C.

continue to exploit La Brea y Parinas for ^0 more years."
In the editorial section, El Comercio argued that in order
for a monopoly to exist, a company did not have to control

100^ of the business.

3y virtue of its

90/0

control of the

crude oil production in the country, International Petroleum

Company was a monopoly.

It charged that I.P.C.

illegally

exploited the fields while paying miniscule taxes, that the

company threatened and coerced Peru in order to obtain
price increases, that I.P.C. spent millions in public relations

— purposefully

trying to confuse public opinion, and that

the company threatened the security and sovereignty of Peru.
52

53

El Comercio

,

September

1,

I960, p.

"El Honopolio del Petroleo," ibid

.

1
,

p.

2.
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This September 1st attack merely
presaged what was to be a
constant dally barrage during the
following
months.

subsequent editorial, Kl Comercio

-s

In a

battle cry centered on

the point that even If the state
were to gam control of
la 3rea y Parlnas In forty years,
by then there would be

no petroleum left.^

As a policy, El Comerclo identified

antl-I.P.C. forces as "patriotic"— those
who deviated from
the Mlro Quesada hard line were dubbed the
"entregulstas.
In an attempt to secure the balance of
power in their

favor, the antl-I.P.C. parliamentarians and El
Comcrcio

deliberately attempted once more to Involve the Army
in the
dispute.
On September 2, Benavldes Correa stated that
the

'

Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to the Beltran bill.

The Army, which had experienced some changes in command since
the Incident in February i960

vrhen it had

first Issued a

statement on the matter, denied having any opinion on
the controversy.

However, El Comerclo knew that the Armed

Forces were generally sympathetic to its position in spite
of the changes in top leadership, and played the Army officers
to its advantage.

The paper reminded the Army of the

"elevated mission" assigned to it by the Peruvian constitution

That "elevated mission" required tho Army to stand in eternal
574

"Proyccto entreguista sobre el Petr61eo," El ConGrcio
September 4, i960, p. 2.

,

"
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Vigilance protecting the country
from a bill which "seriously
compromised the sovereignty and security
of the Fatherland."
El Comercio warned that the "Armed
Forces will not permit
the progress of bills which are
damaging to the Country
and threatening to its rights and high
"^^
national interests
Here again was an interesting twist;
the radical left
and a conservative newspaper joined their
,

voices to call

for an unconstitutional military intervention
necessary
to save Peru from what they interpreted as a
treacherous

coalition of foreign and domestic capitalists bent on
defrauding the country.

Obviously, El Comercio and its radical

allies were engaged in a "no holds barred" offensive designed
to ruin Prime Minister Beltran and International PetroleiJim

Company.

Hovrever,

their goals were not identical, a con-

clusion xfhich will be examined later.

Recognizing the attack on the jugular vein of his
government, Pedro Beltran reacted immediately.

As a con-

noisseur of Peruvian oligarchical intrigue, he had several
dramatic options which he could play against his enemies.
The first such move came on September

6

during a television

appearance by Eudocio Ravines, an associate of Beltran and
a vrrlter for La Prensa

.

Ravines had been a Communist in

"La Fuerza Armada y la reivindicacion del Petroleo,
El Comercio September ^, I96O, p. 2.
.

159

the 1920

an associate of Haya de la Torre-APRA
founder,
and of Jose Carlos Mariategui-Peru s
foremost Marxist
intellectual. Ravines stayed on good terms
with Moscox.
until the Nazi-Soviet pact; he then abandoned
international
Communism and became an outspoken critic of the
Communist
's.

•

movement in Peru.

Party official

m

This background as a former high Communist

Peru promised to be useful to Pedro Beltran.

Ravines put his knowledge to use during the television

broadcast--he declared that Senator Alfonso I-Iontesinos
was a Communist.

V/hen the

surprised interviewer asked how

he knew, Ravines stated that he had personally issued Monte-

sinos his membership years ago.

Montesinos, who was watching

the live television broadcast, marched over to the studio

and tried to attack Ravines.

56

During the momentous first week of September, events

moved quickly.

Senator Carlos A. Minao, a former Army general,

introduced legislation calling for the nationalization of
La Brea y Farinas.

Instead of taking any action, the Chamber

of Deputies once more dumped the issue in the lap of another

study group, but the Special Commission of the Chamber of
Deputies in turn passed the problem on to the Array by formally
56

Information from: Confidential interview with I.P.C.
"Veneno
executive. Coral Gables, Florida, Hay 26, 1971;
de Ravines causo indignacion general, " _il Comercio September
6, i960, p. 1 (Afternoon edition).
.

.
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requesting its opinion on the matter
of
The Social Progressist Party issued
a

Brea y Parinas.

statement calling on

the Peruvian people and the Army to
stand united, and
warning the Army against becoming involved
to aid the
government
El Comercio played up statements by
retired general

Alejandro Barco L5pez
Senator Hontesinos.

.

Senator from Lima, who sided with

The paper published a series of articles

by another retired general, Cesar
decidedly against I.P.C.

A.

Pando who wrote very

In a September 8 editorial. El

Comercio took note of the position of the three retired
generals, stating that their point of view reflected well

upon the Armed Forces.

Once m.ore. El Gom.ercio encouraged

the Army to overthrow the government. 57

In fact,

it seemed

as if the paper vjould stop short of nothing in its effort
to discredit Beltran and I.P.C.

For example, when a mis-

fortunate young boy fell into a service station underground
tank and died, El Comercio mentioned that it was an Esso

station connected with I.P.C, as if the company were ressponsible, and not the local dealer.
57

58

58

,

"El Ejercito y la reivindicacion del petroleo,"
September 8, i960, p. 2.

El Comercio

,

"Por negligencia punible murio en nine Harco Antonio Salazar,
El Comercio September 8, i960, p. 5«
,
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It was durins this period of
confrontation that an

organization was formed with the specific
purpose of battling
International Petroleum Company-the
National Front for the
Defense of Petroleuin.
The Front's president was retired
general Cesar A. Pando
its executive vice-president was
Alberto Rufz Eldredge. a Castro sympathizer
and Political
Secretary of the Movimiento Social Progresista.
;

Other

members included Senator Alfonso Hontesinos
and Deputies

Alfonso Benavides Correa and Fernando Noriega Calmet.
an
59
avowed enemy of I.P.C.
The Front organized anti-I.P.C.
demonstrations and published a series of public statements
in several Lima newspapers denouncing the company.

The

Front for the Defense of Petroleum also published a pamphlet

attacking I.P.G.

Most importantly, this group sought the

backing of individuals and other groups in its anti-I.P.C.
crusade.

While it got support from the Society of Retired

Personnel of the Armed Forces of Peru, and did manage to
get several labor leaders to a meeting, the Front failed

to gather support from any major group or organization.

International Petroleum Company attempted to coimter
the Front's efforts by gathering its own allies.

company

d^ d

The

get the backing of a group of forty retired

^^Frente Nacional de Defensa del Petr(5leo, Declaracion de
Prlncipios
Exposicion de Motives (Lima: Technograf S.A.
,

i960)

,

p.

199.

,
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military officers, but in general,
most Peruvians were
unwilling to become involved in the

controversy, let alone

in the "entreguista" cause which
had been so maligned by
El Comercio.
l.P.c. 's most significant
support came from
its own workers, who in early October
travelled in great
numbers to Lima to protest the attacks
on the company.
Even
though El Comeroiq tried to discredit
these workers by

suggesting that they had been sent by the
company, the facts
seem clear that they came on their own.
out of genuine concern for their own future should nationalization
take place.

The La Brea y Parinas controversy, which had
virtually

destroyed the Civilista Party and made possible the
I919
Leguia coup, came close to having the same effect on
3ela{inde

Acci5n Popular.

Senator Alfonso Montesinos was a member of

Accion Popular, one of the most important men in that party.
It was general knowledge in the political circles of Lima

that Hontesinos would be chosen to run in the number two

position on the Belaundista ticket in the I962 election.
However, during the first two weeks of September i960,

while

Prensa was trying to sell Beltran's petroleum bill

to the Peruvian people and El Comercio

was doing its best

to make sure the bill failed, BeD.aaide reached an important
Han sido
"Asalariados de la IPC llegaron ayer a Lima;
al
proyecto
petrolero
apoyo
manifestar
su
traidos para
del Ejecutivo," El Comercio, October 11, I96O, p. 3«

'

s
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decision.

Ke decided to accede to the
general principles

of the government's petroleum bill,
but to demand that the
time span of the new concession be
reduced from thirty
to five years.
In accordance with his decision
and in

keeping with his role as party leader, he
sent a message
to Montesinos on September I9 explaining
his reasoning
and asking that ilontesinos conform to this
more conciliatory
position.

Montesinos reacted with anger and announced

that if the party took the Belaunde position, he
would im-

mediately repudiate Accion Popular in public.

Efforts to

placate Hontesinos failed, and finally Belaunde had to

accept the senator's point of view in order to avoid a
split in the party.

Accion Popular

vjas

virtually forced

to introduce a bill in Congress ordering the immediate

confiscation of La Brea y Parinas without compensation.
Despite Belaunde

'

s

concession to party unity. Montesinos

star dimmed considerably following Ravines

appearance.

's

's

television

During I961, it became apparent that Belaunde

would not choose Hontesinos as his running mate, or even
as senator for another term.

After the election of I962.

Montesinos was forced out of politics.

61

Noveiuber i960 brought still another dramatic move on

the part of the very resourceful Prime Minister and his

3l

Zimmermann, pp. 99-106.

.

,
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associate. Eudocio Ravines.

On November 16. a group
of

Cuban exiles, allegedly
guided by Ravines, conducted a
raid
on the Cuban embassy in Lima.
They came away with several

suitcases filled with confidential
papers from the embassy
files.
In time, select documents
were passed
on to the

Peruvian military and the press.

These included several

communications from the Cuban Ambassador
to Peru. Luis
R. Alonso to the Ministry
of Foreign Relations and the

Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
in Havana.
In
a report dated October t,, i960, the
Cuban ambassador gave
a detailed account of "political
expenditures"
and noted

that
In accordance with the instructions
received from the Armed Forces Minister.
Commander Raul Castro, I have directly
concerned myself with the organization
of insurgent groups in cooperation with
the Communist Party and Apra Rebelde
/a radical spinoff from APRA7. as well
as with the other friends of the left
who are ready to go all out, in case
the announced imperialist invasion of
Cuba should take place.,
62

Funds vrere passed directly by the ambassador through the

Peruvian Communist Party to individuals in responsible
"

V2

Photostatic copies of the documents were provided by I.P.C.
While the authenticity of the papers has been denied by the
Cuban government and the alledged recepients of the funds,
it has on the other hand been upheld by defecting employees
of the Embassy.^ The fact that a raid did take place, and
that the expose reached into the ranks of La Prensa as much
as El Comer cio tends to support the authenticity of the
papers.
The fact that ant i -I.P.C. forces seemed to come
up vjith money to publish pamphlets and books on the petroleum issue in a country where --rriters have to absorb the
initial costs of publication also suggests some outside financing.
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positions in every political
party and in numerous
labor
unions, newspapers and other
organizations, including one
publisher.
From the list of -political
expenditures.- it
soon became clear that Havana
was underwriting the
publication
Of pamphlets and books in
defense of the Cuban regime,
that

it had friends on nearly every
newspaper, and that it

provided heavy subsidies for the
Social Progressist Hovenent.
particularly for its leader Alberto
Ru£z Eldredge. the man
who distinguished himself as an
advocate of the Cuban Revolution in the Peruvian Congress, and as
the organizing element
behind the National Front for the Defense
of
Petroleum.

The Prado-Beltran government chose
to delay release of
the Cuban documents, probably because they
were sure to

evoke embarrassment not to the radical left
alone, but to

many more prominent Peruvians.

However, on January

196I.

all hell broke loose in the Peruvian Senate when the War
Minister, General Alejandro Cuadra Rabinez read the
list
of recipients of Cuban funds.

In a sense,

the disclosure

of the Cuban papers brought this stage of the controversy
to an end.

The elections which were scheduled for I962 began to

loom larger and larger in everyone's mind.

For El Comercio

the issue was once more how to prevent APRA from taking

control of the government.

For APRA the problem was how to
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become acceptable to the Arnea
Forces so that it could tal.e
over if it won an election.
Thus, as I961 progressed. APRA
and Pedro Beltran. who had
presidential ambitions of his own.
dropped the thorny issue of La 3rea
y Parinas. and declared
an unofficial moratorium on the
problem until after

the election.

The period from July 1959 to the
end of i960 proved
singularly important in the La Brea
y Parinas controversy.
The International Petroleum Company
entered this stage of
its history as a troubled entity, but
there was no questi,.on
then concerning I.P.C.'s legitimacy in Peru's
petrolei

industry.

When the battle was over. I.P.C.'s
legitimate

existence had been severely undermined.

The question was

not whether I.P.C. should be removed from Peru,
but how soon
it could be ejected from that country.

Yet,

in spite of the

overall political deterioration in the company's position,
the score was not completely negative.
The price increases of July I959 gave the company a

new lease on life, and despite opposition from the political
left, El Comer cio and even the i^rmed Forces, International

Petroleum Com.pany endured.

It outlived the presidency of

Manuel Prado and even the premiership of Pedro Beltran.

Poli-

tically weakened with its reputation in tatters, Standard
Oil's Peruvian affiliate navigated the stormy vraters of the

early i960

'

s

and made ready for the final battle.
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CEAPTERV
ANATOMY OF THE ANTAGONISTS
£1 Comerclo
One of the most important participants
in the controversy surroionding la. Brea y Parinas. and
in the general poli
tical process of Peru was a newspaper, El
Comercio and the
.

family which has owned it since the 19th century,
th Miro
Quesadas.
Like The New York Times in the United
States

or Le Monde ia France, El Comercio was. and still
is, a

very influential publication in Peru— a gate-keeper to
the
minds of many people.

This newspaper is more important to

Peru than The New York Times is to the United States because its impact is not neutralized by competition from

other news media.

All American papers compete with tele-

vision and radio for the attention of the public;
ix*i

however,

a relatively poor society like Peru that competition is

minimized by the small number of receivers

.

•

Given the

relative concentration of political and economic power as

well as population in the Lima-Callao area, El Comercio
was even more important.

2

There were other dailies in

In fact:, television only serves the Lima area.
For the 2.1
million r&.dios in Peru, there are 150 radio stations. U.S
Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports
Basic
Data, on the Economy of Peru
U.o. Government
..'ashington
Printing Office, I969T. P- !?•
;

(

2

Ibid

.

,

p.

2.

:
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Peru, but Peruvians considered
only two of them "great"

newspapers. El Gomercio and La Prensa.

The other news-

papers were generally categorized as
prensa chica. or small
press.

Of the two important newspapers in
Lima, only El

^^^^^^^Q

^ continuous existence under two generations

of the same family.

3

.Indeed,

considering the countless coups,

dictatorships, wars and constitutions since £1
Gomercio

's

original edition, the newspaper endured with remarkable

stability in a country where governments, ideologies and
even constitutions come and go frequently.

El Gomercio

has been an intensely political institution, and
outlived

most of its targets, including the International Petroleum

Company— another old institution in the economic and political
life of Peru.

What prompted one enterprise to become the arch enemy
of another?
combat

x^rith

Why did El Gomercio engage I.P.C. in mortal
disastrous effects for the company and nearly

disastrous effects for the newspaper?

The answer to this

question must be sought in the background of this extraor-

dinary family rimning El Gomercio
3

.

The current generation

La Prensa vias taken over by the Leguia government and turned
into an official publication during the Oncenio.
In 19^7,
it editor Francisco Grana Garland v:as assassinated, and
there was then another change in oxmership and editorial
policy.
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of Hiro Quesadas took over c^nntr^r^i
control of +-u
the paper when their
father, the first Antonio Mir5
Quesada died in I905.
The
editorship then went to this eldest
son, Antonio, who ran
the paper with the help of his
brothers until he was assassinated in 1935.
The position of editor-in-chief
and head
of the family then went to Luis
Hiro Quesada. the oldest
survivine- brother.
This man has acted as editor of
the
paper and family patriarch to this day.

While information about the affairs
of the family is
scanty, several important factors m.ust be
considered.
First, the family's only source of wealth
and prestige is
the newspaper.
They have made it a matter of pride that

their positions are not influenced by any extraneous

business considerations.
the years;

The family has grown large over

even though by custom they should carry only

the Miro of their last name, they have kept the two last

names of the family founder.

Quesada with great pride.

They carry the name Hiro

Since this family is a sort of

institution in itself, its interests are carefully guarded

against the changing winds of Peruvian politics

—a

feat

usually accomplished by having important family members in

nearly every political party in Peru.

Thus no matter what

group or political movement wins in Peru, there is sure to
be a Hiro Quesada in its leadership.

The one important
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exception to this practice which
cannot be ignored is the
Aprista Party.a group which the Hiro
Quesadas have engaged
in an unparalleled vendetta during
the last forty years.
To illustrate the uncanny flexibility
of the family.
many examples can be drawn from the
political literature
of Peru.
During the 1930 's. when fascism was
over-running
Europe, one of the Miro Quesada brothers.
Carlos, travelled
to Italy.
Convinced of the virtues of fascism, he wrote a

series of very favorable articles for El Comercio.

The

Italians were so pleased with his statements that they

compiled and published the articles in book form in Italian.^

By 19^0. the situation had changed enough to prompt Carlos
Miro Quesada to withdraw his sympathies.

His reason was:

"The Thrid Reich has sacrificed its principles and has

permitted communism--a barbaric Asian phenomenon--to dictate
the law in Poland and the Baltic.""^

Peru's Communist Party returned fire.

It was not long before.

In one of their

resolutions passed at the Party Congress of 19^2, the
Communists denounced the Miro Quesadas as part of a native
6

pro-nazi fifth column.
Carlos Miro Quesada Laos, Intorno Af^li Scritti e JDiscorsl di
Mussolini (Milan: Fratelli Treves i:^ditori, 1937).

^Carlos Miro Quesada Laos, Lo que he visto en Europa (Lima:
Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1940") p. 197
,

6

Partido Coraunista Peruano, Congreso Nacional. Resoluciones
del Primer Conp;reso del Partido Comunista del Peru (Lima:
n.p.

,

19^2)

,

p.

8.
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In 1959. under the impact of
sputnik and the Cuban
revolution, the Miro Quesadas began to
take a second look
at the Communist movement.
In that year. Francisco Miro

Quesada Cantuarias. more commonly known as
Paco. took an
extensive trip to the Soviet bloc nations,
including

visits

to Moscow and even Peking.

Francisco was a nephew of Don

Luis, and as the intellectual and philosopher
of the family
he was very influential with his uncle.

After his return from the Communist

x^orld,

Francisco

Miro Quesada wrote several articles for the Sunday supplement
of El Comercio, and his articles in turn were compiled

and published in book form.

While Francisco did not engage

in outright praise of the Communist regimes of the Soviet

Union and China, he shocked many in the circle of family
friends with his participation on an officially sponsored

tour and the subsequent publication of his friendly account
of Soviet society.

In the book preface, Francisco Miro

Quesada related a conversation with a friend who had read
the articles in El Comercio

.

The friend, he reported,

told him:

Whoever reads them, realizes that you
have been impartial, understands that
you have not gone to the Communist
coimtries to criticize or to praise
One
them, but rather to observe them.
realizes that you have returned to
But, at the end of
tell the truth.
the reading, one is left with a feeling
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of sympathy.
The reality you describe
through your pen has defects.
But the
final impression is that one is dealina:
With a sympathetic realiT;y.^

Francisco Miro Quesada was clearly impressed
with the Soviet
arguments, and even more interestingly, with
Chinese arguments.
In Peking, he was told that there had been two
kinds

of bourgeoisie in China, the national and the
bureaucratic.
The latter was allied with Chiang Kai-shek and was
exiled
to Formosa, but the national bourgeoisie

despite their destined disappearnace

,

vjas

told that

they would be allowed

to keep the means of production for awhile.

The regime

merely took over the means of distribution.

Francisco

Miro Quesada was told that the Chinese government actually

allowed this national bourgeoisie to exploit the workers

during the first stage of the reordering of Chinese life.
The Chinese hosts assured him that the national bourgeoisie

would be re-educated and would take up management positions
in the nationalized industry.

But even if they were not

ready, additional time would be allowed for them to make the

transition.

Hiro Quesada was so impressed by the Chinese

presentation that he entitled the chapter dealing with China
7

Francisco Miro Quesada Cantuarias, La Otra Mi dad del
Tipografia Santa Rosa, S.ii., 1959). P1 (Lima:

Vol.

ilundo
9-

,
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"About capitalism in China.

The Chinese went so far as

to tell riiro Quesada that there
were several political parties
in China-he was even introduced to
the leaders of some of
these parties, the Kuomintang and the
Association for the

Construction of Democracy of China— a
political party
supposedly composed of bourgeoisie and many
small and large
9
capitalists.

Francisco Miro Quesada returned to Moscow from
Peking
in a state of bewilderment.
He never quite understood

that

what the Chinese described as political parties were
nothing

more than various state-sponsored associations or
groupings

along occupational lines.

He continued to attack Marxism,

but concluded that the Soviet Union was not really a Marxist
state.

Through what he called "a supermarxist analysis of

jazz" he decided that since art reflects the conditions of

production in Marxist theory, and the Soviets enjoy jazz-a capitalist art form, the Soviet Union was turning into

a bourgeois,

capitalist and exploiting society.

Coinciding with Francisco Miro Quesada

's

"^^

pilgrimage to

the Soviet Union and China, El Comer cio began to include

articles by a great riumber of leftist writers in the pages
_
9

Ibid

.

,

pp.

97-100.

ibid

.

,

pp.

101-103.

"*"^Ibid.

,

p.

136.
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of its Sunday supplement.

A new humorous column
entitled

"Behind the Nylon Gurtin" and authored
by someone with the
pen name "Sofocleto" began to appear
regularly;
this column

ridiculed the life style of people in the
United States.
It was after Pace's return from Moscow
that El Comercio
began its most extensive campaign against the
International
Petroleum Company.
I.P.G. executives who were personally

acquainted with Francisco Hiro Quesada saw a definite
trend
in the chain of events involving their company. The
.management
of I,P.C. believed that Don Luis Hiro Quesada feared a

violent swing to the left similar to the one vrhich had

taken place in Cuba.

The only way to preserve the family's

status and its liveUhood in such an eventuality was to make

their position more compatible with the Peruvian left by

reflecting an increasingly anti-American point of

view."^"^

Naturally, International Petroleum Company acted as a

lightning rod in the subsequent storm.
Of course, neither the company nor Pedro Beltran let

Mir5 Quesada 's challenge go unanswered.
Zavala, a loyal employee of the
I.P.C.

.joined hands

I-Iiro

Augusto Zimmermann

Quesadas, claimed that

with foreign capital to destroy El Gomerci o

He states that Beltran and I.P.C. management contacted various
^"^Confidential interviews vJith I.P.C. executives,
Florida. Hay 23-28, 1971-

Coral Gables

.

'
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industrialists and advertisers and tried
to persuade them
that El Gomercio was ant i -American,
anti-free enterprise,
and an ally of international communism.
As a result of thi;.s
pressure during the early 1960's. National
Broadcasting Company (N.B.G.) cancelled an agreement to
operate a television
station in Lima jointly with El Gomercio
The Hiro Quesada
family had to sell the station at a loss
of several million
.

soles.

_

_

A similar fate befell a radio
station operated by
12

£1 Gomercio

.

International Petroleum Company management

candidly admitted that they did suggest to other
American
businesses that El Gomercio had taken an anti-Am.erican
tone,
and that it would be wise not to advertise in the
newspaper

""''^

.

Not all the exchanges between I.P.G. and El Gomercio

were acrimonious.

In late I959 or early i960, a top company

executive visited Alejandro Miro Quesada. one of Don Luis

's

sons, and tried to convince him to ease the I.P.G. issue out

of tne headlines.

Alejandro promised to intervene;

El Gomercio continued the attacks on I.P.G.

however,

The same exe-

cutive then tried his powers of persuasion on Francisco Hire
Quesada.

At a dinner meeting arranged by Francisco, El Gomercio

motivation in attacking I.P.G. was explained as an attempt
12

Augusto Zimmermann Zavala, La His coria Secreta del Petrolfao
(Lima
Editorial Grafica Labor, I968), op. 167-I70.
:

13

Interview with John Oldfield, Coral Gables, Florida,
Hay 26, 1971-

s

.
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to put down Pedro Beltran.

that the editor of

m

U

Francisco Mlro Quesada declared

Prensa sent letters to various
firms

the United States. Includlns
advertising aeenoies,
and suggested that they cease doing
business with El Coraercl o
because of its ant i -American attitude.
Hir5 Quesada stated
that he regretted the difficulties
with I.P.C. but that
the Miro Quesada family would not
rest until they had the

"political corpse of Beltran.

""^^

Even though the company management
did not accept

Francisco's explanation as the complete truth,
it is probably correct to assume that the elder Miro
Quesada. Don

Luis, perceived both International Petroleum
Company and
La Prensa as his enemies.

The events of July I959 provided

him with a good opportunity to launch a simultaneous
attack
on both.

This animosity for Beltran was to a large extent

the result of normal competitive irritation between the

two leading newspaper entrepreneurs.

However, this competition

did not prevent the two men from interacting on a social

level before Beltran became Prime Minister.

'''^

Bon Luis

Miro Quesada felt personally offended at Beltran 's rise to
power.

i5

For decades he had viewed El Comer cio as a source

Confidential interview with I.P.C. executive. Coral Gables,
Florida, Hay 25, 1971.

time when Beltran became Prime Minister, he used
to send Don Luis complimentary vratermelons from his hacienda.
Ziramermann, p. 16?

^•^Up to the

'
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of political power;

New

Prensa

s

editor Pedro Beltran

had out-maneuvered him at his own
game.
It was unfortunate that
International Petroleum Company

had to request a price raise from Miro
Quesada's arch competitor, for the company automatically
became involved in
a quarrel from which it had little to
gain.
3y 1962, Beltran
and I.P.C. had ceased to deal with the Hir5
Quesadas socially
In a sense, they broke diplomatic relations.
Since in

Peruvian politics, most of the problem solving takes
place
on a personal level, this social break bctvieen
Beltfan and
I.P.C.

's

management on the one hand and the Hiro Quesadas

on the other hand precluded face-to-face interaction,
and

consequently eliminated a major bargaining medium.
The Social Progressist Movement

Another group prominently involved in the campaign
against I.P.C.

vras

a relatively small political party,

Movimiento Social Progresista.
members of this group

x^ere

The Social Progresistas

called,

humanists" and "revolutionary."

the
,

as

claimed to be "socialist

— men

opposed to capitalist

society's failures and human exploitation.

They were "revolu

tionary" because they believed that "the great national
problems can only be solved through a profound change in the
social and economic structure of the country.

"

However,
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unlike the radical fringe of the
Aprista party which broke
ranks and launched a guerilla
movement in 1965. the Social
Progressists by and large operated
within Peru's political
framework. Among their basic objectives
were the socializatio
of Peruvian agriculture and the
suppression of the feudal
system which they claimed existed
in Peru, the nationalization of natural resources and the means
of production, and
the reform of the credit or banking
system so that financial
resources would no longer by in the hands
of the
privileged,

but rather in the service of the country
for development.
Peru's development and improvements in the
standard of living
required a planned economy, according to the
Social Progressists.
The 1959 Cuban Revolution heavily
influenced this

Peruvian political movement, as much of its rhetoric
on
"socialist humanism" reflected.
No concession to "the

economy of free enterprise and the imperialist interests

which are the beneficiaries of the country's dependence.
would be allowed.

.

The movement urged its follovrers "to

erradicate the capitalist system" and to "deliver to the
people the political and economic power.

""^^

Members of the

Social Progressist Movement in the Chamber of Deputies

x^^ent

on record as sponsors of a resolution censuring the Beltran

TTSee

the ideological statement of the Movimiento Social
Progresista in S. Martinez, Ideario ^ Plan de Gobierno de
los Partidos Politicos (Lima, n.p., I962), pp. 130-140.

."
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Cabinet for supporting the United States
the Cuban government in 1960.^^

's

O.A.S. moves against

When the documents allegedly

stolen from the Cuban Embassy in Lima
were made public, the
leader of the M.S. P.. Alberto Rufz
Eldredge was listed as
one of the recipients of the largest Cuban
revolutionary
welfare payments.
The Social Progresistas were the
product of Peruvian
higher education and social structure. Many
were trained
as lawyers, doctors, and other professionals,
but their

upward social mobility was thwarted by their
lack of con-

nections With the Peruvian oligarchs.

I.P.G.'s management

admitted that these radicals were intelligent and welleducated;

however, given their lack of contacts they would

never occupy a place in Peruvian society commensurate with
their professional capabilities.

19

Like the young reformers

of Accion Popular who had been inspired by Papal encyclicals,
the radical M.S. P. members wanted to reform Peru.

However,

unlike the men of Accion Popular, most Social Progressists
did not have the family pedigree of a Fernando Belaunde, a
17

Peru, Camara de Diputados, Diario de los Debates. Tomo I.
Legislatura Ordinaria de I96O (Lima; Pnbli cfic~r5n Ofi-^ial

i960), pD. 210-213,
18

19

See th3 report on political expenditures.
Luis Ricardo
Alonso Fernandez to Carlos Olivares Sanchez, Department
of Latin American Affairs, Havana, October ^, i960.
One I.P.C. executive stated that he knew several M.S. P.
leaders during their university days.
Confidential interview with I.P.C. executive. Coral Gables, Florida, May 25, I971

.

180

man whose ancestors had been
prominent in Peruvian politics,
diplomacy and literature for several
generations.

The young

radicals formed the Movimiento Social
Progresista in I955.
but it was not until the Cuban Revolution
that they developed
their own pedigree, couched in the language
of Cuban Marxism.

The Social Progressists despised the
Alianza Popular

Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) vehemently, in the
same manner that Lenin had despised the socialist,
gradualist and
other non-violent reformers.

For them. APRA had become

"the defender of the oligarchy and the large
foreign enter-

prises.

.

.

the submissive servant of the interests of

imperialism."

20

The M.S. P. had long despaired what its

members saw as the collusion of the wire services and the

newspapers with United States imperialism.

When the Miro

Quesada's El Comercio. APRA's ancestral foe. launched the
1959 offensive against I.P.G., the M.S. P. quickly grasped
a golden opportunity.

El Comercio was an institution of

the establishment but it shared common enemies with them.
Out of this mutual hatred grew an iinlikely alliance of one

of Peru's foremost oligarchs and one of its militant revolu-

tionary groups.

However, the ultimate objectives of El Comerci o

and the Social Progressist Movem.ent were quite different.
20

Martinez,

p.

135
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The first wanted to keep APRA out
of power and I.P.C. out
of Peru, but basically it had no
quarrel with the sociopolitical structure of which it was a
beneficiary.
The Movimiento Social Progresista. on the other
hand, merely wanted
to use the I.P.C. issue as a first step
in what it hoped
would be the eventual destruction of Peru's
entire sociopolitical system.

The Military
The Social Progressists knew that in order to
make a

real impact on Peruvian politics they needed more
than 21
Comercio

's

cooperation.

Their credibility was greatly en-

hanced by the Cuban xRevolution;
could happen in Peru.

what had happened in Cuba

El Comercio's daily coverage of

their congressional speeches added an aura of respectability
to a group which five years earlier was dismissed as an

inconsequential fringe of the Peruvian left.

The M.S.

P.

now needed to convince Peru's ultimate power brokers, the
military, that it was their movement v^hich

vias

best tuned

to the temper of the times.

The opportunity to mingle with the military came \ihen the

M.S.P.'s leader. Alberto Huiz Eldredge

vjas

invited to speak

to the students and staff of the Center for Higher Military

Studies (C.A.S.M.).

Rufz Eldredge used this opportunity

s
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to the fullest.

He developed close relationships
with several

C.A.E.M. officers-much to the dislike
of I.P.C. management,
which had for years sponsored an annual
course about the

petroleum industry at the Center.

Eventually, an officer

friendly to I.P.C. attempted to alert the Armed
Forces command of the close relationship between Social
Progressist
activists and C.A.E.M. officers, only to be told
that the

C.A.E.H. curriculum called for the officers to
be exposed
to all types of philosophical orientations, including
Marxism.

By the middle 1960's. even though I.P.C. continued
to send

lecturers to the Center, the officers began to react more
and more belligerantly towards the company's general manager
and his staff, thus indicating that to a very large extent,
the Social Progressists were able to persuade C.A.E.M.

officers that their position was valid.

Several scholars have vrritten about the Peruvian military
in general and about the Center for Higher Military Studies
22

in particular.

According to Luigi Einaudi and Carlos Astiz,

among others, C.A.E.M.

's

curriculum during the late I950

'

Confidential interview with I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables,
Florida. Hay 25, 1971.
22

See Luigi R. Einaudi. Peruvian Military Relations with the
Unit ed States (Santa Monica. Ca.
Hand Corporation. Jvjij,
I970TT Luigi Einaudi. Revolution from V/ithin? Milita ry
See also:
Carlos A. Astiz,
Rule in Peru since I968
i'he
Peruvian Armed Forces as a Political Elite: Can They Develop
a New Developmental Model?" Paper delivered at the I969
Round Table of the International Political Science Association,
Rio de Janairo, Brazil, October 27-31. 19^9;
Victor Villanueva,
El Militarismo en el Peru (Lima: Empresa Grafica T. Scheuch,
S.A.. 1962.
:

.

'
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and early i960

evolved from the traditional and
technical
fare to a far more comprehensive
program including a heavy
dosage of social science.
The officers ceased to concern
themselves exclusively with the
specifications of weapons
systems or Prussian battle plans, and
began to look into the
socio-economic problems of Peru.
By I962, C.A.E.PU officers
predicted that in less than twenty years Peru's
population
would be twenty-one million; seven million
people would
•

s

have to be incorporated into a productive modern
economy.

and at Peru's current rate of growth the goal would
never
be achieved.

23

It was at the Center for Higher Military Studies that

I.P.C. was found wanting as a corporate citizen of Peru.

This inquisitive body of officers--a truly new breed of
soldier,

judged that I.P.C.

's

role in the Peruvian economy

was damaging to the national interest.

It was from this

foruu that radicals such as Ruiz Eldredge, Hontesinos, and

Benavides Gorrea persuaded the Army that I.P.C. owed Peru
large amounts of money, and that the national honor demanded
not only the expropriation of the company but its complete

humiliation.

In other words, a mutual agreement between the

government and the company for even a token compensation was
23

Villanueva,

p.

I76.
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out of the question for the
radical anti-I.P.c. forces;
the company had to be unceremoniously
routed from Peru.
International Petroleum lost its cause
in spite of
the fact that for years it had
courted the favor of the Armed
Forces.
In 19^6. the company gave the
Air Force a substantial amount of land in La 3rea
y PariKas for the construction of the air base -El Pato. " In
195^]-, I.p.c. gave
a buildins to the Air Force for use
housing officers, and
it also gave houses to the Army.
In this and in every case
where I.P.C. ceded land to the Armed Forces
or the government,
it required the receivers to legally
acknowledge its claims

to the subsoil even ^onder the land or property
ceded.
I.P.C.

supplied its neighboring military installations with

electricity and water.

How could the- military overlook the

company's generous efforts and side with the radicals?
The answer to this question must be sought in the

military's hatred for APRA.

On July 7.

I932,

carried out a revolt in the city of Trujillo.

the Apristas

After a bloody

assault on the garrison of that city, they captured the

garrison and about sixty military officers and enlisted men.
The Apristas held the city during that day. but by night
it became apparent that the governraent forces vrould soon

2k

i^Ioticias de Petr6leo,

XIII, No.

II6 (April, i960).
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reclaim the garrison.

The Aprista leaders fled
before the

government troops launched their
massive attack, but not
before they ordered the death of
the officers they captured
earlier in the day.
The Aprista mob even reportedly
mutilated
some of the officers's corpses.
When the Army recaptured
Trujillo, the officers in charge
summarily executed any man
suspected of having participated in
the uprising.
Henceforth, the Army commemorated July
7 every year as the day
of the Trujillo massacre;
the military held APRA responsible.
Although some Army officers were working
with APRA during
the 1932 uprising, and some others have
secretly worked with
that party since the massacre, the Army as a
whole kept

alive an undying hatred for the Aprista party.

It made a

well known commitment to the principle that APRA would never

win the presidency of Peru.
Alianza Popular Hevolucionaria Americana
The Trujillo massacre did not entirely explain the

Army's antagonism for APRA.

As the military became more

involved in socio-economic engineering, and offered more

radical proposals to deal with national problems, APRA moved
in the opposite direction.
25

According to Luigi Einaudi,

Fredrick E. Pike. The Mode rn History of Peru (New York:
Praeger, I967). pp. 26^-266.
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^^^^ ^^^i^S Started.

APP^''^^^^

rignr, the two have moved tox«rard
and
perhaps passed each other in
opposite
directions until today many military
officers may be more favorable
toward
social innovation than the i\t)rista
leadership, which lives increasingly
^
in the past.^.
26
After the unsuccessful coup of
19^8 and the long period

of repression din-ing the Ochenio
of Odria, APHA acquired
legal recognition only by throwing
their support to one of
Peru's most traditional leaders, Hanuel
Frado.
During the
Prado administration. AFRA joined in what
became known as
the convivencia a political association
which included APHA
and such notable representatives of the Peruvian
establishment
27
as Pedro Beltran.
In the words of former British Ambassador
to Peru, Sir Robert Harett,
.

At long last, and largely thani^s
to Hanuel Prado, the Aprista lion
and the Establishment lamb lay
down together.
2o
Later, in I962. APRA made a political deal with its former

enemy General Manuel Odria.

These alliances clearly illus-

trated iiPRA's realization that it

vras

not longer Peru's only

popular mass party, but had instead become one party among
26,

.

.

Luigi i:.inaudi, Peruvian Military R elations with the United
States p. 15.
Carlos Astiz, Pressi;ire Grou:?s and Power Elites in. Peruvian
Politics (Ithaca, N.I.
Cornell University Press. 196977"
Francois Bourricaud, Power and Society in
pp. 99-100;
Contemporary Peru (New York: Praeger, I970), p. I85.
'

,

:

28

Sir Robert Marett, Peru (New York:

Praeger,

I969),

p.

I78.

18?

many.

Haya de la Torre's willingness
to deal with the
traditional political leadership indicated
that the Apristas
and the Army indeed crossed each
other's paths on the political
spectrum sometime during the late 1950 's,
and by the early
1960's the military had come to look upon
AFRA as part of
the inept establish^Tient which, in their
view, was keeping
Peru stagnant.
This conception had some validity,
considering
APRA's turnabout on the petroleum issue.
In I931, an Aprista

leader

T^rrote

denouncing "imperialism" and partially defined

it thus:

Imperialist is the Standard Oil Company
(yankee company) which in the United
States pays ^ and 5 dollars to its workers
for a day of work of 7 or 8 hours, while
in Peru it pays two soles and 53 cents
for a work day of 10 or 8 hours.

According to the Aprista leadership, the answer to this imperialism was nationalization."^^

Hovrever.

its position on the petroleum question.

by 19^6 APRA changed

Hanuel Seoane.

Eaja de la Torre's second in command, delivered a speech

pointing out that unlike countries such as Argentina, Peru
produced more petroleum than it consumed, and thus it needed
the exporting and technical expertise

provided.
29

7J-hich

foreign capital

APHA's solution to the oil problem

vras

to increase

Luis E. iieysen, El ABC de la Peruanizacion (Lima:
Editorial APRA, 193177 p. 1^.

30

Ibid., p. 17.
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Peru's share of the petroleum
industry's profits.
As the
party's position developed over the
years, several questions
were crucial.
if Peru expropriated La Brea
y Parinas. would
Standard Oil allow Peruvian oil to
enter the international
markets? Where could Peru get the tankers
to transport it;;s
oil if it could be sold? As an alternative
to an unfeasible
.e

nationalization. A?RA preferred their "most
practical program,'
to force I.P.C. to pay higher wages and
higher
taxes.

The

resulting revenues would be used to create other
industries.
The problem with APRA

•

s

reasoning was that as time went on

it became less and less valid.

Domestic consumption in Peru

increased astronomically while exports dropped.

Peru became a net importer of oil.

In I962

APHA forgot the reasons

for it 19^6 position and stuck to its conclusions.
I'larett

observed that:

Sir Robert

"Among liberals in the U.S.A., the

conviction grew that APRA represented the true forces of

democracy in a country which for too long had groaned under
the heel of a rich oligarchy. " 33

Perhaps the Apristas pre-

ferred to safeguard these North American sympathies by

keeping their favorable attitude towards the American oil
company even in the face of changes which rendered their
31
32

Manuel Seoane, Gredito Externo v justicia Social --Un discurso
polenico (Lima: iiditorial Atahualpa, 194-67^ p. 54-.

Harry Kantor, The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista
Movement (New York: Octagon Books, I966), p. 78.

-^-^Marett,

p.

I68
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previous reasoning obsolete.

APRA's support in Congress for Beltran's
I.P.c. programs
led the Peruvian military to conclude
that indeed I.P.G.
and APRA were closely tied.

Therefore, the Army's aversion

for APPJi was automatically translated into an
aversion for

International Petroleum Company.

This dislike was then

reinforced by the military's traditional fear that
foreigners
controlled their fuel supply.

By allowing I.P.G. to control

the production and distribution of oil in Peru, they felt

that the destiny of their country
of foreigners

— this

x^as

vias

too much in the hands

a rather traditional view of defense

policy.

Pedro Be It fan and

La.

Prensa

Another major participant in the controversy over
La Brea y Parinas

v:as

Pedro Beltran

— editor

and owner of

La Prensa and a very wealthy man with many commercial and

agricultural interests.

Beltran was described by an I.P.C.

manager as Wall Street's ideal of the South American businessman, newspaperman, and statesman, and he was proud of
the esteem in which American businessmen and government

officials held him.

La Prensa regularly reported his many

Luigi Einaudi, Oral Presentation at the 67th iinnual Convention, American Political Science Association, Chicago,
(Panel:
Comparative Military
Illinois, September 7, 1971«
Regimes in Developing Societies).
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commendations from the United States.

An article in the

February I962 issue of Fortune magazine
hailed Pedro Beltran
as the Peruvian statesman who
could very well become his
country's next president.
La Prensa
greeted the Forti:une

article with a front page headline.

"Beltran an exceptional

statesman considers Fortune magazine. "^^

Americans were

generally impressed with the results achieved
by the Beltran
cabinet.
Peru's gross national product grew to a
annual
rate, and the country's foreign exchange
reserves were replenished.

A United States commercial

mission which

visited Peru in late i960 found that country much
improved
in stability, and ruled that Peru's investment
climate vjas
most favorable for U.S. capital.

^"^

Originally. La Prensa was strongly antagonistic to
APPiA.

for the 19^7 assassination of La Prensa

'

s

editor

Francisco Grana Garland was linked to that party.

VJhen

Pedro

Beltian succeded Grana Garland as editor, he reportedly
swore eternal hatred for APRA on GraKa Garland's grave.
However, by the late 1950's Beltran
vjas

wearing thin.

animosity for APRA

's

Like many other Peruvians with political

ambitions. Beltran knew that it would be difficult to A'overn
3^

Freiisa

^^Pike.
37

p.

.

January 29, I962,

p.

1.

298.

"Estabilidad en el Peru," la Prensa

,

January

7.

I962. p.

l^l-.
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Peru Without the co-operation or at
least the acquiesence
Of AFRA. Don Luis Miro Quesada. Beltran's

competitor, seldom

missed a chance to reproach this accomodation
with the
Apristas. and as early as February I958
he editorially
condemned Beltran for shaming the memory
of

Grana Garland

by associating La Prensa with the APRA-Prado
coalition.
As the 1962 elections approached, Beltran
began to

maneuver for his own presidential nomination.

He resigned

from the Cabinet, but it soon became apparent that
he did
not have the popular support he needed, even if Fortune

and the U.S. Department of Commerce endorsed his fiscal
accomplishments.

He withdrew from the presidential race,

and by early I962 it was clear that he would support the

Aprista leader Victor Raul Haya de la Torre for the office
of president.

took two forms;

La Prensa

first,

'

s

support for Haya de la Torre

the large front page headlines

depicted Haya de la Torre as the triumphant leader making
the final bid for the long-denied presidency.

APRA supported

Prado in I956 because of his promise to legalize the party.
The Apristas regarded Prado as a transitional ruler who would

make it possible for Haya de la Torre to assume the leadership of Peru in I962.

But one institution blocking APRA's

-^^"Nueva maniobra del organo de los exportadores
February 2, 1958, p. 2.

,

"

El Comercio

,
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probable success was the Army.

Would the Army use its

veto power in I962 as it had done
before in order to dash
Haya de la Torre's presidential
ambitions?
Clearly, the Apristas hoped that the Army
would acquiese.
After all. APRA had long ago renounced its
revolutionary tactics
The party had ceased to advocate socialism
in any meaningful
form, and it had in general become a
political grouping

acceptable to the Peruvian oligarchy.
with favor on Haya de la Torre;
not go unnoticed.

Even Washington looked

his support for I.P.C. did

Beltran called on his Army friends to

assure the country that Haya de la Torre would be an acceptable president of Peru.
Cuadra Rabinez, Beltran

On January 5, I962, General Alejandro
's

Minister of War. declared that the

Armed Forces would not only abide by the results of the
elections, but would in fact guarantee their "purity." 39

Here was La Prensa

'

s

second task

— to

publicize positive

commitments to free elections, elections which vrould determine
the next president of Peru.

Although Cuadra Rabinez

's

position

within the Armed Forces was not a strong one, on January 12
he again declared that "whoever the People elect will occupy
^0
the chair."
To further press this point of view. La Prensa
39 "Las

Fuerzas Armadas Garantizaran Sugragio," la Prensa.
January 6, I962 p. 2.
,

"Qui en Elija el Pueblo ocupara la Silla

— Fuerzas

Garantizan Pureza del Proceso Electoral,
January 13, I962, p. 2.

"

La.

Armadas
Prensa
,
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carried an article by another general,
arguing that the
Armed Forces were "essentially
obedient and hence cannot
engage in political deliberation."'^'^
The Oligarchy

During most of the 19th century. Peru,
like other Latin
American nations, was dominated by an oligarchy
composed
of the Roman Catholic Church, the Armed Forces
and the
landed elite.

land was then the trademark of wealth and

high social status.

As Peru became incorporated into the

world markets, the resulting specialized demand for particular products made certain types of land more valuable

than others.

Since the demand was for sugar and cotton,

large plantations along Peru's coastal strip were developed
to meet that demand.

This agricultural emphasis had an

impact on the nature of the Peruvian oligarchy.
crats of the sierra, the gamonales

holdings

— their

,

The aristo-

retained their vast

self-sufficient haciendas;

however, they

lost much of their power and influence to the prominent

coastal families.

This coastal oligarchy differed from the

sierra oligarchy because they were oriented to exports.
It was their crops which generated most of Peru's foreign

^
General Pedro A. Kerida. "Ortodoxia Institucional del
Ejercito," La Prensa January 18, I962, p. 8.
,

:

19^

exchange, and consequently they
tended to dominate the import
market as well. As a direct result
of their strength in
the foreign trade of the country,
the landed coastal oligarchy
dominated the credit institutions of Peru.
Through their
control of the banks, they controlled
most of Peru's commercial and industrial ventures.
French scholar Francois Bourricaud wrote

There is ... a Peruvian oligarchy,
in the sense of a nucleus of TDowerful
families who control the nation's
wealth.
Its members are not mere consumers, and while they may not themselves be producers or organize production, they determine its scope and
direction.
Is this plutocracy a
governing class? The question is hard
to answer.
The povxer of a governing
class is always difficult to define;
the fact that such a class exists, hovrever manifestly, does not mean that it
governs everything.
And in Peru, the
problem of measuring the extent of the
oligarchy's power is especially baffling.
The "oligarchy" which Beltfan and Prado represented

was an entity difficult to categorize, and this difficulty

stemmed from the fact that the oligarchy closely guarded
its affairs.

Since many Peruvian businesses functioned

an family-owned enterprises rather than publically-owned
corporations, disclosures of ownership and operations were
far less prevalent than those in the United States.

^
Bourricaud.

p.

^8.

It vxas
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banking system of Peru which many
Peruvians, including the
military, regarded as one of the chief
culprits
of the in-

equitable social structure.

The Social Progressist Movement

wanted to reform the credit system so
that it would be
available to the population at large and
not only to a few
privileged elements of Peruvian society. The
large Peruvian
banks were used as holding companies (companies
which
own

other businesses) for the oligarchy or for
foreign business
interests.
For instance, the Banco Internacional was

in fact

owned by the Bunge Born firm, an agricultural conglomerate
based in Argentina, but also operating in Peru.

This bank

accepted the public's money, but it lent money almost exclusively to Bunge Born ventures.
The Prado family controlled not only the presidency

through Manuel Prado. but it also controlled a vast financial
empire through the Banco Popular.

The lending policy of

this bank was to give funds for a venture only if the bank
got a substantial share of the business.

If the venture

failed and the loan was defaulted, the bank simply took
over;

if the business suceeded. the Banco Popular had a

share in the success.

paper La Cronica

55

.

The Prado family bank ovmed the news-

and a radio station of the same name;

thoy

Confidential interview with I.P.C. executive. Coral Gables,
Florida, May 2?, 1971.
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also had a 20% interest in A.P.S.A..
the Peruvian airlines.''''
While the Peruvian oligarchy was
not homogeneous on an
economic or political level, it was
quite homogeneous and
cohesive on a social level. Therefore
such institutions
as the Jockey Club and more
importantly, the Club Nacional
were significant.
Membership lists for these
.

groups are

secret.

However. Phillip Gilette. a sociologist
at the

University of California. Los Angeles, obtained
Club Nacional
membership lists going back to the 19th century.
He found

that during the 20th century the proportion
of high political

office holders belonging to the Club Nacional
progressively
declined, except dui^ing the Frado administration, when

trend was temporarily reversed.

tv-is

This temporary upswing

in the political fortunes of the oligarchy perhaps caused

a kind of over-confidence.

The oligarchy was now brave

enough to carry out a public internal struggle over the

petroleum problem.

Peru's military officers, especially

those steeped in social science at C.A.S.M., probably

perceived this increase in oligarchical pov;er as a direct
threat to the pre-eminent role of the military, with its

middle class and rural background.

mi

r.r

Ibid.

Interview vxith Phillip Gilette, V/ashington,

D. C.

,

Hay 18, I97I
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The Presidential Campaign
of I962

Seven candidates sought the
office of president in the
1962 election campaign in Peru, but only
four were running
in earnest, and only three had
realistic possibilities of
Winning the election. General Odrfa s
followers, who had
backed Hernando LaValle in I956. now
supported the general
himself— under the banner of the Union Nacional
Odriista
(U.N.O.).
Haya de la Torre once more was the
standard bearer
of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria
Americana, and Fernando
Belaunde Terry was the candidate of Acci6n Popular.
'

The

fourth candidate was Hectro Cornejo Chavez, the leader
of
the Christian Democratic Party, a political grouping
which

closely paralleled Accion Popular in its ideology.

The

Christian Democrats appeals to the same young, reformist
Catholic constituency that Accion Popular attracted.

'

How-

ever. Fernando Belaunde Terry was a far more charismatic

candidate than Cornejo Chavez, and therefore Accion

Popular

got the bulk of the votes of this constituency.

While Cuadra Rabinez and other senior officers had

attempted to commit the Army to support vjhomever won the
election of I962, the younger officers were definitely un-

happy with the possibility of eithor Haya de la Torre or
or even General Odria assuming the presidency.

Their
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favorite candidate was Belaunde.

The olisarchy divided

its sympathies amons Odrfa. Belaunde,
and Haya de la Torre.
However. Beltran and the very large
financial interests

With which he was associated decided to
support Haya de la
Torre.
This group was impressed by APRA s
"good" behavior
during the Prado administration, and they were
now willing
'

to let APRA have a try at the presidency.

The coming of the election offered a breathing
spell
for International Petroleum Company.

In a report covering

1962, the American embassy staff in Lima commented:

The Government of Peru was occupied
with politics during the first half
of 1962 so that the La Brea-Parifias
controversy remained in the backn:round.
Six of the presidential candidates
running for office.
expressed themselves as being in favor of immediate
nationalization of the la. Brea-Parinas
and Lobitos concessions and one candidate identified himself with progressive
nationalization.
.

.

V/hile the single candidate was not identified in the re-

port, there was little doubt to his identity.

Belaunde

and Come jo Chavez were both committed to nationalization
in principle.
I'iarett.

p.

The minor candidates were all radical leftists.
185;

Political 21ite."

Astiz,
p.

"The Peruvian Armed Forces as a

20.

Department of State, Supplement to Annual Petroleum
Report 1962 Peru U.S. Departm.ent of State Document .'Jo.
A-717, April 10, 1963. p. 1.

'U.S.,

—

—
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The only traditional conservative,
General Odrfa vaguely
pledged his party to:

Defend the national resources,
while
promoting their exploitation in accordance With the Constitution and
Laws of the nation;
demanding the
immediate and definitive solution
solution to
the problem of La Brea y Parinas.

^8

Victor Raul Kaya de la Torre was the only
candidate committed
to "progressive nationalization." or
"covert adaptation"
as the enemies of I.P.C. preferred to
call it-the alternative
which Pedro Beltran and APRA had supported
since
I961.

While I.P.C. attempted to project a low profile
during
the election, its sympathies for Haya de la Torre
could hardly
be concealed.

traveled

Early in the campaign, the Aprista leader

to Talara, where I.P.C. personnel gave him a

tumultuous reception.

Speaking to what was reported to be

the greatest crowd ever assembled in Talara, Haya de la Torre

once more pledged his support to "progressive nationalization,"
a statement which won him warm support from the I.P.C. workers.

After the speeches, the Aprista leader was treated to dinner
at the iLsso Club.
Of the minor candidates for election in I962, only one

was running almost exclusively on the petroleum issue.

candidate
ITH

i-as

That

Cesar Pando, a retired general and the head

See the official statement of the Union Nacional Odriista in
J. Hejia Baca, 1962), p. 2kl

rianuel del Elector (Lima:

"Entusiasta Recepcion Tuvo Haya en Talara," La Prensa,
January 28, I962, p. 2.
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Of the Front for the Defense
of Petroleum.

The other radical

candidates were Luciano Castillo,
of the ninlscule Socialist
Party, and Alberto Ru£z Eldredge.
head of the Movimiento
Social Progresista. The elections
were held as scheduled
on June 10, and the vote counting
process began immediately.
However, vote counting took weeks in Peru,
and the candidates
were condemned to a long wait. There x.as
usually a considerable
amount of speculation between the election and
the announcement
of the results.

The Lima papers published a daily count

of the votes processed up to that point, and tension
built
up as time passed.

For reasons only known to him. Fernando

Belaunde Terry chose to claim victory on the basis of the
votes counted during the first few days.
had favored his candidacy, echoed Belaunde

El Gomerclo, which
's

enthusiasm.

However, as time went on. it became increasingly clear that

Belaunde would not receive the minimum one third of the vote
to get the presidency.

Claims of victory gave way to ac-

cusations of fraud in the pages of El Comercio

,

and soon the

the Armed Forces began an investigation.

When the results of the election were finally announced,
Eaya. de la

Torre had the highest number of votes (557.047),

closely followed by Belaunde (5^^.180) and Odria (480,798).
The other candidates received between nine and fifty thousand

votes apiece.

Cesar Pando ran fifth, ahead of Castillo and
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Rufz Eldredse. who came in last.^°

m

order to win the

election a candidate had to have at
least one third of the
vote, and since the closest
candidate missed the mark by
a fraction of a percentage
point (Haya de la Torre received
33.0;^ of the vote),

it was clear that the contest
would have

to be decided by the Peruvian Congress.

elections.

AmA

In the Congressional

won lUf seats out of a total

21^1,

just short

of an absolute majority, but with a very
definite edge over
the runjier-up parties.
Furthermore, since the Odriistas

were far more compatible with Haya de la Torre than
with
Belaunde. it seemed as if the APRA leader's victory
was a

foregone conclusion.

51

With Haya de la Torre on the brink of achieving the
presidency, the Belaundistas and El Gonercio launched a

shrill fusillade of accusations, all the time appealing to
the Army to correct what they claimed was an Aprista fraud.

Realizing that the Army would not stand for the election
of Haya de la Torre, the Apristas compromised.

They agreed

to support their former enemy. General Odria, for a second
terms, with the understanding that they would have an even
50

oee "Cuadro del riesultado I'inal con las Cifras Oficiales
del J.N.E. de I962," Hunberto Uglotti Dansay, Las Eleccione;
de 1963 ^ la Eleccion del 62 (Lima;
n.p.
I963)
p. 181.
,

,

^""Marett,

pp.

185-186.

.
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larser role in the new administration
than they had had with
Prado.
Their compromise came too late, for
the Army had
already set up a coup d'etat.
In the early hours of the

morning of July 18. I962. a mere ten days
before the change
of governments, a crack unit of Peruvian
Rangers

surrounded

and then captured the Presidential Palace
and placed Manuel
Prado under arrest.
El Comercio probably had advance notice
of the coup,

for its photographers were there as a tank

crashed through the iron gates of the Executive mansion.
That very day the Lima newspaper gave profuse coverage
to

what must have been Peru's best photographed military coup.^^

During the next few hours, and in front of the cameras of
El Comercio reporters, an officer asked the leaders of
the Peruvian Congress to clear the congressional building.
The military's announced intention in carrying out

the coup

vjas

to annul the results of the I962 election.

They promised, as the military usually does on such occasions
in Latin American countries, new "clean" elections.

But,

unlike previous coups in Peru, the Armed Forces did not install a strong man in power.

Instead, the officers insisted

on calling their take-over an "institutional
that no dingle man was responsible
52

El Comercio

,

July 18-19

.

1962.

— the

'•

coup, meaning

military as a whole
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engineered the governmental
talce-over.
A junta was established to rule Peru in the
interim, with members of all
three military services
participating.
The Junta insist,

on maintaining collective
leadership, and when Junta chair.
.rinan
General Hi cardo Perez Godoy showed
caudillistic tendencies. h<le
was promptly dismissed and
substituted by General Nicolas
Lindley.
The J.onta surprised the country
when it announced
that it would not merely preside over
a new electoral process,
but intended also to work towards
solving Peru's most urgent
problems in the interim.
This task fell to the colonels

and majors at the Center for Higher
Military Studies (C.A.E.H.).
who then searched their files for answers
to Peru's dilemmas.
The Junta proceeded to create a Planning
Institute,

given the task of formulating a comprehensive
plan for national
development over a period of several years. This institute

eventually produced a national plan of economic and social
development to span the time from I962 to 1971."^^

also created a Housing Bank (Banco de la Vivienda)

The Junta
.

with the

purpose of b7/-passing the oligarchically-controllcd credit

institutions in order to provide low interest loans to wouldbe hom.e owners.

reform projects;
53

i^stiz,

54

The generals started several "oilot land

their most well-known effort was in the

"The Peruvian Armed Forces as a Political Elite." p^.

24-

Banco Central de Reserva del Peru. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
^ Social del Peru I962 - I971 (Lima: Banco Central. 19^

Econor.ico

.

s

^o^

Convecion valley, where peasants
appropriated lands 11legally.
The junta even declared I963
as Literacy Year, and
made plans for a massive effort to
teach the Peruvian illiterates how to read and write.
There was talk of annulling
the concessions of La Brea
y Parinas, a move apparently advocated by General Bossio. the junta
government's minister
most directly associated with the Center
for Higher Military
Studies.
However, the junta's reformist zeal lasted
only from

July to December I962.

In early I963.

the government took

a more moderate course—many of its radical
projects were

forgotten, and the military leaders accepted

Prensa

'

pressing argument that there was a grave danger of a communis,
tic take-over by the labor unions and peasant movements.

•

During the first week of I963, some 2,000 persons were

arrested in .Peru;

many of them were leftist leaders.

General Bossio was apparently forced to resign by his follovj
officers as early as October I962, and with him went any
hopes which the radicals might have entertained concerning
the nationalization of International Petroleum Comapny.
V/ith

Bossio out of the way and the junta engaging in anti-

communist campaigns, the United St'ites
^^Pike, pp.
56

^stiz,

301-302;

Political Elite,"
Astiz, ibid.

p.

26.

vjas

quick to warm up

"The Peruvian Armed Forces as a

r
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diplomatic relations which had
been cool since the coup.^^
I.P.C. was relieved by the
More concllliatory attitude
on
the part of the military.
Before

the Junta handed over the

reins of government to a civilian
president, the company
made a substantial purchase of
eovernBent bonds-bonds which
were not specifically issued
for I.P.C. but which were definitely a way^for private enterpreneurs
to show their support
for the junta.
Even though the military junta
mellowed in terms of
many of its original plans, it did pursue
one of its goals
to the very end.
The military supported the election
of
Fernando Belaunde Terry. Belaunde was the
kind of reformer
x^hom the C.A.E.H. officers could identify
mth— he seemed
to have the vision and the charisma to make
major changes
in Peruvian society.

Belaunde

's

The question became how to assure

victory.

With many of the radicals out of the picture, the
Armed Forces believed that Belaunde would easily catch the
votes which had been cast for them in the I962 election.
Just to be on the safe side, Belaunde reached an agreement

with the Christian Democrats.
gressiona]
57 Ibid.

,

In exchange for some Gon-

-eats in safe districts, the Christian Democrat

pp.

26-29.

^^Confidential interview with I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables,
Florida, May 25, I97I.
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backed his candidacy.
y

'Jhen
wnen

fh^
the election was over.
Belaunde

had received 39. 0.^ of the
vote.
Haya de la
and Odrfa got 25.5,?. Peru's
military junta
Of power to Fernando Belaunde
Terry on July
What can only be described as
an atmosphere
euphoria over what appeared to
be a new age
politics.

Torre got J^.oi
handed the reins
28.

1963.

of general

m

Peruvian

m
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CHAPTER

VI

INTERNATIONAL PETR0LELJT4 GOHPANY
AND
BELAO-NDE FACE EACH OTHER:

THE FIRST ROUl^D

Neither in the campalsn of
I962 not in that of 1963
did I^ Brea y Parinas figure
as a major issue.
Most of
the political parties avoided
the thorny question in their
formal platforms.
Candidate Belaunde did promise
that he

would solve the problem, but he
did not specify how he would
so about doing so.
Fernando Bela.:bde Terry was
inaugurated
as President of Peru on July
28.

general euphoria.
including the

I963.

in the midst of

He had the support of many
Peruvians,

Armed Forces and El Comercio

.

During his

inaugural address. Belaunde promised to
settle the La Brea
y Parinas controversy within ninety days.
Soon after he
was installed in office, negotiations
between Peru's
president and the management of International
Petroleum

Company began.
All during the month of August and well into
October
1963,

I.P.C. and the government negotiated.

I.P.C. was

willing to exchange its rights over the subsoil of I^ Brea
y Parinas for a contract to operate that property for a

period of at least two or three decades, a plan which com-

pany management had advocated since the early 1950'

s.

According to the company, considerable progress towards
"adaptation" was made during this period.

However, on
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October 17. I963 the government
ca.e up with a proposal
which
surprised the company.
That proposal included an
exchange
Of I.P.C.-s property rights
for a twenty year operation
contract, but it also set forth a
"tax debt" payment of
fifty million dollars over a five
year period, and a tax
regimen which according to the company
would have exceeded
100;^^

of the profits.

While Belaunde and his party. Accion
Popular, had always maintained a strongly nationalistic
position on the
I.P.C.

issue, their campaign rhetoric had
probably gone far

beyond what they were actually willing to
do with the large
American company.
In i960 Belaunde had given qualified
support to Pedro Beltran's "progressive nationalization"
plan,

but Alfonso Hontesinos's threat to split the
party

had forced Accion Popular leadership to introduce a
nation-

alization bill in the Peruvian congress.

However, by I963,

Montesinos was out of the party, and in fact out of politics,

and Benavides Gorrea. another vocal I.P.C. critic, had also

affected a tactful withdrawal from politics.

Even the Social

Progressists had done very poorly in the I962 and I963 elections.
"^The La

Despite his relative freedom from pressures of the

Brea y Parinas Controversy Vol. I (International
Petroleum Company, i^ebruary, I909), pp. 7-8.
.
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extreme left. Belaunde
adopted a

-'get

tough',

policy with

International Petroleum Company.
Several reasons can be
given for the President's
strong
position.
Of course. El Comeroio was
as committed as ever
to I.P.C. speedy demise, and
Belaunde was quite aware of
the power of that newspaper.
In fact, after his presidential
inauguration. Belaunde noted that
Luis Hiro Quesada had
not dropped by to congratulate
him as many of his supporters
had done.
He decided to visit Miro
Quesada at
his office

at El Comeroio headquarters, and a
time was prearranged for
the presidential visit.
As Belaunde entered the building
which houses the newspaper, he was received
in several

lobbies by progressively more prominent
members of the rlir6
Quesada family.
Finally he was escorted to a great staircase, and at the top stood Don Luis himself.

The patriarch

of the family descended but a few steps to meet the
presi-

dent of Peru;

this reception was widely interpreted as a

snub in Lima circles.

The incident well illustrated the

power of the Miro Quesadas, and the willingness of even the
president of the "supremo gobierno" to humble himself before
the pov7er of this one newspaper.

2

With La Prensa allied with

APRA and the Union Nacional Odriista (U.N.O.),
2

rielaiinde

This incident was related by I.P.C. 's former general manager
in Peru, Fernando_Espinosa, during an interview at his
residence in Key Biscayne, Florida, May 28, 1971.
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feared losing the support of El
Comercio. a consideration
which made a compromise with I.P.C.
very difficult.
Another factor which appeared to
have strengthened the
hand Of Belaunde was the election
of John Kennedy as President of the United States.
Kennedy had been in the White
House Since I961. but Peruvians had
been busy with internal
politics and there had been no major
confrontations with
I.P.C. since the Democratic
administration had taken over
in the United States.
Peruvians knew enough about .American

politics to discern that the Democratic Party was
not nearly
as sympathetic to big business as the
Republican Party. They

were well aware of the fact that Presidents Franklin
Roosevelt
and Harry Truman had had several confrontations with
big

business, and they knew of Kennedy's confrontation vrith
the steel industry.

Peruvian leaders watched intently how

the young American president handled the situation concerning
the unilateral abrogation of certain contracts between the

Argentine government and several American oil companies,
and they concluded that without a doubt, Kennedy would not
stand behind Standard Oil of

Mex^

Jersey in a confrontation

between its subsidiary, I.P.C. and the government of Peru.
3

-^Robert Kennedy,

3

brother of the president, is reported to
have said:
"You Peruvians want to nationalize La Brea y
Parinas.
V/ell, do it.
Nothing is going to happen." For
Peruvian opinions on the Kennedy administration, see:
Augusto Zimmermann Zavala, la Historla Secreta del Petroleo
(Lima:
Editorial Grafica labor, I966), pp. 153-168.
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Fernando Belaunde. a relatively
young Catholic reformer,
probably derived sone comfort
from knowing that his counterpart in Washington was. lilce
himself a young Catholic president.
This feeling was reinforced when
Kennedy ordered
Teodoro Moscoso. the Coordinator
for the Alliance for Progress,
to fly to Lima immediately after
Belaunde >s inauguration with
an offer of substantial American aid.
There are differing
accounts of Hoscoso's aid mission. According
to Richard
Goodwin, announcement of the aid grant was
withheld pending
a compromise between the Peruvian
government and I.P.C.
.

.

so

that Belaunde could then use the announcement
of American

aid to

blijint

Parinas.

any opposition to the compromise over

Brea v

The company's management suspected that iioscoso

was annoyed by Belaunde

's

suggestion that the announcement

of aid be used in such a manner.^

In any case, Belaunde

was assured of American aid regardless of the outcom.e of the

dispute with International Petroleum, provided of course
that no outright confiscation without compensation took place.
In conversations between Moscoso and Belaunde, the American

envoy made it clear that the I962 coup had delayed American
aid,

but now that the country was bad: on a ccnstitutioiial

IT
Richard
(Ilay 17,

Goodwin, "Letter from Peru," The New Yorker
1969), p. 58.

h.

^Interview with Fernando Sspinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida,
May 28, I97I.
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course, more aid would be
forthcoming/

The Alliance for Progress
itself had a very dramatic
effect on both I.P.C. -s
antagonists as well as on its
Peruvian allies.
The development plan set
forth by the Planning
Institute in I962 included a
provision that future foreign
investment in Peru would change
from private corporate
sources to United States government
aid through the Alliance
for Progress.
Hence, there would be no need
to be particularly careful with foreign capital
as such, since the
incoming capital would be public rather
than private.
In reaction to this attitude.
I.P.C.'s Peruvian allies
began to resent very deeply what they saw
as Kennedy's policy
of promoting reform in latin America
through the Alliance
for Progress and at the expense of private
enterprise.
Peru's

oligarchs had long ago recognized the United States
as an

international ally in the defense of property rights.

They

sided vrith I.P.C. on many occasions, probably reasoning
that
if I.P.C. could be deprived of its property, there

v/as

no

guarantee that their property would not be eventually taken
as well.

The Peruvian oligarchy observed an inconsistancy

in the United States position.

Many American citizens

^ "Golbe
del Ano Pasado Retraso A^^uda de E.U
Lo Revela
Teodoro Hoscoso, " La Prensa August 25, I963. p. 1;
"HoscoGo Prometio iias Ayuda. al Peru Hablo 3 horas con
Belaunde," La Prensa August 27, I963, p. 1.
,

—

,

n

'Banco entral de Reserva del Peru, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
Economico 2 Social del Peru, I962 - I971 (Lima:
oanco Central,
1962), p. 37.

:
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Vigorously protested any attempts
to tamper with the property of American companies

abroad, while at the same
time

approving various agrarian reform
schemes which included the
confiscation of Peruvian lands long
held by families of the
oligarchy.

In an article which accused
the Kennedy admin-

istration of promoting two kinds of
property. American and
Peruvian, with the latter wide open
for confiscation. Enrique
Chirinos Soto, an important Aprista
writer for 1b, Prensa
noted
If the Alliance for Progress V7ere an
invitation to confiscations and socialism,
... it could not be at the same time,
a carefully delineated invitation
so as to
exclude American investments from the
confiscatory free-for-all.
The American investors will have to
go also into the pot of confiscations.
.

.

8

This belief that the United States government was
interested

only in protecting American property while sacrificing
Peruvian private property on the altar of reform was rein-

'

forced by the fact that throughout I963. a very limited number
of peasants organized and appropriated private haciendas

located in the La Convencion Valley.

The Peruvian government

did not prove very effective in dealing with this problem,

and the liberal American press reported these invasions
'

"S

Enrique Chirinos Soto, "Kennedy y el Hi jo Prodigo,
Prensa November 10, I963, p. 14.
.

"

la

21^
in a very favorable light.

If Washington was willing
to

promote reform at their expense,
the Peruvian oligarchy
could Play the same game.
Why not reform Peru at the
expense
of Standard Oil of New Jersey?
What the Peruvian oligarchy
could not see was that
Kennedy himself was wavering in the
defense of American
capital in Peru.
They interpreted the Alliance for
Progress as a betrayal, and promptly
withdrew whatever support
they had given previously to I.P.C.
Belaunde decided to
take full advantage of the situation; he
pressed the com-

pany to secure concessions to the very end.

As the deadline

he had set for himself approached with the
company not yielding

substantially. Belaunde prepared a bill to send to
Congress
on the appointed day.

On October 28,

I963,

three months

after his inauguration as president, Belaunde sent a proposal- outlining U^o alternative courses of action.

The

President wanted Congress to authorize him either to impose
his solution on I.P.C. in the form he had made knovm to

the company on October 1?, or else to transfer

la.

Brea y

Farinas to Peru's Empresa Petrolera Fiscal (E.P.F.).
Belaun.de

'

s

solved nothing;
9"

~"

Droposal was awkward ^n

qq>ooc»

^4-

it merely served notice on the company that

^

The I^ Brea ^ Par inks Controversy

,

Vol.

I,

Exhibit

6.
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it would have to accept
the government's terms
or face con-

fiscation.

Belaunde probably introduced
this measure to save
face, for October 28 was
his deadline to solve the
la Brea
Parims
dispute and some dramatic
y
announcement
had to be

made on the appointed day.
It was at that point that
International Petroleum

Company began to fight back
energetically.

Up to then.

I.P.G. kept scrupulous discretion
on the negotiations with
Belaunde.
Even when the Peruvian government
leaked information, thus arousing the curiousity
of the Lima press, the
company limited itself to declaring that
negotiations were

under way but that a solution was yet
to be found.
However,
upon the introduction of the government's
bill
the Peruvian
Senate on October 28. I.P.C. issued a
strongly worded

m

press

release stating that Belaunde's proposal amounted
to "economic

confiscation."

I.P.C.

's

president. M.M. Brisco issued a

simultaneous statement in New York indicating that I.P.C.
had for the first time heard from the Peruvian
government

that the company had a "debt" for back taxes.

He denied the

debt and charged the Peruvian executive with promoting
"economic confiscation" of I.P.C.

's

operations in Peru.

In

what must be considered a significant diplomatic blunder.

Brisco suggested that the Peruvian Congress would not approve

:
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the Belaunde's proposal."'''^

President Belaunde was so angered
by I.P.c.'s press
release and by Brisco's New York
statement

that he "admon-

ished" I.P.c.'s general manager
Loren Smith.
The government
then issued an official communique
saying that Smith had
been officially rebuked for issuing a
press release which
contained "false and tendencious affirmations"
which the
government naturally denied.
The communique also noted
that Smith was reprimanded for trying to
create Impressions
favorable to the company abroad by lying about
the nature
of the Peruvian government's bill.

The management of International Petroleum
Company

remained undaunted by Belaunde's reprimand, and for the

following day the company took a full page ad in nearly

all of Lima's newspapers (with the exception of El Comerclo
to present its point of view.

)

Under a large title reading,

"The Executive's bill implies Confiscation," the company

said in part that
Due to the overwhelming taxes and the
other requirements which the bill establishes, it vjould imply that the Company

"IPC Dice que Proyecto La Erea Serfa Conf Iscaclon Ecnomlca
Dice que nada debe y que nunca de la ha cobrado, " La Prensa
October ;c9, I963, p. 1;
"Peru reivindica Brea y Parinao,
El Comerclo
October 29, I963, p. 1.
'

'

,

—

llamo al Gerente IPC y lo i^monesto Comunicado
"El Goblerno
Oficial," La Prensa, October 29, 1963,^p.l;
amonesta a~Ta IPC por emltir informaclon tendensiosa, " El
Comerclo October 30, I963, p. 1.

-'--^"Gobierno

,
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would have to operate at a losstherefore, the bill proposes
ECONOHIC CONFISCATION.
^2

On October 31. another full
page announcement appeared in
the Lima papers.
In this one. I.P.c. intended
to show with
facts and figures that Belaunde's
proposed solution '^ould
tax more than 100;^ of the company's
profits.
According to
I.P.C, its net income before taxes for
the year I963 would
be 70 million dollars;
from this sum the company subtracted
^7 million dollars in operating and producing costs,
thus
leaving a net income before taxes of
23 million dollars.

From that 23 million. I.P.C. subtracted
7.8 million in proposed debt payments, duties and taxes, thus leaving

a profit

of 15.2 million dollars.

60% of the profit;

-

In theory, the government demanded

however , since the government- did not

allow 10.9 million dollars as legitimate, costs, the total
profit from which the government wanted its

oOfo

was 26.1

million dollars— an amount which would be 15.66 million dollars
or

^^^^-60.000

more than the total profit calculated by I.P.C.

This discrepancy stemmed from the fact that the Peruvian gov-

ernment considered I.P.C.
fund excessive;

's

payment to its employee retirement

it also did not allow the costs of producing

the oil which the company gave the government as a royalty
12

See the advertisement entitled "El Proyecto del Ejecutivo
implica Confiscacion. " La Prensa October 30. 1963, p. 3.
.
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as a tax deductible expense.

Furthermore Peru did not con-

sider the payments on the
alleged

deductible from taxable Income.

50 million dollar debt

What Just a few days be-

fore had been hi.,hly secret
information discussed only
the privacy of the Persldentlal
Palace was now spread over
the pages of the Lima paper.
International Petroleum
Company was determined to take its
case to the public, an
eventuality which President Belailnde
probably did not forsee.
Not only did I.P.C.'s general
manager Loren Smith speak
up on October 29. but on the following
day he made additional
statements.
He reasserted that the government's
bill was
confiscatory, and declared that he had been
"admonished"

m

for expressing an incontrovertible truth.

To underline

the solidarity of the workers with the
management of the
company, I.P.C. personnel
Lima held a large luncheon for

m

Loren or.ith.

There, they made speeches and road a "public"

letter to Belaunde.

In that letter,

the employees and

workers of International Petroleum protested the "admonishnoiit" of the general manager,

and asserted that they would

continue to press their point of view regarding the negative
Jstado absorberia mas del 100 por cionto de la Utllldade
31, 1963, p. 7;
"Dice presidente de
International Petroleum Co. --At cernativa del Gbno. a I.P.C.
es autrcconomica, "
Gomc rclo, October 30, I963, p. 1.
"i:il Proyecto es
Gondiscatorio Heitera el Gerente de la IPC, "
La Prensa, October 31, I963, p. 1.
'la

Fron^, October

.
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aspects Of the executive's bill.
came froa Smith himself.

v,ho

The only oonolllatory note

suggested that negotiations

between the^company and the Peruvian
government be initiated
once more.
Another strong reaction T.hich Belaunde
did not foresee
came from the American embassy,
which actually circulated
a communique to the Lima press
expressing its "disillusionment" With the course of action taken
by the Peruvian executive.
Spokesmen for the American embassy stated
that it hoped
for an agreement between the company and
President Belaunde

prior to the submission of a bill to the Peruvian
Congress.'^
In Washington, a spokesman for the United States
Department

of State described official reaction as one of
"surprise"

and wonderment as to what might have brought about
such a
course of action by the Peruvian president.

The Associated

Press cable to Peru covering the State Department's reaction

noted that just a few months earlier, President Kennedy
sent "v7arm congratulations" to Belaunde upon his election,

and Under Secretary of State Edwin Hartin had recently described the Belaunde government as the most progressive

T5

-^"Gerente de IPG cree Posible
la Frensa
October 31. I963,
Presidente de la Republica, "
"Kmpleados de la IPC
p. 10;
,

Presidente,"
16

1^1

—

Comercio
—
— —

,

se Reinicien ITegociaciones
;

,

"Embajada de E.U. ExDresa Desilucion con el Case IPC,"
October 31, 1963, p. 1.

La Prensa

,

,

"

"Carta Abierta al Senor
Pla Prensa
October 31, I963,
apoyan actitud de desacato a
October 31, I963, p. 1.
^!
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one Peru had ever had.

if nationalization of
I.f.c.

property was carried out without
compensation. American aid
would be suspended, and such a
suspension would have a very
negative effect on Belaunde's
announced plans of economic
and social development.^^ How
much of the report from
Washington was actually planted by the
Department of State
and how much was pure embellishment
by the Associated Press
remains uncertain.
But In any case, the message was
clear;
Washington encouraged Peru to solve the
I.P.c. problem, but
the solution envisaged by the United
States government did
not include any form of unilateral
nationalization.
Belaunde
misunderstood Washington, for he assumed that the
Kennedy
.

administration had given him carte blanche to deal
with the
company In whatever manner he deemed necessary.
He also

overestimated the weight which Kennedy's personal sympathies

would carry within the complex forces which actually shape

American foreign policy.
From London came word that unidentified sources were

questioning the effects of the Belaunde bill on future foreign
investment In Peru.

From Coral Gables, Florida— the corporate

headquarters of Esso Inter-America, came some additional saber

rattling remarks.

Brisco once more repeated his charges for

Repercusion en E.U. e Inglaterra del Proyecto de Brea y
Parinas," La Prensa October 31. I963. p. 4.
.
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the eager Associated Press, and
in effect, he identified
Belaunde's position as one held
by "some Peruvian extremists.
This clamor from abroad and from
I.P.C.'s management
backfired on the company.
While Washington. London and Coral
Gables produced ominous sounding
statements, the Peruvian
congressional factions tried to outm.aneuver
President Belaund
in what became a highly popular
anti-foreign campaign.
In
the Chamber of Deputies, an Aprista
spokesman took the floor
to claim credit for Belaiinde's action.
He said that APRA
had been struggling to recover La -rea
y Parinas since I929.
and he also claimed that Belaunde's proposal
vias patterned

after the earlier Beltran-APRA proposal.

This Aprista deputy

Armando Villanueva. added that his party would
support President Belaunde's stand.

19

However, instead of actually sup-

porting the president's bill.

APilA

and the Union Nacional

Odriista. which had formed a congressional coalition, intro-

duced and passed two bills of their own, and Belaunde signed

them into law on November

6.

I963.

The first. Law Mo. 1^695

revoked the law vjhich in I9I8 had authorized the executive
to settle the La Brea y Pariffas controversy by international

arbitration;
Ibid
19

the second, Law Ho.

1^696. declared the

.

See statements by Armando Villanueva in:
1^ Prensa. October 31. I963. p. 2.

"En las Camaras,
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Arbitration Agraement of 1922
"null i£so jure" for "having
violated the pertinent legal
requirements.
By passing
Its own bills, the opposition
coalition hoped to steal
.

the

thunder from Belaunde. his party
Aoolon Popular, and his
allies, the Christian Democrats.
Both the opposition and
the government coalitions had
their eyes on an impending
election which would determine who
would be the mayor
of

Lima,

During the debate over the bills which
were introduced by
the APRA-U.N.O. coalition, a curious
development occured in
the Chamber of Deputies.
A deputy from Belaunde 's party.

Accion Popular took the floor to claim that
impending vindication of La 3rea y Farinas was "a patriotic act
of the

present government."

Realizing that the Selaundistas

the help of El Comer cio

.

.

with

were not about to let the Apristas

and Odriistas cash in on Belaunde
once more returned to the floor.

'

hard fought battle, AVRA

s

Speaking for that party,

Armando Villanueva remarked that his party had always favored
the vindication of La Brea y Parinas. and accused El Comerclo

of trying to confuse the issue.

He went so far as to say

that when Luis Miro Quesada was secretary of State in 1931,
he failed to do anything about the laudo of 1922.
20

The La Brea

Parinas Controversy

,
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I,

Villanueva
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was answered by Sandro Hariategui

an Acoi6n Popular deputy.

.

Who attacked APRA for claimins
credit.
He declared that APRA
had in fact never been in favor
of vindicating La Brea y Pari nas
Some Communist Party deputies
proposed that the American
ambassador. John Wesley Jones, and
I.P.C.'s general manager.
Loren Smith, be declared unwelcome
persons in Peru, but their
motion was rejected. An Accion Popular
senator. Juan Cravero
characterized the I.P.C. employees who
wrote the public
letter to Belaunde protesting his
policies as "traitors"
and demanded that they be investigated
by the police.
However,

his demands were not seriously considered.

A dissident

U.N.O.

senator who was later dropped from the party
proposed
that the government use military force to
occupy
I.P.C.

installations— to prevent any disruption of the oil supply.
When this rush to capitalize on the popular anti-I.P.C.
sentiment was over, it was Belaunde who came out on top.

For

mayor of Lima, the APRA-U.N.O. coalition nominated General
Odria

wife, Maria Delgado de Odria.

's

Accion Popular

and the Christian Democrats nominated Luis

3edo;>-a

man who had the personal support of Belaunde.

Reyes, a

In December

———
unanimidad aprobaron las dos Camaras la Derogatoria de
ley previa al Laudo, " la Pronsa November 6, I963. p. i^.
"Diputados Rechazan Ilocion Roja contra Embajador de liU e
IPC--Senador AP Censura a empleados de esa Em^resa. " la
Prensa iJovember 5. I963, p.'l.
^^See the statement by U.N.O. senator Fernando Noriega Galmet
in "En las Camaras. La Prensa. October 31. I963. p. 2.
-^'Tor

.

.

1963 Bedoya Reyes became mayor of Lima.

Even thoush Belaunde managed to
raise his already high
level of popularity in Peru by taking
a tough position against
I.P.C. in the La Brea
y Parinas controversy, by early November
it was clear that his position ms
not without serious risks.
On November

7,

the National Federation of Petroleum
Workers

announced that they would proclaim an
indefinite strike if
the government nationalized I.P.C.
Ignoring

this threat.

Belaunde pressed on in Congress, and asked that
his bill of
October 28 be passed quickly.
Despite his efforts,
some

radical senators began to criticize the president
for not
going far enough. 25

Realizing the political dangers of a

petroleum strike, a suspension of American aid. and radical
criticism, Belailnde decided to chart a more conciliatory co^orse
In a November 12 interview with an Associated Press cor-

respondant, the president declared that he was not in favor
of the creation of a state monopoly over the petroleum
industry.

Clearly, since the nationalization alternative

of his own bill would result in a state monopoly. Belaunde

's

statement indicated that he would prefer a settlement whereby

International Petroleum Company would continue to operate La
"Los j-etrolerons Pararan si se Expropia la IPC," I^ Pren^a
8, I963, d. 1.

November
25

-'^"Senadores Griticaron Duramente la Exposicion que Hizo

Pestana,

"

La Pronsa

,

November

8,

1963t p.

5.

,

:
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Brea y Parlnas.^^

Belaunde^s statements „orrled
the „ore
extreme antl-I.P.c. elements In
Peru, for he preferred

I.P.c.

to continue to operate La i3xt.ci
Brea y
Par-in^c.
v Jr^armas.

t
In
the words of

August© Zimmermann
The danger of this alternative
was not
^^""^^
th^^^ appeared
in the mind of the Chief i^xecutive
idea of keepin,- I.P.C, but rather the
that
the articles in the bill were
written in
such a way, that one could perceive
with
clarity an absolute identity of
concepts
between the so-called Beltran bill
and
alternative "a" in the ^roDosal of President Belaunde.

Zimmermann forgot that in his own account
of the events of
i960. Belaunde x^as basically in favor
of the Beltran

solution,

except for the fact that he wanted a shorter
period of time
for the operating contract.
In the same November 12 press interview.

Belaunde also

stated that Peru's relations with the United States
government
"had not suffered alteration.

"

Either the president

x-ianted

to minimize the impact of his decision on his relations

with Washington--intending to calm Peruvian domestic tempers,
or he believed that Washington was merely going through the

motions of protest in order to satisfy the American petroleum
lobby.

Did Belaunde have assurances from Kennedy that the

2^

"Belaunde dice que no Pretende KonoDolio Zstatal del Petroleo
November 13, I963, p. 1."

la Prensa

27

.

Zimmermann,

p.

180.
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United States would merely stage a
standard diplomatic protest while backing Belaunde in
his encounter with I.P.C?
The answer to this question lies
hidden in the files
Of the Department of State-files
which are inaccessible to

scholarly researchers for at least
another decade.
The issue
was certainly confused during the
first half of November
1963. for Belaunde did not expect the American
embassy to
react as it did.
Either the embassy
played its part in a

meaningless staged protest, or Washington was
genuinely
"surprised," and Belaunde's understanding was
nothing more
than a misunderstanding of Washington's
Intention.

President Kennedy was assassinated on November
22,

and Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency of the
United
States.

The fact of Kennedy's assassination in Eallas, a

city which Peruvians perceived as the heartland of Texas,
"the richest oil emporium of the United States," v/as a bad
28
^
omen.
Almost
as if to confirm Peruvian fears, Lyndon

Johnson immediately changed the Department of State's Latin

America head, bringing in fellow Texan Thomas Hann.
had great misgivings about this appointment;

Belaunde

he knew that

Mann had a long association with Texas oil interests, and
ho believed that Hann was an attorney for several American

28
Ibid.

22?

petroleun companies.

He expected a much tougher
fight,

for I.P.C. would surely have the
solid backing of the United
States Department of State.
In Belaunde's

vieT^^.

the balance of power between
his

sovernment and International Petroleum
Company changed in
favor of the company at this point
in time.
With Brisco
in charge of I.P.C. and Thomas Ilann
in charge of U.S. Latin
American policy, Peru would run into
trouble, for the two

men constituted a formidible team bent on
forcing his country to accept I.P.C. 's terms.
Instead of negotiation the
company assumed a position of stubborn insistence
on its
30
terms of settlement.
The Department of State

suspended

all foreign aid to Peru.

Journalist and one time Kennedy

staff member Richard Goodwin quoted a State Department

official as saying:
The idea was to put on a freeze, talk
about red tape and bureaucracy, and
they'd soon get the message.
Unfortunately, thev believed we were as inefficient as we said, and it took about
a year for them to get the message.

Goodwin stated that the Department of State acted on its
own, v7ithout I.P.C. pressure for a suspension of American

29^

interview with former president Fernando Belaunde Terry
at his residence in Chevy Chase, rlaryland. May 21, 1971.
30ibid.
31
Goodwin, p. 60.

s

228

aid;

I.P.c. management claimed
that they put no pressure
on the U.S. government. ^2
However. President Belaunde
saw the situation in quite a
different light. As far as
the Peruvian chief of state
was concerned. Standard Oil
was behaving in its old
traditional way.
Belaunde believed
that through its powerful
lobbies in Washington and New
York. I.P.C. secured a
suspension of American aid.
The
company did bully various credit
institutions into technically

stalling action on several loans for
which Peru had contracted.
Without aid and without credit.
Belaunde saw
his development programs come to a
grinding
halt.

day,

To this

the Peruvian leader places full
responsibility for

the slow development of his country
during the middle i960
on Standard Oil of New Jersey, and claims
that the Peruvian
'

people concur with his opinion.

"^"^

Whether I.P.G. was instrumental

m

bringing the sus-

pension of aid or not, the fact remains that aid was suspended pending a solution of the controversy.

The British

soon joined hands with the American government in exerting

pressure on Belaunde.

On January 3,

196-^,

the British

government sent a diplomatic note to the Belaunde government

advising it that Britain considered the Arbitration Award
32

Ibid.
Interview with Fernando Espinosa, Key Bisca yne,
Florida, May 28, 1971.
;

33

IntervleX'T with Fernando Belaunde Terry, Chevy Chase,
Maryland, Hay 21, I97I.
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Of 1922 completely valid, and
that it did not recognize
Peru's^right to unilaterally disavow
the international agreement.

This note was most likely sent
at the urging of
the U.S. Department of State,
since the British had virtually
no interest in the
Brea y Parinas controversy.^^
In early l^G^-,

Belaunde

'

s

bill was finally shelved,

and in its place the Peruvian Congress
passed I^w No. 14863.
That bill. Signed into law by President
Belaunde on February
12.

1964. authorized the executive to "make suitable
arrange-

ments to resolve the pending matters on 'La Brea
y Parinas.
Congress established no significant guidelines on
the nature
of the future arrangements;

it merely stated that the

petroleum deposits in .question should be exploited in

a

manner "which best benefits the interests of the country."
There was only one important requirement in this otherwise

wide grant of discretionary powers to the Peruvian president.

Whatever solution was arrived at would have to be submitted
36
to n
Congress for ratification.
^

V/as

this new law a Congres-

sional booby trap set for President Belaunde?

By its passage,

the APRA-U.N.O. coalition avoided the issue altogether by

making it Belaunde

's

responsibility to arrive at a solution.

35

minority interests ovm shares of I.P.C, and some
are reportedly British citizens.
:iowever, this is a very
Interviev^r with John Oldfield.
small r>ortion of I.P.C. stock.
Coral Gables, Florida, May 25. 1971.
^^The La Brea ]i Parinas Controversy Vol I, Exhibit 8.
^-'^Certain

,
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However, at the sa.e ti.e.
the, reserved the ri.ht to
crucify
Belaunde politically should the
solution be unacceptable to
them.
Since APR., had managed to
shroud its oun position in
a veil of vasue contradictions,
the party could simply wait
out Belaunde.
If the president arrived at
a compromise with
I.P.C.. APRA could accuse him
of sellins out to American
pressures, if Belaunde took a hard line
towards the company.
APRA could attack him for damaging
Peru's international
standing and foreign credit.
In April 1964. a new round of
negotiations between

International Petroleum Company and the Peruvian
government
was initiated.
In order "to clarify basic concepts and
set
the stage for active negotiations," Brisco.
I.p.C.'s president, and Haider, Standard Oil's president travelled
to

Lima and held conversations with President belaunde

"^"^
.

Since personal relations betvjeen I.P.C.'s general manager
•

in Lima, Loren Smith and President Belaunde had grown con-

siderably worse during the first year of Belaunde
in office, a new general manager

v;as

's

term

appointed.

Fernando i^spinosa, an I.P.C. executive of Cuban origin,
was a man particularly suited for the job.

He was the company'

manager in Colombia just prior to his assignment in Lima, and
^"^Ibid.

,

p.

9.

;
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While in that country, he had
successfully mediated a potentially disastrous crisis for the
company.
^spinosa was
the opposite Of what many Latin
Americans perceive as the
typical North American businessman-cold,

blunt and calculating.

A very urbane and well
educated man.

Fernando Espinosa was

more a diplomat than a business
executive.

His task was to

reach an agreement acceptable to the
Peruvian political
leaders, and naturally to the company.
In the pursuit of
this quest, the new I. P.O. general manager
found himself
acting as an intermediary between Belaunde and
his political
rivals.
Mot since the I930 s was I.P.C. so deeply
involved
'

in the politics of Peru.

From Hay to July 196^. the company negotiated with
the
government.

Fernando Espinosa visited President Belaunde

frequently, and the two men developed a personal friendship

which went beyond strict negotiation."^^

an unofficial agreement was achieved.
cede its property rights over

La.

3y the end of July,
The company would

Brea y Parinas in exchange

for a release from all claims for back taxes,

.^s

payment

for operating the oil fields, the company would receive 20%
of the sales of petroleuju products from La Brea y Parinas

Interview with John Oldfield, Coral Gables. Florida, Hay 23,
Intervieii vrith Fernando Espinosa. Key Bi sea yne, Florida,
Hay 28, 1971.
-'^Intervievr with Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida,
Kay 28, 1971; President Belaunde also indicated a personal
liking for Espinosa in an intervievj. Chevy Chase, Haryland,
Hay 21, I971.
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that fee was to cover
production costs.

Any funds remaining

after the company had been
paid its production fee would
be
split on a fifty-fifty basis
between I.P.C. and the Peruvian
government.
Both the basic and the
contingent fees received
by the company would be subject
to a 50:^ income
tax.

It

was calculated that this
arrangement would result in a 6535fo split of over all profits
in favor of the Peruvian government.
I.P.G. gained a greater measure
of control over
the operation of its refinery, but at
the end of a 25 year
period, ownership of the refinery would
revert back to Peru.
"Suitable provisions" were made so that pricing
of petroleum
products would cease to be a political issue of
major proportions.

Now that a private verbal agreement had been worked
out,
President Belaunde faced the problem of whether or not it

would be acceptable to APRA, La Prensa, and El Gomerci o.
In his conversations with Sspinosa, Belaunde is reported

to have asked repeatedly,

"VJhat

would El Gomercio say?"^"^

Even though President Belaunde placed some fourteen members
of the Niro Quesada family in various government jobs, in-

cluding some top choice diplomatic posts, and even though
Don Luis's nephew Francisco Miro Quesada
The La Brea ^ Parinas Controversy

,

Vol.

\ia.s

I,

Minister of
pp.

10-11.

Interview with Fernando Espinosa, Key Bisca yne, Florida,
Hay 28, I97I.

:

,
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Education-a Cabinet position.
President Belaunde related
that he could not count
on Luis Hiro Quesada to
support
him in anythin,^ short of the
nationalization of I.P.C.''^
There was little that Espinosa
could do in regards to
the position Of El Comercio.
The last effort at personal
persuasion was made by company manager
Jack
>\shworth in

late 1959.

He flew from Lima to New York
on the same plane

as Luis Miro Quesada.

Ashworth attempted to convince Don

Luis of the error of his anti-I.P.G.
position, only to be
rebuffed by the editor of El Comercio who
was quoted as
.

saying
Please do not try to persuade me.
You are the General Manager of IPC
and you do well to defend your Company.
I am the Editor of El Comercio
and I do well to defend my country.
You have to be responsible to your
share-holders.
I have to be responsible
to my readers.
.

Fernando Espinosa, I.P.C.'s general manager during
most of the Belaunde administration, was so angered by the

policies of El Comercio that he called in the company's
legal staff with the intention of instituting a libel suit

against that newspaper.

However.

I.P.C.'s Peruvian lawyers

persuaded him to abandon this idea.
Ibid

^3

.

Zimmermann.

p.

32.

They argued that it

s

23^

would be difficult to Win
against Miro Quesada, and that
even if the company were to
win,

Don Luis could have a sud-

den heart attack or stroke
and die-thus providing the
antiI.P.C. forces with a
formidable martyr/*"^
I.P.C.'s unsuccessful bid for a
change in El Comercio's
policy did not daunt the company
from approaching Belaunde
main political adversary. Vfctor Raul
Ha^-a
•

de la Torre.

Soon after the president expressed
his fears of AFRA to
Espinosa. the latter got in touch
with APRA s high command.
He explained the nature of the
agreement he had reached with
Belaunde and asked whether it would be
acceptable to
'

AFRA.

After a brief consideration of the details
of the proposed
agreement, the Aprista leadership expressed
its willingness
to accept the terms.
Espinosa communicated APRA's assurances
to Belaunde, but the Peruvian executive declared
that he could

not put his trust in such private assurances.

Espinosa

returned to the APRA leadership, and persuaded them to make
a public commitment;

an unidentified Aprista leader

v/as

instructed to endorse a solution to the I.P.C. controversy
in a public address

—a

solution which matched the agreement

already arrived at between the president and the company.
Espinosa pointed out this public commitment to Belaunde, only
to be told once more that APRA was not to be trusted.

^^Interview vrith Fernando Espinosa. Key Bi sea yne, Florida,
Hay 28. 1971.
^^ibid.
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Seeking a way to convince
Belauncle of APRA's honorable
intentions, Esplnosa then Insisted
on talking to Haya de la
Torre personally.
.-El Jefe." as the
Aprista leader is known
to his AmA associates, had
Just returned from his 196^ stay
in Europe, and he agreed to see
Esplnosa.
I.P.c.'s general
manager talked with Haya de la Torre
at several
interviews,

and managed to convince him that
Belaunde required his personal assurance that the agreement was
acceptable, and that
AFRA would not try to capitalize on
it once Belaunde sent
it on to the Peruvian Congress.

Hox^ever,

when Esplnosa met

again with Belaunde and referred to Haya de
la Torre's
personal assurances, Belaunde snapped:
"That

is a banana

peel.'"— a reference to the fact that the president
interpreted the Aprista leader's assurances as part of a
great

political trap.
Since President Belaunde had a Hiro Quesada in the
Cabinet, and a score of family members in other government
jobs,

he should have been able to secure at least silent

acquiesence from

ly,

he wished to pursue.

GomGrcio in regards to whatever policy
Furthermore, since he had the personal

assurances of Haya de la Torre, he should have been able to
proceed with the La Brea y Parinas agreement.

However,

there did not seem to be anything APRA could do to convince
him.
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Was Belaunde really afraid
of political repercussions
from AFRJ. and El Cornercio? While
Fernando Espinosa accepted
the president's explanation for
not sending the agreement
to the Peruvian Congress for
ratification, there is an alternative explanation.
Perhaps Belaunde did not want
to solve
the La Brea y Parinas problem
during I964. After all, although American aid was suspended. Peru
had been told that
there was no suspension-merely a delay
due to red tape in
Washington.
President Belaunde might have been
playing his
own red tape game with the company.
If Thomas ilann had
decided to suspend aid until the I.P.C. issue
was settled
Without ever informing Peru of its policy.
Belaunde might
have been vjaiting for aid to resume before
settling the
I.P.C. issue Without ever informing Washington
of his intentions.'

This conclusion is supported by the impressions
of the

general manager, Fernando Espinosa.

de noted that the

Peruvian chief of state seemed to operate under the assumption
that the government of the United States was very much under

the influence of American business, particularly Standard Oil
of New Jersey.

During the conversations between Belaunde

and Espinosa, Belaunde brought up the question of American
aid several times.

Espinosa got the impression that Belaunde

actually thought that all that was needed for a resumption
of aid

v:as

a telephone call from Standard Oil's president
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to Lyndon Johnson.

However, as Espinosa pointed
out in

an interview Hay 28. I97I. if
Standard Oil of New Jersey
had that kind of influence, it
would certainly have put
it to better use by having the
United States government
drop the pending anti-trust suits
against the

company, or

make slight adjustments in the U.S.
oil imports quota.
Either action would have represented a
greater dollar gain
for the conpamy than the entire Peruvian
operation was
worth.
.

Fernando Espinosa met on some sixty occasions
with
Belaunde. and if he was correct in his
interpretation, then
a conclusion that President Belaunde lacked
perspective

on Standard Oil's ability to influence the i\merican
government, and the importance of I.P.G.'s Peruvian operation
to

that company is quite valid.

I.P.G.'s oil operations in

Peru represented but an infinitesimal portion of Standard
Oil's assets--reported in I968 as nearly I7 billion dollars
"book value.

Standard Oil of

rjew

Jersey,

the world's

largest corporation,

could not be easily swayed by Peru's

pressure on what

at best a remote and almost forgotten

vras

province of its immense financial empire.
liT

Ibid

.

For figures on Standard Oil of New Jersey's assets, see:
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), I969 Annual Report
(New York:

n.p.,

1970).
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Nevertheless. President Belaunde
might have thought
that he was holding an important
hostage within the borders
of Peru, and that if he waited
long enough. Standard Oil
would order Lyndon Johnson to ransom
I.P.C. with a bountiful
aid grant to Peru.
This hypothesis does not deny the
possibility that Belaunde was at the same
time genuinely afraid
of opposition from other Peruvian
political leaders.
After
all. APRA had not inspired much
confidence when
it had be-

come an ally of General Odrfa in I962.

From I952 to I956,

Odrfa persecuted the Apristas and even tried
to do away

with Haya de la Torre.
For such domestic and international reasons, the
Belaunde

administration decided not to settle the I.P.C. controversy,
at least not by the terms vrhich had been worked out
during
the first half of

196^^.

The Peruvian government stalled

for nearly six months while I.P.C.

's

general manager tried

to rally support for the agreement from potential opposi-

tionists.

Ironically, I.P.C. management was as slow to get

the Peruvian point of vievr of la Brea y Parinas as the Peru-

vians vfere said to have been in getting the message behind
the American "red tape" delays on aid.

By the end of

196^1-,

President Belaunde presented a "revised" version of the Ju] y

agreement to the company.
This new proposal of December 30. 196^ substantially

changed the July agreement.

The exchange of property rights
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for an operation contract was
a principle deleted from
the
"revised" proposal, and the
company got no clear release
from claims for back taxes.
More significant perhaps was
the fact that the profit ratio
was changed to 90-10^ in
favor Of the Peruvian government^^
I.P.C. could have negotiated on the basis of the president's
proposal, but instead
the company expressed "surprise and
consternation. "^° and

rejected it.
In a sense,

this rejection sealed the fate of the

company in Peru.

1964 was the year in which Belaunde received

his largest measure of political support.

In January of

that year. West Germany's President Lubke
visited Lima, and
in September, none other than Charles de Gaulle
graced Peru

with his presence.

Belaunde

's

ambitious plans for the de-

velopment of Peru truly captured the imagination of many a

foreign leader, as well as the imagination of most Peruvians.

He had a resevoir of good will /Jhich would have

made a compromise with I.P.C. politically tolerable.
I.P.C. had more reasons than ever to compromise.

The

oligarchy deserted the company due to their disenchantment
v:ith the

Alliance for Progress.

American insi stance on a

more equitable income distribution
The

Brea
/

^^Ibid.

Parinas Controversy

I'or

.

the country, and tax

Vol

I,

pp.

11-13.

,
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and agrarian reforms made
it seem as if the United
States
was sponsoring change at the
expense of Peru-s traditional
establishment.
Whereas they looked upon
Washington in the
past as the protector of property
rights, now the United
States seemed to support only
American-owned property.
The
oligarchy had successfully avoided a
property tax during
Peru's republican history;
yet. under the general cover
of the Alliance for Progress. Washington
pressed for such
a tax using the leverage of the
International Monetary Fund.^^
As the oligarchy perceived the
situation, with allies like
the Americans, they needed no enemies.
The oligarchy grew
at first detached from and eventually
antagonistic
to the

American presence in Peru, and correspondingly, the
country's
public opinion grew ever more aware of I.P.C. as a
source
of nationalistic irritation.

CO

Another reason which should have swayed the company
towards compromise was the fact that Standard Oil's original
51^

American policy makers took on the cause of righting latin
American social injustices.
For instance, they virtually
demanded that industrialists and landowners in' Latin America
be taxed, a proposition which was particularly difficult
to implement in the case of Peru.
See the testimony of
James Fowler. Acting U.S. Coordinator. Alliance for Progress,
Agency for International Development, in
U. S. Congress
House, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on InterAmerican Affairs, Nevr Directions for the I970 s Tovrard a
Stra tegy of Inter - American Development
;^lst Cong.. 1st Sess.
:

.

'

.

1959.

pp.

:

,
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In 1962, Peruvian visitors to Talara often asked to be shovm
the Laudo of 1922 because they had heard so much aboub it.
However, many thought that it vras some kind of landmark.' Private

investment In Peru had been
amortized over the years, a
relatively s^all return should
have been acceptable to
the
company.
Yet. the golden
opportunity slipped through the
flnsers of International
Petroleum Company and President
Belaunde.
Why did both parties to
the controversy

fall to

compromise at a time when It „as
Imerpatlve that they do
to the benefit of both?

so-

The inability to reach a
compromise was due to Peruvian
nationalism, and a corporate
phenomenon very similar to

nationalism-company pride.

The essence of Peru's demands

on the company was not that more
money be given to the
state, or that I.P.C. comply with
existing general legislation;
it was rather that the company
be humiliated.

Peruvian felt wronged and defrauded by
the Laudo of I922.
It was as if With hindsight the
country boy suddenly realized
that he was cheated by the slick city cousin.
Peru's demand

for humiliation took the form of a claim for back
taxes.

While the exact amount varied over the years, the demand
that the company

throughout.

A

pay the alleged taxes remained constant

payment of the taxes would have been a public

acknowledgement that

I.

P.O. was

VNrrong,

and that it owed

surveys by I.P.C. 's public relations office showed that
of the total population was totally i.gnorant about
I.P.C. and La Brea y Parinas.
By I965, that percentage
had dropped to 50;i one half of the population v;as aware
of and usually detested the Laudo, a change in public
sentiments largely attributable to El Conercio
Confidential
Interview with I.P.C. executive, Coral Gables, Florida,
May 27, 1971.
95/0

—

.
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reparations to Peru.

Peruvians also wanted the company
to
give up its claims over the subsoil
of la. Brea
y Parifias.

and in so doing, again admit that
it was wrong to claim
such ownership.

International Petroleum Company consistently
refused
to acknowledge any debt for bad: taxes,
and
furthermore,

the company insisted that it would
give up its rights

over the subsoil of La Brea y PariHas
onl^ in
for a contract to operate the fields.

exchan,.-:e

If the company

successfully exchanged its ownership of the
subsoil for
a contract from the government of Peru,
then the

govern-

ment would implicitly acknowledge the Laudo of
1922 as a

legitimate document setting forth I.P.G.'s property
rights
in Peru.

As a matter of principle, every major political

group declared the Laudo of 1922 to be an anathema to the
nation, and Belaunde

validity
^

— implicitly

vras

not about to recognize its

or not.

conversation between the General Hanager of I.P.C.

and unidentified Odriista (U.N.O.) senator well illustrated
the heart of the problem.

After considerable discussion

over vrhether the company owed Peru back taxes, the senator

agreed vrith Espinosa that the company did not.
the senator asked

txhat

Nevertheless,

the company make a settlement of

50 or 60 million dollars and terminate the controversy.

To this suggestion,

Espinosa replied "but we have proved

2^3

there is no debt." only to
hear the senator
turn declare.
"but the natter of the debt
Is
a national psychosis.'"^'

m

Fernadndo iCspinosa's reasoning
for not capitulating
to Peruvian demands for debt
payment v;as eminently practical.
A private corporation
cannot disburse fifty million
dollars
as therapy for a psychotic
condition.
Hovrever. the

expediency of the senator's suggestion
deserved attention.
The amount of money was not the
issue,
for if I.p.C.

felt

that fifty million dollars was
too high a price to pay. then
it might have been adjusted
downward.
Furthermore, since
the pa.yments on this debt would have
stretched over a period
of years, the Peruvian government would
have acquired a

vested interest in the success of I.P.C.'s
operation so
that the debt payments could be made.
At the

end of the

payment period, the company could have returned
to the fold
of Peru's good corporate citizens— having expiated
its sins.

The company

vras

willing to pay the money, as the frustrated

agreements between I.P.C. and the Beltran Cabinet and the
Belaunde administration proved

— these

agreements provided

for special payments of one sort or another.

V/hat

the

company was unable to do was to acknowledge v:rong doing,
to humiliate itself.
52

Interview vjith Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida.
May 28. 1971.
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This is indeed a
surprising conclusion
given the
senerall, accepted belief
that a corporation
such as
Standard Oil or New .erse,
,s interested In
profits and
nothing else.
If the ultimate
lo^lty of the co.pan,
was to the dollar sign,
how can the company's
behavior
be explained?
I.p.c. ±xi>K^a
risked capital
car^^t^i to save
face to
preserve its corporate
pride.
..l.P.c... or "the
is composed Of a group
of hu.an beings subject
to the full
range of e.otions-f ear
hatred, love, anger,
compassion,
and pride.
They strive to do their
Job. which might be
to protect the profits of
the enterprise, but not
at the
price of their own personal
dignity.
^-

cl„-

.

While exploring the gamet of
options which the
company had during the Selaunde
administration, research
pointed to this conclusion.
John Oldfield, I.P.C.'s top
executive officer in Coral Gables,
headquarters of Esso
Inter-America, adknowledged that
International Petroleu.m

Company would not have considered the
possibility of relinquishing ownership over the subsoil without
an operating
contract, and moreover, the company would
not have publicaJly
apologized to Peru as a tactical move designed
to vent the

company's long accumulated hatred for the company.

For

the group of men who had been responsible for
their company's

policy during the last thirty years, the men who had seen
^^Interview with John Oldfield. Coral Gables, Florida, Hay
28, I971,
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polio, durln, the last
thirty years, the .en
.ho had seen
Talara ,row fro. a
miserable village into a

bustlm, an,

prosperous Industrial city,
it was hard to ad»lt
that they
had been defrauding the
Peruvian nation all along,
especially
since they certainly bore
no more responsibility
for the
developments than .en such as
.ugusto Le^ufa or Luis Sanchez
Cerro, both Peruvian chiefs
of state.
President delaunde held

Fernando Esplnosa

m

his

highest esteem, and the feeling
„as returned by Esplnosa,
yet the two men represented tv,o
Incompatible points of view.
Compromise was Impossible unless
either man was willing to
alter his point of view. Perhaps
each man assumed that the
other would yield eventually.
Unfortunately, they both
embarked on a course which led only
to the mutual failure
Of their causes.
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CHAPTER VII
THE END OF INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM

COMPANY AND DEMOCRATIC REFORM
IN PERU

While the best opportunity
to solve the La Brea
y Parinas
problem was lost in the I964-I965
period, negotiations continued.
Nearly four years of President
Pelaunde's
term re-

mained, and International Petroleum
Company hoped that political
conditions would change enough to
make an acceptable settlement once more likely.
However, the I.P.C. controversy was
a millstone around Eelaunde's
political neck throughout the
remainder of his term and eventually doomed
his effo-tc to
promote developrriont in Peru.
In outline,

the Belaunde administration had several

favorite projects.

The Peruvian president placed considerable

emphasis on agrarian reform, Cooperacion Popular,
and on
various engineering projects, particularly the
construction"
of a highway along the eastern slopes of the Andes--the

marginal highway.

Since Belaunde had to contend with an

opposition legislature dominated by an APRA-U.N.O. coalition,
his programs faced an uphill battle almost from the beginning.

Mindful of the agricultural interests which controlled
the large sugar and cotton plantations, the congressional

majority chipped away at Belaunde'

3

agrarian reform until

the coastal estates were virtually exempt from its effects.

24?

congress also passed a

Mil providing

for i^ediate compensation for Whatever lands
were distributed, thereby
placing
a very high price tag
on the program.
The various construction
projects Which Belaunde
envisioned were, or course,
capital
intensive projects. Only
Cooperacidn Popular, a self-help
program wherein the government
provided the organizational
and technical expertise, as
well as the necessary materials,
and the peasants contributed
the labor to construct schools!
wells, roads and health facilities
was a relatively inexpensive reform program. However,
the Peruvian congress
voted against the necessary funding
for this program when
it was barely begun.

Since Congress refused to increase
taxes to finance
adequately the executive's programs,
aid from abroad, particularly from the United States, became
Eelaunde's only hope
for success.
His reforms were very close to the
prescriptions which the Alliance for Progress had
issued as a cureall for Latin American problems.
Therefore, Belaunde

expected that the United States would contribute
heavily
to financing Peru's development through the
Alianza.

Those expectations were unfulfilled to a large degree
Selden Rodman, "Peruvian Politics Stalls Eclaunde's Reforms."
The ^ororter Vol. 35, ^^o. 1 (July l^i-, 1966), pp. 37-Ato.
'

.

2^8

because the controversy with I.P.c.
remained unresolved
throughout most of the 1960's.
As a result of the lack of American
aid, and the rel--UCtance of the Peruvian Congress to vote
in new taxes, Peru
began to experience serious inflationary
problems in
1965.

The rate of inflation increased during
I966 and 1967,

forcing a

30.^

devaluation of the sol on September

This devaluation

viae

1967.

1,

particularly damaging to President

Belaunde's credibility, for he promised in April
of that
year that he v/ould uphold the then existing rate
of exchange

between the sol and the dollar.

In spite of this dramatic

devaluation, the unofficial rate of exchange continued to

drop until by the Fall of 196S, the sol had depreciated by
about

3

'^1%

in relation to the dollar.'

As the Belaunde administration lost ground,

opposition grew bolder.

its

•

In mid-June 1965, a guerilla

movement developed in the center of the country, in the La

Convencion Valley

— the

area which had witnessed considerable

peasant unrest during the early 1960's.

The guerilla move-

ment soon spread to Southern Peru as well

.

Many of the

guerilla leaders were former Apristas who disapproved of
Haya de ]a Torre's moderate position.
'"Sir PxObert
3

Ibid

Marett, Peru (New York:

In Congress,

the

Praeger, 1969), p. 192.
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APHA-U.N.O. coalition passed
a law establishing the
death
penalty for the guerrillas,
and voted extraordinary
funds
for the Ar.„ed^Forces to
support their effort to
wipe out
the movement.
The first nine months ui
of 196^
lyo^ saw
qqw i^ffi-^.
iittle progress in the
negotiations between I.P.c. and the
Belaunde administration.
Accion Popular and the Christian
Democrats reaffirmed their
commitment to nationalization of
I.P.C. during their
respective party meetings in June.
In his July 28 annual
address to Congress, President Belaikde
made only slight
references to La Erea y Parir^as.
It was not until September
1965 that the controversy once more acquired
momentum.

On Septem.ber 1, 1965, U.S. Under Secretary
of State

Jack Hood Vaughn visited President Eela^de.

The Lima press

reported that Belaunde told Vaughn that petroleum
was too
grave. a problem to leave in the hands of the
oilmen, and that
'

Peru would take the road to expropriation if no
prompt agre^ment with I.P.C. was possible.

5

Since no progress was made

during the month, President Belaunde made good his threat
and sent a "Bill of Expropriation with Ponds" to Congress
on September 30.

Brea y Parinas.

This bill did not mentio-' I.P.C. or La
It merely referred to "expropriations"

5

"Dijo Belaunde al Sub-Secretario de Egtado de E.U.," El
Comercio September 2, 1965, p. 1.
.

for
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purposes of agrarian reforem.
irrigation projects, enlargement Of cities and tovms,
etc.
A.ong the properties listed
for possible long term
expropriation via 18 to 22 year bond,
there was a category entitled
"sources of energy." According to International Petroleum
Company, the purpose of the
bill was to pressure I.P.c. into
reaching a settlement.^
The United States Embassy in Lima
informed the company that
it considered the proposed
methods of compensation unsatisfactory under the Hickenlooper Amendment
to

the U.S. Forei gn

Aid Bill.

If the Peruvian government
expropriated La Erea

y Parinas and then compensated I.P.c. with long term local

currency bonds, aid to Peru would be
discontinued.

Since

the bulk of American aid was already being
withheld, the pos
tion of the U.S. Ambassador John Wesley
Jones must have been

very awkward— he threatened that the United States
would

officially suspend aid that had already been unofficially
suspended.
In December 1965 a new round of negotiations began, and
at the end of the month, I.P.C.

submitted a draft contract

which reflected the areas of agreement up to that point.
z

Z Fariras Controversy Vol. T (February, I969),
The entire text of the bill appears as Exhibit 11
in the same volume.
La

p.

PJ"^?^

.

13.

7

Ibid

.

.

pp.

13-1^.

—

.
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However, by January, the
company encountered what
it interpreted as "clear evidence
of the President's
intention not
to press for a solution.
Henceforth, l.P.c. tried to
isolate the La Erea
y Farinas ownership dispute from
all
other related operating problems.
The purpose
.

.

of this nlew

company policy was to press for
government permission to
proceed with a refinery expansion
at Talara, and with a
corporate realignment whereby l.P.c.
would establish a
subsidiary ovmer of the Talara refinery
and the distributi on
apparatus Egso Peruana.
"

In early 1966, a new Assistant
Secretary of State for

Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Lincoln Gordon,
assumed office.
In an effort to clear up misunderstandings
between Washingto
and Lima, the State Department announced in
February for the
first time to the Peruvian government that
American aid had
been suspended pending a solution to the La Brea
y Parinas

controversy.

In March, U.S. Presidential Assistant Walter

Rostow flew to Lima and during conversations with Belaunde
he assured the Peruvian executive that if Peru did not

expropriate La Brea y Parinas, American aid would be resumed
8~
Ibid., p.l';.
9

"La Decada del 60-Del Colonialismo Liberal a la Revolucion,
O^-^'a (J'-^^nuary, 1970) v. k7:
Richard Goodwin, "Letter from
Peru," The New .Yorker; (May 1?, I969), p. 60
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promptly.

President Belaunde in turn
declared that he had
never intended to confiscate
the company.
American aid began
to flow into Peru soon
after.
'

American aid, however, was destined
to another suspension, but this time it had
nothing to do with I.P.C.
It was the result of a
dispute between Washington and Lima
over the purchase of some jet
planes for the Peruvian Air

Force.

The Peruvian Armed Forces had
proved themselves rather
capable in their dealings with the
giaerriUa movement, for
in less than a year they had
virtually

eliminated the

guerrilla threat.

However, the military had come to look

askance on their role as internal policemen;
they envisioned
themselves as the defenders of Peru in
potential international conflicts. U.S. military aid
policy vis-a-vis
Peru and other Latin American countries
seemed
to be one

of re^inforcing their counter-insurgency
roles.

The matter

came to a head when the Peruvian government
attempted to

purchase some of Northrop Aviation's F-5 fighters, a

relatively inexpensive aircraft with which the Peruvian Air
Force planned to replace their aging F-80's.

Under U.S.

Congressional pressure against aid for military hardware,

Washington delayed authorization for the sale, and the
Goodwin, ibid

.
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Peruvians, in a fit of anger, purchased
some very expensive
and far more sophisticated French
Mirages.
In retaliation
for the purchase, the American government
once more suspended
aid to the Belaunde government.
Thus,
out of his five

years in office. President Belailnde received
full American
aid for about one year.
Between the I.P.C. controversy and
the disagreement over the jet fighters, his
administration

was denied aid for most of its time in office.
On July 28, 1966, President Belaunde once more
addressed
the Peruvian Congress, and he referred to the La Erea
y

Parinas controversy.

Belaunde told the Congress that

considerable progress had made in the negotiations with the
company.

He added that in a projected agreement, twenty of

twenty-one articles had already been accepted by both sides.
Only one article remained to be ironed out, a task which
he expected to complete by early December 1966.

President

Belaunde criticized his political opponents, and without

directly mentioning APRA, he noted that it would not be
sensible for those who had been ready to give La Erea y
12

Parinas away to now demand expropriation.
Lungi Eiaaudi, Pom.vir'.n Military Rel -wA nnr vn th
iinlHid
:at:cs
(Santa Tlonica, Calif.:
The liana Corporation, 1970),
33-36.
^^PP.
For tVie text of President Belaunde 's remarks on the subj;Dct
see
Augusto Zimmermann Zavala, La ili storia Sec rota del
Potroli
roleo (Lima:
Editorial Grafica Labor, 1963), pp. 183-18^1.

:

,

"

'
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Andres Townsend Ezcurra, speaking for
the Apista
delegation in Congress, responded hy
attacking Belaunde
for not pursuing the type of radical
solution which his
own party, Accion Popular, had advocated
while out of
office.

He pointed out Montesinos's Congressional
bill

calling for the expropriation of La Brea
y Parinas, and
remarked that while APRA backed "progressive
nationalization,

Belaunde

's

Accion Popular engaged in demagoguery, calling

for more radical steps.
has changed?

Tovmsend Ezcurra asked:

Has the Company changed?

"What

Has the problem

Changed? ^Or is it the President of the Republic who has

changed?
The intent of the -APRA-U.N.O. coalition was clear-to embarrass President Belaunde by contrasting the tough

position of former prominent Accion Popular members such
as Alfonso Kontesinos with the current conciliatory politics

with which the President hoped to settle the long-standing

problen of I.P.C.

This intention to embarass the President

became even more clear between August and November I966,

when the Pelaunde Administration agreed to let I.P.C.
proceed with an eight million dollar refinery expansion
at

Talara, as well as the creation of a v.'holly-owned

13

Andres Townsend Ezcurra, Re spue 5 ta a im Discurs c
Presidenci.^1 (Lima:
Sdiciones Pueblo, 19^6), p. 8.

1

.
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subsidiary "Esso Peruana"
to act
acL afh^ h.^^ao the
holding company of
the TalarP- refinery.
The Congressional
opposition
criticizea the Peruvian
Executive so severely that
approval
for the expansion and the
creation of a subsidiary was

withdravm
Durlns the same month of
November, negotiations
proceeded, based on zne
^-p
thp "Dr^ar-tDraft of
December I965," and once
more, agreement seemed
within reach when the President
.

suggested a 60-im profits split
with the company's share
subject to a 50% tax.
International Petroleum accepted
the Executive's proposal and
returned it to him with some
minor revisions, without altering
the profit
split or

the tax level.

Once again, there was no action, and
six

months elapsed before negotiations were
re-initiated.^'
By the middle of I967, the Belailnde
administration faced
great economic adversities.
Although the President had
•

promised not to devalue the_sol, he had no choice
but to
do so because of Peru's ram.pant inflation.

Against this

background of economic unrest, Belaunde turned to Congress
TU
La Proa v Parinas Controversy p. 16; U.S., Depar-m.^^t
of State, A-inu3.1 Petroleum H c r. o r t - - 1 Q 6 - F ? r n 'tj.S. D--.-^-V'~
ment of State Document Mo. A- 639 "(Washington:
U.'s! ciJ-'r--ment Printing Office, 1966), p. 6.
'^^'5

,

-^^

'

Th£

]± g£±E I j::^inas Controversy

.

Vol.

I.,

p.

17.
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in an effort to raise
revenues.

However, Haya de la Torre

declared his opposition to new
taxes in February, and APRA
responded to Belaunde's proposal by
unleashing more
criticism. On June 20, the Commission
which the Chamber
of Deputies had established to
deal with the
La Erea y

Parinas controversy declared itself
in permanent session
with the avowed purpose of sifting
through all of the

proposals which had come up over the
years, and to make
a unanimous recommendation of the
best

solution/^

22,

Ey June

the entire Chamber of Deputies was
once more debating

two bills which would have effectuated
expropriation;
one was submitted by the Christian Democrats
and the other

was backed by the APRA-U.N.O. coalition/

Feeling the

pressure, the president's party, Accic^n Popular, joined
in the new wave of pro-expropriation sentim.ent.

On June

23, Accion Popular publically demanded that the State-owned

petroleum enterprise, Empresa Petrolera Fiscal, take over
the La Brea y Parinas fields.

rr
"En sesion perm.anente se declare Comision de la Brea de
la Gamara Paja," El Comercio, June 21, 196? p. 1.
,

—

"Sxpropiar Erea y Parinas se di scute en diputados Hay
dos proyectos en Mesa:
de la Coalicion y de la D. C,"
El Comercio June 2^, I967, p. 1.
.

18

"AP pide que la EPF explote La Brea
y Parinas," El
Comercio June 24, I967, p. 1.
.
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However, the APRA-U.N.O. majority
prevailed with their
version of a solution, and by July 8 the
bill was approved
by the congress and sent on to the
president.
Belaiinde

signed it into law on July 26, 1967.

Law No. 1667^1 reiter-

ated what a previous law (No. 1^696) had
already
established:

the Laudo of 1922 was null and void.

it went on to state that in passing Law No.

But

1^1696,

congress intended to transfer ownership of the La
Brea
y Parinas oilfields to the state.

The new law also

instructed the Peruvian executive to enter the oilfields
in the property regi stories in the name of the state
since

all other inscriptions were null and void, and to establish
an exploitation plan "most consistent with the national

interest."

President Belaunde was also authorized to

expropriate equipment, installations and other assets

which either might be needed to operate the fields or to
cover the debts owed the Peruvian state by the company.
A thirty day period begirjning the day the law was

promulgated

v;as

given as the maximum time the president

would be allowed to effectuate the provisions of the
19

bill.

Once more, the Peruvian State

rights over La Brea y Parinas.

v:as

"vindicating" its

While these same rights

had been "vindicated" several times over the years, the

entire text of Law No. 1667^ appears in The La Brea y
Farinas Controversy Vol. I, Exhibit 13.

"'^The

.
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government of Peru seemed incapable
of actually seizing
the oilfields in spite of its
numerous laws and proclamations
to that effect.
Mirroring past performance, this new
offensive merely signaled the beginning
of another onrush

or papers, resolutions, and administrative
orders— with
little effect on the actual operations of
the International
Petroleum Company.
On July 31, President Eelaunde issued Supreme
Decree
61-F, ordering that the oilfields be registered
in the

name

the state in the Real Registry in Piura; he also

"of

instructed the Energy Bureau of the Ministry of Development
to evaluate the worth of the company's investment and to

authorize T.P.C.'to "temporarily" continue to ©Derate the
20

oilfields.

On August 10 the Petroleum Bureau issued

Directional Resolution Mo. 76; I.P.C. was to continue
21

operating La Brea y Parinas.

For its part, the company

began to flood all available legal and administrative
channels with sundry appeals v;hich argued in general that

Law No. 1667^ was unconstitutional because it deprived
the company of its property without due process.

I.P.C.

also argued that the 1922 Laudo had merely settled the
20

Ibid

.

,

Exhi bit I6.

Ibid

.

.

Exhibit 17-

21
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question of taxation and that the property
rights of
the company/ had nothing to do with tha
Laudo; hence,

the

invalidation of the latter had no bearing on
its property
rights.
There was an electoral campaign under way in the

background of this new paper war.

An Accion Popular

deputy from Lima died, and a special complementary

election was scheduled for November 12 to fill his seat.
The bi-election developed into a key test of Belaunde's

political strength.

Running against the Belaundista

candidate was APRA's Henrique Chirinos Soto, the man who
had so well articulated Peruvian upper class frustrations

with the Alliance for Progress.

Like another prominent

leftist, Eudocio Rabinez, Chirinos Soto had teen co-opted
into the fold of La Prensa by Pedro Beltran.

However,

unlike Rabinez, who had broken completely with his former
allies, the Communists, Chirinos Soto could maintain

both his upper class connections and his APRA membership,
for APRA had become closely identified with the upper class.
22

For example, see "Administrative Appeal filed against
Lav; 1667''- v:ith Ministry of Development and Public Works,
August 1, 1967," ibid Exhibit i;.
.
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On election eve, the
Peruvian government published
what I.P.C. termed "measures
of great demagogic appeal"
in the Official Gazette.
The Tax Court ruled

that I.P.C.

would have to pay the Peruvian
government its profits of
the last fifteen years.

President Eelaunde issued

Supreme Resolution l609-H ordering
the attorney general
to institute^a suit against the
company for "unjust
enrichment."
November 12 brought ominous news to
President Eelaunde. Aprista Enrique
Chirinos Soto
won the election, thus confirming what
had been suspected
for some time— Eelaunde s popular appeal
had declined
•

considerably and his personal endorsement could
no longer
carry an election.
Furthermore, since the Aprista
candidate ran on a platform openly hostile to the

president's policies, the election was atest which did
not go unnoticed.

President Eelaunde, who has always held I.P.C.

largely responsible for his political misfortunes, shifted
from a policy of negotiation to one of open confrontation.
The company was still in the process of preparing one of
Ibid., pp. 27-28; Exhibits 25 and 26.

Interview with Former President Fernando Belaunde Terry,
Chevy Chase, Maryland, May 21, 1971.

its appeals against the
pre-election decrees when on
Novem
ber 17 Belaunde issued an
official

co^ique

declaring
that the National Superintendency
of Taxation had oal-"
oulated the amount owed by
I.P.c. to the government
as U.S
.^I'^'^.OlS.SSa.aS.

The figure was the government's

calculation of I.P.C..3 profits
during the last fift,:een
years.
Eight days later, a new Supreme
Resoluti,.on
(Mo.

1770-H) ordered the company to
pay "complementary
taxes" of 26 million soles within
three days "under

warning of attachment."

'

On November

21;,

International

Petroleum filed an appeal against the
government's last
collection order; this appeal was first
rejected and then
accepted by the Peruvian government, but on
November 29,
I.P.C. learned through the news media that the
company's
26

assets had been frozen.

I.P.C.

immediately paid the

tax bill to free its bank accounts.

This was the first

time that the company was directly affected by the

Peruvian government's drive to vindicate the La Brea
y
Parinas oilfields!
A long string of government decrees rejecting the

company's appeals came in December and January.

On

^5
-^'^

La Prea j Parinas Controversy

26
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December 19 the Attorney General
was authorized to achieve
full "restitution" and to sue
I.P.C. for "unjust enrichment." On January 2?, the
Empresa Petrolera

Fiscal (E.P.F.)

was designated as the representative
of the Peruvian government in all dealings with I.P.C.
Negotiations between the

managements of I.P.C. and E.P.F. began,
and even though the
Peruvian government had expropriated the
oilfields already
in law,

I.P.C.

still negotiated on the position that
it

would cede Peru its rights and title over
La Erea y Parinas
only in consideration for a cancellation of
all debt claims
and for an operating contract whereby the company
could

continue to work the fields.

The Belaunde government was

willing to drop the debt claims in exchange for La Erea

y

Parinas, but it would not give I.P.C. an operating contract.
By mid-February negotiations between I.P.C. and E.P.F.

broke down; neither side was willing to yield on the
27

question of the operating contract.
With his political footing badly shaken, President
Belaunde faced unsurmountable odds.

On the one hand, the

opposition-controlled congress had decreed the expropriation

— it

was his responsibility to carry it out.

How

could Belailme undertake such a battle with the American
27

Ibid ., pp. 32-33.
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giant and its allies at a time
when he was so lacking
in political support? At the
same time, the company
showed an unyielding face to the
Peruvian executive,
making what amo^onted to a cLeinan.:!
for Belaunde's political
head.
There was little question that the
president could
not have risked in 1968 what he did
not want to risk in
196^ when he had far greater political strength.

During the last round of negotiations in
January and
February, President Belaunde appealed to the company
to

yield— to give up

its rights to the oilfields and to the

surface installations.

According to I.P.C., Belaunde

assured the company that by yielding La Brea y Parinas
without an operating contract, it would gain a new
28

"certificate of legitimacy."

Belaunde

's

anxiety

perhaps stemmed from the early 1968 rumor that General Doig,
then Peru's Military Chief of Staff, was preparing a
29

coup d'etat.

But I.P.C.'s General Manager Fernando

Espinosa felt less urgency; he had personal meetings
with Generals Doig and Morales Berraudez, and found
28

The La Erea j Parinas Controversy Vol. II (February I969,
International ?e ci-ol eurn Company
p. 1.
.

)

29
Goodwir.,

p.

72.

,

26k

the. well-disposed towards
the oo„,pany.^° General
Dolg-s
coup never materialized,
and mandatory retirement
soon
removed him from the political
scene.
His replacement
was General Juan Velasco
Alvarado-a man reportedly
antagonistic to International
Petroleum Company for
political and personal reasons. 31
On Farch 28, 1968 El Ccn^orcio
carried a story declaring
that the Empresa Petrolera
Fiscal recommended to President
Eelaunde that it be allowed to take
over the La Brea y
Parinas oilfields. The article noted
that the recommendation was unanimously approved by the
E.P.F. Board of
30

Say'28^'lV7u^

Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida,

31

In 19^11, Peru was at the brink of
war with
There were rumors that the Ecuadorian Air Ecuador.
Force was
about to bomb Peru.
I.P.C.'s personnel knew better,
for in tneir capacity as gasoline suppliers
to the
Ecuadorian air bases, they had noted that
Ecuador's
planes were /^rounded due to poor m^aintenance
At the
heignt of this crisis, a Peruvian army captain
arrived
at lalara, endeavoring to commandeer motor v^v^icl^^o
take his troops to the front.
The I.P.C. manager "Tn^
Talara refused to co-operate with the captain untU he
had a chance to consult the authorities in Lima.
Communications being what they were then, it took some
24 hours to secure an answer from the capital.
After
what must have seemed an interminable wait, the furious
captain received the equipment he needed and proceeded
to the front 2^!- hours behind schedule.
The car)tain
became a General--Juan Velasco A?varado.
Interview
with John Oldfield, Coral Gables, Florida, Way 2^, 1971,
.
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Directors, on which General
Jorge Maldonado represented
the Ar.ed Forces.
The article also revealed
that prior
to the final vote on the
recommendation, General Maldonado
asked for a twenty-four
hour delay so that he could
consult
With the Armed Forces command,
and that the latter was in
favor Of the recommendation.
While the contents of
the E.P.F.-Armed Forces
recommendation was never made
public, the Miro Quesadas must
have interpreted
'

the

document as being quite radical,
for on the following day,
El Com.ercio editorially
applauded a document of which it
had very limited knowledge "^"^
.

While many of the actual details of
these developments
were obscure, there was evidence to the
effect that these
events in late March were very significant.
According
to President Eelaunde, he requested the
E.P.F. Board of

Directors and its President, Carlos Loret de Mola,
to

draw up a recommendation for a final solution to
the La
Erea y Parinas problem.

On March 21, Loret de Mola

forvjarded a proposed decree to President Belaunde.

The

"Reversion al Estado de los yacimientos de Rr'ea y
^Parinas pide E.P.F.," El Cc:'ercio March 28, 1968,
.

33
"El Directoric de E.P.F. ha cumplido con su deber,"
El Conercio, March 28, I968, p. 2.

p.

1.
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proposal was remarkably tame;

it ordered E.P.P.

to take

over the npn-£roduclns areas
of La Brea y Parinas and
develop them, while I.P.c.
would continue to operate
the existing facilities.
The proposed resolution
provided
that all proceeds from the
operation be deposited
bank.

in a
I.P.c. would be compensated
for operating costs, but

the profits would remain in
the bank pending a later agreement with company.
Included with the proposed resolution,
there was a covering letter from
E.P.P. Director Carlos

Loret de Kola;

he assured Eeladnde that
General Maldonado

supported the resolution and that both
E.P.p. and the Armed
Forces were behind it.
It is possible that Smpresa Petrolera
Fiscal took this

position because Carlos Loret de Mola actually
doubted the
ability of the state enterprise to run the
complex operation
at La Erea y Parinas.
It is also possible that the Armed
Forces acquiesed to Loret de Mola in a effort to
trap

President Belaunde.

Since a coup had been in the vjorks for

some time, the military might have wanted to encourao-e

Photostatic copies of both the proposed resolution and
the letter were shovm to this researcher by Former
President Eelaunde, who stated that he had never before
released tnic information.
Interview with Fernando
^^Belaunde Terry, Chevy Chase, Maryland, May 21,1971.
The information on Loret de Mola's doubts comes from a
confidential Interview with an I.P.C. Executive, Coral
Gables, Florida, May 25, 1971.
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Belaunde to reach a compromise,
and then use the compromise itself as an excuse to
take over the reins of
power.
Someone leaked information to El
Gomercio to the
effect that E.P.P. and the Armed
Forces wanted to take
over La Brea y Parinas immediately;
however, the details
were withheld.
If Belaunde had interpreted
the position
of the Armed Forces on the I. P.O.
problem as rather lax
or even favorable to the company, he
might have been
tempted to yield to I.P.C.'s demands for
an operating
contract.

Once the agreement was finalized, the Armed

Forces could have overthrown Belaunde and then
denied ever

agreeing to such a concession, and the story in HI
Gomercio on March 23 would have corroborated their denial.

General Juan Velasco Alvarado

vjas,

in his capacity as

Army chief, involved with the proposed resolution.
Perhaps the "banana peel" which President Belaunde feared
from Haya de la Torre in

196'+

had actually been dropped

in his path by the Armed Forces command in 1968.

President Belaunde decided to i,gnore the solution

proposed by E.P.F. and the Armed Forces.

He kept it

confidential, perhaps hoping that the version of the
story car-'ued by El Gomercio would provide additional

pressure on I.P.G.

Fernando Espinosa indeed took note

of the El Gomercio article, and on April

1

the company

.
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filed a co^unique with
the Minister of
Development
Elvlng its own version of
the negotiations with
E.P F up
to that point.
Acoording to this statement.
Loret de Kola
remained adamant on ^ne
the question
au^qfinn of an
o
operating contract;
however, he had.
.

.

persuade I.P.C.
in «
"^^^-i-S^ ii^
a
definitive manner an it--- ^-^^^ to assirn
located on La™rea1'pa^rnirto""iSf
Itltt'
continue
'in
VolntTAlTtTl
operate the oil field
?,
,,v,i-n
until there might be formalized
the above
°
mentioned operating contract
! ?
with
which could be finalized within
a ^y^^^^or
a year and a
^^;-*.!:^^®^

•

half. 36

In other words, Loret de
Mola wanted I.F.c.

to yield its

claims on the promise that an
operating contract could
be secured later on.
The company refused.
April, May and June went by without
any further

meaningful action on the petroleum front.

The Peruvian

government was preoccuppied with the
economic and
political problems of the day. On J-one
1, Acci6n Popular
selected Edgardo Seoane as its presidential
nominee for
the 1969 elections.

his own candidacy.

On July ?, Haya de la Torre announced

Fernando Belaunde, constitutionally

barred from running, became a "lame duck" executive.

But

IS
The La Proa x Parinas Controversy

.

\/ol

.

II,
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as the candidates lined
up on crucial issues,
the question
became whether President
Eelaunde's government would
endure
to the end of its constitutional
term.

Realizing the extreme vulnerability
of the constitutional
order in Peru, I P.
^decided to yield at last to
C.
the
President's demands.
On July 25, three days
before
Belaunde was to present his annual
address to Congress,
an I.P.C. executive walked into
the office of Belaunde's
Minister of Development and announced
that the company was
now ready to transfer La Brea
y Parinas and the installations thereon to the Peruvian State;
the company also
agreed to renounce its claims over the
subsoil, and would
abandon its insistance on an operating
contract as a
.

condition of the agreement.

In exchange for its con-

cessions, I.P.C. expected the government to drop
all debt

claims against the company, and to agree to have S.?.F.
sell I.P.C. the petroleum from La Brea
y Parinas so that
the company could continue its refining and marketing

operations in Peru.

The government reacted "first with

incredulity, and subsequently with unsurpassed delight."
In his July 28 address to Congress, President

Belaunde dedicated considerable time to the announcement
37
"^^e

La Ere a ^ Parinas Controversy

38

Ibid

.

.

p.

2.

,

Vol.

II.

PP.

1-2.
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or the settlement.

OnX, the details or
the transfer as
-11 as subsequent arrangements
for supping the
I.P.c
-nnery at Talara re.aine. to
be wor.ed out. The
main
I.P.C.

the petroleun, it
extracted from the
nationalized

La Brea
y Parinas.

Ecla^de also announced

to Congress
that he would travel
to Talara to sign
the final agreement with the company ao
J as „uon
coon a.=;
as tho
the remaining details
had been worked out.
•

Arriving at an agreement on
the celling price proved
-re difficult than anticipated. By
Monday, August 5, no
agreement had been reached,
but Belaunde, anxious to
finalize the deal, declared
to the press that he would
travel to Talara during that
week.
Saturday
brought

"

still no agreement, and the
President summcned the

negotiators to the Executive Palace
in an effort to
pressure them into agreement. Joining
I.F.C.'s Lima
management was the President of International
Petroleum
Company, James Dean:
joining E.P.P.'s management
were

several Cabinet members and the President
himself.

Pelaunde reportedly told the negotiators that
he wanted
to keep his promise to travel to Talara.
Mo progress
vjas

made during the long day of negotiation.

I.P.C.

wanted E.P.F. to supply it with at least 80% of the
oil
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produced at La Brea y Parinas-at
the price of $1.80 per
barrel.
The company also wanted
the State enterprise to
retain more La Brea
y Parinas workers than
E.P.F.

was willing to accept.

Finally, speaking for I.P.C,"

James Dean insisted that Peru
should give the company a
concession to exploit certain tracts
in the Selva region.
"^^
This demand was later dropped.
Saturday's negotiations broke down
late that night

when Relaujnde announced that he was
being forced to take
stem measures. There was no movement on
Sunday,

Belaunde's self-imposed deadline for his
trip to Talara
with the agreement. On Monday morning, El
Comercic
came out with a prominently displayed front
page headline

announcing an "impasse" in the negotiations, and also

noting that I.P.C. demanded a concession in the Selva
region of Eastern Peru as well as a contract to purchase
E.P.F. petroleum for $1.80 per barrel.

On Monday 3 August 12, International Petroleum again

attempted to resume negotiations.

position
been

m.ade

vjas

The government's

now that since the company's demands had

public knowledge through an unidentified leak

to El Comercio

.

the government could no longer accept

39

For almost an hour by hour account of the few days
preceding the agreement of August 13 see: Zimmermann.
PP.

11-19.
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these terms.

cession

ir.

I.p.c. dropped its demands
for a con-

the Selva region but car.,
to no agreement on

the priice it would pay for
E.P.F. petroleum.

night,

Ey mid-

the negotiations broke do;vn
once more.

President

Relaunde then ordered that a decree
of expropriation
be drav:n up, and at three
o'clock in the morning of

August 13, 1968, the Cabinet approved
the expropriation.
In a final effort to reach an agreement,
Belailnde's

Prime Minister, Osvaldo Hercelles telephoned
the American
Ambassador, John Wesley Jones to inform him
of the step
the Peruvian government was about to take.
The ambassador

asked for a three or four hour delay, and within
that
time span he persuaded I.P.C. 's general manager, Fernando

Espinosa to return to the Presidential Palace and accept
the governm.ent

'

s

terms.

E.P.F. would take only 167 I.P.C.

workers and the rest would remain with the American company
I.P.C. would pay OI.97 per barrel for E.P.F. petroleum,

and the state enterprise would determine how
it would sell I.P.C.

m.uch

petroleum

The company would supply E.P.F. with

water, and maintenance services from its utility plL.nt3
in Talara at a price to be determined later.

agreement

vras

signed at 5:30 A.M. on August 13, 196R.

pidiendo una concesion en la Selva.
August 12,. 1968, p.' 1.
hi

The final

.

."El Comercio

Ibid.; Goodwin, pp. 80-82.

"Zimmermann, pp. 11-19:

Richard Goodwin, ibid

.

.
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Later the same day, the
President and several Members
of
his Cabinet, the Presidents
of both chambers of
Congress
(both Apristas) and I.P.c.
management flew to Talara and
in a brief ceremony signed
the Acta de

Talara-the official

document by which the^Peruvian
state acquired the La Erea
y Parinas oilfields.
The Act of Talara was indeed
an historic document,
but one which only outlined
formally the details of the
agreement. The actual terms were
delineated in the

contract signed earlier that morning
at the Presidential
Palace.
Unfortunately, E.P.F.'s Loret de Mola
and I.P.C. 'c
Fernando Espinosa signed different contracts.
Since I.P.C.
was to supply La Brea y Parinas with certain
services, and
the price of these services was not immediately
determined,

Loret de Mola insisted that I.P.C. should not be
able to
make deductions for those services so as to bring
the

price of crude oil below a certain minimum level--;|;i
.0835.

Espinosa refused to bind the company to provide the services
on such terms.

Each subscriber to the contract maintained that the
document he signed reflected his position on the
price question.

nir^iT.um

The typed contract contained no provision

^3
For the text of the Act of Talara, see The La Erea
Parina.i Controversy
Bol. II, Exhibit ^i8.
,

^

.

for a minimum priceItP
It Vn^
had „i
eleven paf:es. but the
text
endea at the bottom or
the tenth pa,e.
The H.P.P. Oirector
later claimed that he
wrote:
»In any event, the
price
for crude oil shall
be no less than
$1.0835,» and then
sipjied his name near
thp tr,r>
t^ne
top of page eleven.
Pdchard
Goodwin, Who investigated
the matter in great
detail and
interviewed both Espinosa
and Loret de Hola,
speculated
that While the document
was in transit from one
room to
the other, page eleven
was removed.
Espinosa then signed
at the bottom of page
ten.
The lawyers who handled
the
contract asked Loret de Hola
to sign each page on
the
margin, so that Espinosa
assumed that his E.p.p.
counterpart merely signed the
document in that manner. The
end
result was a ten page contract
signed at the margin of
every page by Loret de Kola and
at the bottom of page ten
by Fernando Espinosa, with
no provision for a minimum
price

On September-

6,

Carlos Loret de Mola and three other

members of the Board of Directors of
Empresa Petroleo
Fiscal resiomed.
In their letter of resignation,
they

alleged

a lack of cooperation from
Minister of Development,

For a more detailed analysis of this
contract mystery
see:
Goodwin, pp, 32-86.
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Pablo Carriquiry.

nore specifically,
Loret de Nola and
his supporters argued
that when they tried
to assume the
administrative duties over
the oilfields. I.P.c.
turned
them away, saying that
the agreement reached
in August
called for the cornpany to
operate the fields until
the
end Of the year 1968.
Furthermore, the for^.er E.P.p.
Director objected to the
Peruvian govern.enfs

permission

for I.P.c.

to expand its Talara
refinery.'''

gi Comercio,

Which had been itching to
openly attack Eelaunde,
seized'
on the resignation of
Loret de Kola and other Board

members

to initiate a campaign
against the Act of Talara.

Through
its front page headlines and
its editorials, don Luis
Kir$..Quesada once more dug into one
of his favorite topics
the I.P.C. controversy.
On the evening of Septenber
10, almost a month after
the actual signing of the contract
between I.P.c. and
E.P.F., Carlos Loret de Mola appeared
on television to
^5
For the complete text of the letter, see:
"'Por ^alta de
Coordmacicn' Renuncio Directorio de EPF " La Fmr-o
^^-n.c

September

8,

1968, p.

8.

'

~

,

Carlos Miro Quesada, Peru's Ambassador to Italy
v/as
forcea to resign his post after he snubbed the"
visiting Aprista President of Peru's Chamber of
De-outies
Por detaixs, see:
"Miro Quesada Ceso er Cargo "
La Prensa September 1, 1Q68, p. 2.
.
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publically denounce the disappearance
of page eleventhat page of the contract on which
he claimed to have
set a minimum price of $1.0835 for
the crude oil I.P.C.

would be purchasing from E.P.F.

The following morning

both major Lima newspapers, which were
by then quite
antagonistic to BelaWe, carried large headlines
suggesting foul play.
On September

from E.P.F.

,

6,

the same day Loret de Mola resigned

a group of political leaders gathered in

a ceremony to mark the introduction of Augusto
Zimmermann's

book, Historia Secreta del Petroleo

.

a frankly ant i -I.P.C.

work by the protege of Don Luis Mirb ^uesada, to whom the
book is dedicated.

The book, which at the time covered

the controversy through the Act of Talara, was critical of

President Eelaunde for not giving credit to the Mirb
Quesadas and' the other anti-I.P.C. leaders during his

Talara speech.

Present at the meeting were some of the

campaigners of the early 1960's, such as Alberto Ruiz

Eldredge and Alfonso Eenavides Correa.
tv^o

More importantly,

major political leaders were also rjresent:

m "Grave

dcnuncia de Loret de Mola--Contracto firmado
el 13 do Agosto fue alterado y le I'alta und pagina," El
Comercio September 11, 1968, p. 1;
"Loret de Mola
Dcnuncio quo no Aparecc una Pagina del Gontracto
con la IPC," La Pronsa September 11, 1968, p. 1.
,

,

277

Hector Cornejo Chavez, the
leader of the Christian
Democrats, and Edgardo Seoane,
Accio^n Popular's Presidential nominee.
The meeting, which introduced
a
book openly hostile to President
Eeladnde, was in itself
a sign of the government's
troubles.
The Christian
'

Democrats ended their coalition with
Accion Popular just
prior to the November 1967 bi-election,
and Acci6n Popular
itself had veered left in support of
its more radical
leader, Edgardo Seoane.

With the administration almost bereft
of political
support, one of Belaurde's top advisor's,
Manuel Ulloa,

apparently attempted to forge an alliance of
loyal

Eelaundistas and Haya de la Torre's Apristas.

While there

was no absolute proof of this alliance, the
evidence

indicated its existance.

For instance, in June 1968, the

APRA majority passed Law No. 1704^ giving the President

extensive powers for a period of sixty days

""to

solve the

structural unbalanced conditions of public finances, to

strengthen the international balance of payments of the

country and to promote the complete development of our

^
"'Historia Secrota del Petroleo" reunion ayer a
Seoane y Cornejo," S]_ Comercio, September 7,1968,

p.

3.
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economy."

The law allowed BelaOi.de
to take extraordinary measures by decree
to deal with the
deteriorating
economic conditions of the
country.
It wa. this law which
allowed Bela^nde to negotiate
the Act of Talara without
Congressional approval,
fact, part of the urgency
to
conclude the agreement with
I.P.c. was due to the fact
that the sixty day period
giving the President extraordinary powers was close to
expiring in early August.
Not only did APRA give Belaimdo
carte blanche to deal
with Peru's problems, but it
defended his use

m

of the

extraordinary powers.

In a television interview,

the

ApriGta President of the Chamber of
Deputies praised
the government for acting sensibly
during the

sixty days.'°

While Eelaunde's former allies, the
Christian Doinocrats
villified hiG emergency measures, APRA defended
them.

On Septem.ber

1,

an Aprista Deputy who accused the govern-

ment of dishonesty

v;as

suspended; while Eelaunde's own

party opposed the suspension, APRA pressed for
it.
^^The La Brca

v

52

Farinas Controvercy, Vol. II, Exhibit 50.

"Tovjnsend Dice Actual Gabinete Actua con Acierto
y
^^csura," La Prensa
August 4, 1968, p. 2.
,

51

"PDC Cri.ica los Impuestos; SI Apr a Defiende al Siecutivo."
La Prensa, August 30, I968, p. 1.
52

"Suspended 2 Dias a Diputado Villaran Por Dccir
•Dishonesto' al Gobierno," La Prensa September
.

p.

1

.

1,
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A Peruvian magazine,

Oi^, had denounced

the covert

Belaunde.APHA alliance for some
ti.e, and by the middle
of 1968 La Prensa joined
in these denunciations,
thus
prompting APRA's Secretary
Armando Villanueva to go on
television to deny the existence
of a. understanding
between his party and President
Eelaunde.^^
El Cor:crciq remained
strangely silent through most
of

this period.

Given the strong antagonism the
MiroQuesadas harbored for APHA, SI
Comercio 's boss could not
have failed to notice the apparent
v/arming relations
betvreen ^elaunde and APRA.

When the Aprista President of

the Chamber of Deputies, Armando
Villanueva visited Rom.e
in August, Carlos Miro-Quesada—

Belaunde

to Italy,

refused to receive him.

•

s

Ambassador

The Peruvian Congress

demanded an apology, and when the Ambassador
refused,
the Eelauiide government apologized on his
behalf.

Carlos

Miro-Quesada imm.edlately resigned, and the fate of
Eelaunde in the pages of El Comercio was sealed.

On

August 15, that newspaper carried both a rather hostile
statement by the former Ambassador, and an editorial in

which El Comercio suspended judgement on the Act of Talara
53

"Alianza con A. P. o el P.S.D. Mego Villanueva por T,V.,"
La Prensa September 2, I968, p. 2.
,
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pending a clarification
of the conditions of
the contract
When Carlos Loret de Mola
resigned and then denounced
the alteration of the
contract. El Comercio La
Prensa
the Christian Democrats,
and even the Odriistas
.

.

(U.N.o.'),

Which had earlier broken its
coalition with APRA, joined'
their voices to attack Belaunde.
The Act of Talara and the
"missing page" became their
battle cry as they rushed to
destroy what had the potential of
being a formidable political alliance between Peru's
t«o ^.ost appealing political
leaders, Fernando Belaunde Terry
and Vfotor Ra^l Haya de
la Torre.
The day after Loret de Kola made
his "page eleven"

denunciation on television, a group of
thirty-cix Army
generals met to study the developments
surrounding the
Acta de Talara- they were led by Juan
Velasco Alvarado.
The Peruvian- Kavy and Air Force were
reported to be studying
the matter separately.
Only the Army generals reached a

conclusion— they disapproved of the measures taken by the
Peruvian governm.ent after the Act of Talara and sent
a communication to Belaunde via the Minister of

VJar,

Kith a re-

quest that it be passed on the Chamber of Deputies.
5!^

Bv

^

"Exposicion del Embajador del Peru en Italia,"
Comercio,
August 15, 1963, p. 1;
"La Becuperacion de La Erea y i'ariFa^^*
El Comercio August I5, I968, p. 2.
.

^^"El Ejercito emite opinion sobre La Brea y Parinas," El
Comercio September 13, I968, p, 1.
.

"
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September 15, neither the Navy
nor the Air Force had joined
the Ar.y in disapproving
of BelaOlnde's petroleum
policies,
but General Velasco Alvarado
publically affirmed that the
Joint Command (Army, Mavy and
Air Force chiefs) would issue
a communique on the I.P.C.
controversy

.

-^^

With the Armed Forces on a collision
course with the
Belaunde administration, the political
parties hurried to
realign their positions. In an effort
to pacify the Army,
APRA demanded that I.P.C. pay for the
privilege of exploiting
La Brea y Parinas until the end of the year.
.Aprista
Congressional leaders also joined in the criticism
of
Cabinet members most identified with the Act

of Talara.

The Christian Democrats intensified their
attacks on the
Act, and even the Catholic Church,

in an obvious effort

not to be left out of what promised to be the political
cause
of the century, demanded through Cardinal Juan Landazuri

that the contract be clarified. 57
To complicate the president's already desperate situation,

Accion Popular'

s

presidential candidate Edgardo Seoane

m.ade

a stinging attack on the Cabinet and deraanvied that the agree-

ment on La Brea y Parina? be annulled.
^

The follovjing day,

"Solo el iljercito ha opinado hasta ahora sobre La Brea,"
La Pronsa September I6, I96S, p. 1.
.

Comercio and La Prensa, September 17-19, I968;
The La Brea '£ L-arinas Controversy Vol. II, pp. 13-I6.
52"Dura critica de Seoane a T^inistros Populistas," La
Prensa, September 21, I968, p. 1.
^"^See Ll_

«
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September 21, Eelaunde ousted
Seoane fro. the party and
ordered a "reorganization"
of Accidn Popular.
This action
split the party into two
groups siding with Seoane and

Bela^de respectively

.

^9

At one point, Seoanistas
and

Belaundistas battled for the Acci6n
Popular headquarters,
with the latter gaining control
of the offices with support
from the police. ^0 Through
this inter-party fighting, APRA's
leadership remained loyal to Eelaunde,
and attacked the
Seoanistas as people "acting without
"^^
moral courage.

With every major political group
except APTA attacking
the Act of Talara, and even the
Cardinal of Lima dem.anding
an explanation. President Eelaunde
's Minister of :.'ar, General
Jose Gagliardi moved to cool the ram.pant
rumors
of a coup.

On September 2D, General Gagliardi
declared that the Armed
Forces would not assume "an attitude of force,
at the margin
of the Constitution," and neither v/ould they
take a position

on the controversy.

Velasco declared:
has no validity.

However, the following day. General
"The announcement by Minister Gagliardi

Neither the Armed Forces nor the Joint

Command depends on one minister."

The writing was on

the—

Eelaunde destituyo a Seoane," La Prcnsa, September 21, 196S
^'^"Seoaniotas Sitiaron Local AP;
^olicia Golpeo a Diputadc,"
La Prensa, September 25, I968, p. 1.
^^"lo Votardn Moci6n de Censura;
Incidente Frustro la Sesion,
La Prensa September 27, I968, p. 1.
^2«La FA no Tomara actitude de Fuerza declare ayer el Ministro
Gagliardi," La Prensa September 21, I968, p. 1; "General
Velasco dijo que la PA depende de un Ministro, Desautorizo
a Gaglio'.rdi " La Prensa September 22, I968, p. 1.
.

,

,

.
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the military was ready
to seize the opportvu^lty
to take
over the Peruvian government.
In a token effort to
prevent the inevitable coup.
APRA-s

secretary General, Armando
Villanueva declared that Apristas
would not tolerate such an
act.
He warned the military
to
pay no heed to the extremists
of right and left «ho
promoted
a coup,

and he encouraged the
Apristas to take arms against
any such attempt. - Despite
Deputy Villanueva- s statements,
the end of the Belafede
administration was just a matter
of time.
On October 2, Belaunde appointed
a

hope of stemming the coup;

nevi

Cabinet in the

but in the early hours of the

follox^ng day, the old routine arou^id the
Presidential
Palace was staged once more. President
Belaunde v/as rudely
awakened .by the Peruvian Rangers. The morning
issue of

La Prensa carried a front page picture
of a lieutenant and
a captain pushing President BelaCinde out
of the
Palace.

On October 4, the junta guided by General Juan Velasco

Alvarado issued a decree declaring the
and the Act of Talara null and void.

I

.

?. C. -E. P.P.

On October 9, another

decree expropriated the Talara refinery as
y Parinas;

contract

v;ell as

La Erea

this action was justified by the new government

^3
"Villanueva autorizo Ayer a los Apristas a ccnbatir si hay
im Golpe de Estado," La Prensa, September 22, I968, p. 1.
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as an effort to collect
the "debt" „hich I.P.c.
owed the
Peruvian nation. Unlike
previous ^overn.ent decrees
on
the problem, this one
was backed by action.
Forty officers
and one thousand troops
moved in to take the oil
fields,
and a Rear Admiral of the
Peruvian Navy was assigned to'
take Talara.

After the seizure, International
Petroleum Company was
left with its 50;r ownership
of the Lima Concessions
(jointly
ovmed with Companra Petrolera
Lobitos) as well as its network of gas stations, storage
facilities and offices.
But
on January 28, I969 everything,
including
the compc^ny's Lim.a

offices, was expropriated.

The Peruvian government took

the position that I.P.C. would be
compensated for the expro-

priated property as soon as the company
paid the alleged
debt of U.S. $690,524,283. This sum
represented the government's calculation of the value of all products
extracted
from La Brea y Farinas from March
1, 1924 to October
9,

1963/^

After fifty years of involvement in Peru, Standard Oil
of New Jersey, one of the world's largest corporations
with

enormous yearly profits and assets, was humiliated by the

Peruvian government, as it had once humiliated Peru by
I2. ^^"^a

^^Ibid., p.

y Parinas Controversy

30.

.

Vol.

II,

pp.

17-18.
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threatening to shut off its
fuel supplies.
Troops took
over I.P.c. property, and
the eovemment issued
warrants
for the arrest of its
management

personnel.
It took Peru
half a century to grow
fro™ a primitive society
which could
be easily manipulated by
foreigners with superior technology
and power, into a self-assertive
nation ready not only to
correct the injustices, but to
administer what it considered
just retribution to the foreign
company which overstayed
its weloorae by several decades.

.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
In taking over the assets
of International Petrol,.eum
Company in Peru the military
Junta headed by General Juan
Velasco Alvarado argued that I.P.C.'s
was a "unique- casethe company existed under historical
circumstances unlike

those facing any other company in Peru.^

However, this

argument did not originate with the junta.

It was part

of El Comer cio.'s policy for years to
report favorably on
the activities of other American companies,
including oil
companies, while attacking I.P.G.
This vehement antiI.P.C. policy was echoed in official circles
and eventually

suceeded in isolating I.P.G. from other American
enterprises
in Peru, who came to view the company as a potential
spoiler

of their good standing in the host country.^
But the anti-I.P.G. argument had more than tactical

value as a means of dividing potential opponents.

logical validity.

Asked

It had

disliked I.p.C, an uniden-

vrhy he

tified Peruvian general with the present government responded:
"They bribed ministers, corrupted governments, and promoted
1

Peru, Petroleos del Peru, Departmento de Relaciones Publicas,
El Petr6le o en el_ Peru
distoria de un Case Sin.^ular mra
que el Hundo lo J"uzgue
Lima
Petroleos del reru, 1965
;

.

2

(

:

}

Both President delaunde and General Manager Fernando Espinosa
agreed on this assessment.
Interview v:ith Fernando Belaunde
Terry, Chevy Chase, Maryland, Hay 21, 1971;
Interview with
Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida, May 28, 1971.

^
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revolutions."^

The evidence pointed to the
truth of this

Charge, at least during the
period covered in the available
Department of State diplomatic
correspondence between the
United States government and the
American iilmbassy in Lima.
However, as Richard Goodwin noted,
"it takes two to make
a bribe, and you cannot corrupt
the

incorruptible."^

Nevertheless, the generals who carried out
the coup and
subsequent seizure of La Brea y Parinas in
I968 i.ere aware
of I.P.C.'s historic role in Peruvian
politics— as the

rescuer of doomed incompetent Cabinet officials,
as
the undervTTiter of any government which
promised

to leave

the company alone, and as the promoter of
international

intrigues designed to bend the will of Peru's public
officials.
Luigl Einaudi suggested that during the 1960's Peruvian

military intelligence began electronic surveilance of I.P.C.'s
telephone communications, and they disliked their discovery
of the company's financial largess towards nearly every

major political party.
Simple nationalistic pride, vrounded by an awareness of
the historic political role of I.P.C., did not entirely

explain the decision by the military to expropriate I.P.C.'s
-^Richard Goodwin.

1969).

"Letter from Peru," The Hew Yorlrer

(liay 17,

T).

'Ibid.

^Conversation with Luigi Einaudi at the 67th Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Chicago. Illinois,
September 7, 1971-
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assets.

For years Peru's military
trained itself through
the Center for Higher Military
Studies (G.i..E.H.) to formulate and carry out developmental
plans for Peru.
In I962.
they made a brief attempt at social
planning but then decided
to slve civilian leadership a
final chance.
When President
Belaunde's program did not progress
as quickly as they had
envisioned, the generals once more became
restless to carry
out reforms.
Many developments in I968 prompted
the military
to take over the government.
The "page eleven" scandal

weakened the already feeble Belaunde government.

The pos-

sibility of a Civilista-type coalition including
APHA and
the Belaundistas would have provided a formidable
counter-

balance to the military's influence in Peruvian
political
life, a state of affairs not seen since the 19th
century.

The possibility of such a block, or "frente unico" as La
^^g-^s^ called it,

moment if the

had to be aborted at the earliest possible

C.A.£.l-l.

plans were ever to become operable.

V/hatever the motive for the coup itself,

the reason

for the seizure was clearly one of immediate political ex-

pediency.

For years the Peruvian leftists such as the Social

Progressists and the

m.em-bers

of the Front for the Defense

of Petroleum, and some conservatives, notably the aire

Quesada family and some Odriistas, had sold the Peruvian
people on the importance of nationalizing I.P.C.'s La 3rea

"
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y Parinas.

For almost ten years the
Peruvian radical left
and El Comercio built up a
political savings account payable
only to the person, group, or
political party which nationalized 1^ Brea y PariHas.
That gigantic pay check of
national
political goodwill awaited the
"vindicator- of the property.
Naturally. I.P.c..s staunch enemies
hoped to be a party to
that final payment.
But International Petroleum
Company,
knowing that someone would benefit
tremendously by the

nationalization of

Brea y Parinas. decided that so
long

as the benefit would be at the company's
expense, I.P.c.
should have the power to determine the
beneficiary.
That
was why I.P.C. yielded to Belaunde on July
25.

1968,

for

the company knew that by then the question
was not whether

the property would be nationalized, but rather,
by whom.
In an effort to save what was in fact its least
antagonistic

political opponents, I.P.C. attempted to make President
Belaunde and

APilA the

political beneficiaries of the long

awaited "vindication.
It was precisely because I.P.C.

jum.ped the gun on its

would-be executors that SI Comercio and the radical left
reacted with anger and frustration

vrhen the

achievement of

their goal was finally announced by President Belaunde on

July 28, 1968.

Had they not been clamoring for the

vindication of La Brea y Parinas?

The ansx-:er of course was
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yes.

but by then. Fernando Belaunde
and the APR^ leadership
in Congress who gave him
the authority to reach the
agreement, would have become the
recipients of a huge payoff of
political goodwill.
It was after all Fernando
Belaunde and
the Aprista leaders of the
Senate and the Chamber of
Deputies
Who travelled to Talara to
officiate in the actual ceremony
of Vindication.
How .could the arch enemies
of AFRA sit by
and see that party share in the
glory of the Acta de Talara
at the expense of the radical
anti-I.P.G. leaders who had
fought the company for a seemingly
interminable ten years?
What a relief to the radical left
and to Zl Gomercio
when the scandal over "page eleven"
developed.'

Assuming

that the page did exist and that Carlos
Loret de Mola did
write in a minimum price for the oil I.P.C.
would purchase

from S.P.F.. the provision was relatively
insi^gnif icant

compared to the magnitude of the agreement reached.

In fact,

the minimum price provision might have been
irrelevant,

since I.P.C.

's

utility service charges might not have reduced

its oil payments below that minimum price.

there was a clause in the contract

Fiscal could stop sales in
agreeable.
ri.P.F.

tv7o

X'Jhereby

In any case,

Empresa Petrolera

years if the price was not

Furthermore, the price of I.P.C.

's

services to

had to be negotiated in the future, and I.P.C. certainly

would not have been free to manipulate the price of petroleum
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in such a way as to cause
E.P.p. to lost money
La Brea
Parlnas.
But these considerations
y
were ignored.
To

m

Peruvians, what mattered was that
I.P.c. allegedly conspired
to defraud their country, an
accusation which found a
sympathetic hearing from people long
conditioned to viewing
I.P.C. in the worst possible
light.
During the month of
September, the campaign of innuendos
tagged responsibility
for the scandal on the Cabinet.
.Although President Belaunde
tried to rid himself of the suspected
Cabinet, his own political head came tumbling down.

International Petroleum's last gamble,
foiled by the
military coup, would have been a masterful
move had it
taken place before-even as late as I967.
but preferably in
196^^-1965.

The company could have given President
Belaunde

a substantial boost

x^Jhich

in turn might have generated

American aid funds and success in many of his programs.

But

International Petroleum Company did not, perhaps could not.

bring itself to yield earlier than July I968.
it was already too late;

By that time,

not even the devolution of La Brea

y Parinas could stop the impending coup.

In fact,

the com-

pany's acquiesence precipitated the coup by providing a
"now or never" situation which the generals could not overlook

They had to sieze power before Belaunde rallied political
support for the agreement.

"
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In spite Of the fact that
President Belaunde reaped

the consequences of the
forceful overthrow of the Peruvian
government, and to this da, appears
to be the only significant

Peruvian political figure living
in exile by order of the
junta, the military coup had a
greater effect on APRi^ than
on the Belaundistas.
For instance, the
.

junta has given-

top priority to the agrarian reform
program for the large
sugar plantations of Trujillo and
Chiclayo, traditional
strongholds of Aprista unionism.
Its purpose is said to
be "that of weakening the agricultural
union of the northern

seaboard.

.

.

Since a coup designed to keep

AmA

out of power could

hardly be justified, the seizure of I.P.G.'s La Brea
y
PariTlas, the Talara complex, and later on
the company's

remaining assets, became the legitimizing element.

The

junta was forced to go beyond a mere seizure of La Brea

-r

Parinas because, after all. Belaunde had already arranged
for its transfer to the state,

rlssisted by the same radicals

who had led the anti-I.P.G. campaign in the early 1960's.
the military junta charged the company vrith a tax claim
so large

(over 69O million dollars) that I.P.G.'s assets

in Peru could never match the aller.ad debt.

By sparing

most other -American investments, and compensating the few

which were also nationalized, such as International
^Marcel Niedergang. "Revolutionary liationalism in Peru.
Foreign /affairs 49. ilo. 3 (April, 1971), pp. ^59-^60.
,

.
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Telephone and Telegraph, the junta
insured the further
isolation Of I.P.G. from the native
Peruvian and American
business communities.
By following a limited confiscation,
the junta managed
to reap bountiful support from the
left, while maintaining
the neutrality of and even securing
support
from the right.

Alberto Ruiz Eldredge. one of the radical
champions in the
anti-I.F.C. offensive and leader of the
Social

Progressists,

actively participated in the shaping of the
junta's postcoup petroleum policy.
He later irrote a pamphlet

lavishing

praise on General Velasco Alvarado and designated
October
as "The Day of National Dignity.

9

""^

The Soviet weekly Hew

Times began to carry highly favorable articles witten
by

Peruvians— hailing the new Peruvian anti-imperialist policy.^
Evidence of the junta's support from

the,

right of the

Peruvian political spectrum was more difficult to find,
but according to Richard Goodwin,

Velasco has found support among the
conservative banking and commercial
families, who see his accession as
a way to increase their x\realth and
have encouraged him to place nevr restrictions on their foreign banking
com "Dct iters
'^Alberto nuiz iildredge.
El Pi a de la D ignidad -"a clonal
(Lima:
Ministerio de Transportes y Comimlcaciones 1971).
,

Gustavo Valcarcel. "Peruvian Paradoxes," New Times (Moscow),
2 (January 13. I969). PP. 20-22.
^Goodwin, p. 100.
No.

2Qk

Support from traditional conservatives
in Peru Is difficult
to gase. Since the newspapers
which in the past articulated
these interests, particularly
Prensa. have operated under
less than complete freedom since
the coup.

Perhaps the most frustrated of all
Peruvian groups
involved in the I.P.C. controversy was
the Hiro Quesada
family.
The junta forced El Comercio to
accept and deal
With a union, which has the statuatory
right

to space in

the editorial page of the paper to answer
or refute editorials
With which it disagrees. The proud Don Luis
Iliro Quesada
has been forced to print material which is
uncomplimentary
to his

oT-m

family.

The threat of union-sponsored editorials

and the possibility of a government shut down of El
Comercio
and all other newspapers has deprived the Hiro Quesadas
of

their power to make and un-make Peruvian governments.'
Clearly. Don Luis Miro Quesada did not foresee that

his anti-I.P.G. campaign would have the effects it had.

He

hoped that with the creation of a powerful state petroleum

monopoly the power of the government would increase, and
since El Comercio

'

s

power is but a function of its ability

to influence, veto or prom.ote governm.ent "oolicy, he believed

that his paper's power would grow accordingly.

Peruvian

chief of state Juan Velasco Alvarado appears to be unvjilling

.
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to allow the Hiro Quesadas or
Pedro Beltran to hold the

enormous power they held during the
Prado and Belaunde
administrations.
Not satisfied with being the managers
who act out
the directives of a board composed
of prominent Peruvians
issuing their memoranda in the form of
editorials and paid
announcements in the Lima dailies, the generals
have become
the actual policy makers of Peru.
Unlike the junta of I9631963. which set out to repress communists because la Prensa

said the country

vias

in danger from them, the I968 junta

has repressed the news media.

The generals define Peru's

enemies

International Petroleum Company's former general

manager Fernando Espinosa suggested that the La Brea
y
Parinas controversy was encouraged by and kept alive with
the blessings of the Peruvian oligarchy

—a

group which cal-

culated that as long as a highly visible foreign company
could be made the object of popular hatred, Peru's pressing

socio-economic problems would remain out of the political
10

vortex.

If his assessment is correct, that strategy

indeed worked for some time.
''"^Intervie-.r x>Jith

Hay 28, 1971.

However, the I.P.C. controvers

Fernando Espinosa, Key Biscayne, Florida.
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eventually developed into a catalyst
for reform.
billed themselves as radical reformers
on the

Having

I.P.c.

issue,

the generals had to keep the momentum
by enacting programs
which are dramatically accelerating the
erosion of the

oligarchy's power.
Beyond the immediate causes and effects
of the I968
coup and seizure of I.P.C. 's property lies
the far more
important lesson of that company's impact on Peru
during
its half century tenure.

It was easy for Peruvians to be-

come enraged over the foreign exploitation of their
oilfields

as of 1966 it was estimated that the country's known
petro-

leum reserves would last only fourteen more years.

"''^

To

them, standard Oil of New Jersey and its subsidiary Inter-

national Petroleum Company were nothing more than the thieves
of their natural resources.

While a great deal of petroleu" extracted from La
Brea y Parinas was exported, even larger amounts were used
for domestic consumption at the lowest prices in the world.
I.P.C. provided Peru with an efficient and virtually self-

contained petroleum industry which encompassed every phase
of the business, from extraction of the crude oil to the

final sale at the gas station pump.

In 1963, Peru was able

Department of Commerce, Bureau of International
Commerce, Overseas Business Reports Basic Data on the
Economy of Peru prepared by oruce B. Sever (Washington:
U.S. uovernmont Printing Office, I969).

'""^U.G.,

:

,
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to seize the entire industry,
knowing that it would not
have to depend on a refinery
or an oilfield located
outside
the country.

I.P.C. provided training and
technical education for
the thousands of Peruvians who
worked in the various phases
of their operation.
When the sovernment expropriated
I.P.c.
it also took over its Peruvian
work force, an asset of

greater value than the wells, tubes and
buildings which would
have been useless without it.
I.P.c. probably gave more

technical and managerial training to
Peruvians than the
Peace Corps could ever hope to give.
By raising the living
standards of its work force in Talara. the
company showed
both the Peruvian elite and the Peruvian working
class that

poor housing, inadequate health services and
lack of educa-

tional opportunities

worker's lot.

viere

not necessary conditions of a

How great an impact this example had on the

expectation level of Peruvian workers has not been measured,
but given the great amount of publicity which I.P.C. handed
out about its

x^rork

force,

chances are that the impact xms

very significant.
International Petroleum Company's influence was not
limited to employers and employees;

it extended into nearly

every intellectual endeavor of the Peruvian nation.

In its

quest for legitimization, I.P.C. supported and encouraged
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nationalistic art and literature.

The company provided a

vehicle. FAUAL for Peruvians' best
literary efforts.
Through
open essay competitions. I.P.c.
encouraged an interest in
Peruvian history and national heroes.
Yet. not even these
contributions to Peruvian arts and letters
could undo the
accumulated hatred and suspicion with
which two generations
of Peruvians had come to view I.P.G.
If anything, the company's efforts as
a benefactor of

Peruvian intellectual and cultural pursuits
reinforced the
conviction among Peru's leaders that I.P.G. had
something
to hide, some burden of guilt which drove
it to give part

of its ill-acquired profits to the victim
of its "fradulanf^

dealings.

While most of Peru's leaders were not well
in-

formed of the facts of I.P.C.'s history in Peru, they
auto-

matically chose to believe the worst.

Ironically, most of

the actual rumors circulated among Peruvians concerning
I.P.C. were not factual.

For example, the company was

charged with using double-bottomed ships to carry twice
as much oil as it declared;

with "inventing" the Laudo of

1922 and the Sv;iss judge who presided over its formulation.
In all such cases, the charges against I.P.C. were false.

The company's actual machinations

by its detractors.

ixi

Peru went unnoticed

During the last days of Jose Pardo's
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Civilista government. I.P.c. withdrew
ships to force the
Peruvian congress to yield to the
company demands;
yet,
Peruvians remain unaware of this
interference.
The fact
that the company helped finance
the administration of Luis
Sanchez Cerro during the early
1930's was also ignored.
Ironically. I.P.c. has been convicted
in the minds of most
Peruvians of crimes the company never
committed, while its
actual transgressions remain unpublicized.
Small countries such as Peru have great
difficulty
trusting a multinational corporation dedicated

to its own

enrichment.

Even when International Petroleum Company was

Willing to negotiate factually with the government, the
Peruvian officials distrusted I.P.C. 's management on any
point.

The dispute over the I968 contract and the Act of

Talara was a result of the fact that the president of
Smpresa Petrolera Fiscal, Carlos Loret de Mola, wanted to
cover every possible contingency.

He assumed that I.P.C.

would maneuver with whatever loopholes existed to deprive
S.P.F. of its just share of the proceeds from the nation-

alized La

i3rea

y Parinas.

In a sense, what S.P.F. manage-

ment feared was the superior expertise of International

Petroleum Company's personnel
knowledge that

I-l.P.F.

—a

f-ar not reduced by the

had the whole vreight of the Peruvian

government behind it in the negotiations.
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Fernando Espinosa. I.P.c.'s
General I-Ianager during the
1960's. recalled that whenever
he attempted to have Peruvian
political leaders examine contract
proposals or any other
documents connected with the
controversy, they declined such
an examination and requested an
oral explanation,
since the

details would be far too bothersome

.

The fact was that

the Peruvian sovernment did not have
the expertise necessary
to deal With an organization as
sophisticated as International

Petroleum Company.

Whatever Peruvian talent existed was

probably under hire to I.P.C. and other
foreign companies.'
Deprived of expert advice, the government was
unable to

accurately gage the reasonableness of I.P.C.
own proposals.

Belaunde

's

or even its

When agreement seemed near in 196^, President

backed away because he sincerely believed that he

would be granting too much to the company.

In his view,

I.P.C. was attempting to operate under a promotional
petro-leura law- -one

highly favorable to oil companies which were

initiating their business operations. 13^
determined his action on the basis of a

However, Belaunde
''gut

the deal was too favorable to the company.

feeling" that
He did not

really Imow and could not know if such was really the case
because

his;

only source of informacion was I.P.C, an obviously

Interview with Fernando Espinosa, Key Bisca yne, Florida,
May 28, 1971.
13

^Interview vrith Fernando Belaunde Terry, Chevy Chase,
Maryland, ilay 21, I971.
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interested party.

His uninformed advisors lacked
the

technical knowledge to determine with
accuracy how much
the Peruvian government was yielding.
In the end.

the very

fact that the company favored the
agreement seemed to suggest that there was something rotten
lurking in the intricate
fine print of the incomprehensible
proposal.
This is not
to say that the Peruvian political
leadership was incompetant
On the contrary. Peru had many highly
educated and intelligent leaders, with Fernando Belaunde Terry
at the forefront.
Peru also had an abundance of legal scholars.
What Peru

lacked was technical expertise of the business
and industrial variety, the kind of Imowledge necessary
to determine

whether or not, for instance, the price of a barrel
of oil
was fair— taking into consideration the costs
of

production,

transportation, storage, processing,

etc-.

Peruvians knew that the large multinational oil concerns
set up machinery to fix prices in the international market,

and that the big oil corporations got together in 1928 and
signed the ashnacarry Convention by which they all agreed to
set a world price of oil based on the Texas Gulf Coast rate.

But Asiinacarry and oil's "seven sisters'' uere

Peru's j'Jiii3diction.

i-iell

out of

The effects of such complex agreements^

on the daily life of a small country like Peru remained an

"
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enigma to its leaders.

'''^

The United States Government has
the power and resources necessary to expose the full
consequences of whatever the "seven sisters" agree to.
While consumer advocates
have argued that the U.S. Government
does not exercise this
power enough, one has only to look through
Congressional

records to find that under supoena. the American
oil companies have been forced to reveal some of their
secrets.

But the government of Peru has no such powers.

In the last

analysis, Peru seized I.P.C. records in the Lima offices,
but the company records in Coral Gables and elsewhere
would

never fall into the hands of a Peruvian official.
The ability to operate across international borders

and outside the complete jurisdiction of any one government
except their "home" country allows the multinational 'cor-

poration to function as a state within other states.

Govern-

ments are supposed to command the supreme allegiance of their
citizens, yet Peru's largest tax payer. International Petroleiun Company,

owed its allegiance to a foreign corporation.

General Marco Fernandez Baca, current chief of E.P.F.,
grasped this problem when he declared:
For a Peruvian viexf of the "sevtn sisters" and their agreement
see Cesar Levano, "Por la nacionalizacion del Petroleo,
Tareas del Pensamiento Poruano I, rlo. 3 (liay-June, i960),
pp. 55-83.
,
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respect for its sovereignty.
when
insolent arro^-ance of
lu^^''^^^^
another state within its o.^rn
frontiers.
.

.

One need not accept the value
judgement contained in the
statement to see that I.P.C. was
indeed responsible not
to Peru, but to its parent company
and its stockholders.

Because the operation of I.P.c. was
primarily the
extraction and export of oil. during
its early years the

company was safe in the assurance that
without its ships
and its marketing facilities throughout
the world, Peru
could not export its oil.
However, as the company became
primarily a supplier of domestic needs, its strategic
position weakened.

^

I962 marked the year when Peru ceased to

be a net exporter and became a net importer
of oil.

From

that point on, International Petrole^jm Company's
position

was extremely precarious.

It was to the credit of its very

capable management that the company survived as long as
it
did.

International Petroleum Company contributed to the

development and national consciousness of Peru.
a common enemy against which Peruvians

v:ho

It provided

might otherwise

have had nothing in common, united to fight on behalf of

their nation.

Unwittingly, I.P.C. bestowed on Peru a modern

-^General Marco Fernandez Baca, as quoted by Goodwin,

p.

48.

petroleum industry, a competent work
force, and a national
unity Which has brought together the
most unlikely alliance
of intellectuals, technicians,

soldiers and middle class

elements ever to grace that country.

—

-
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